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FOREWORD 
This document is submitted by the Space and Information Systems 
Division of North American Aviation, Inc., to the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration Manned Spacecraft Center in parital fulfillment of the 
final reporting requirements of Contract NAS 9-6445, "Study of a Renovated 
Command Module Laboratory and Renovated Command Module ." 
The final reporthas been prepared in 2 series of five volumes as 
listed below. 
Volume I 
Volume 11 
Volume 111 
Volume IV 
Volume V 
Summary SID 66-1853-1 
Mission System Performance and 
Configuration Analy si s 
SID 66 -1 853 -2 
Subs y stems Analysis SID 66-1853-3 
Resources Requiraments Analysis SID 66-1 853-4 
Cost Analysis (Limited Access) SID 66-1853-5 
S&ID acknowledges the voluntary technical contributions made to this 
study by a number of companies. The Avco Corporation contributed ablator 
data which were used a s  a basis for determining the feasibility of heat shield 
renovation. 
appendix to Volume III. 
-4 report covering the data provided by Avco is included as  an 
A. C. Electronics Division of General Motors Corporation supplied 
data on technical problems associated with renovating the Apollo G&N system 
and estimated costs. 
The Defense Programs Division of General Electric Company provided 
characteristic data on G. E. 's active space pointing systems. 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation provided data on rendezvous radar 
and transponder characteristics. 
The Aeronautical Division of Honeywell, Inc. , provided renovation data 
on the Apollo Block I1 stabilization and control system and associated costs. 
SID 66-1853-3 
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The Autonetics Division of North American Aviation, Inc., provided 
data on an alternative guidance and navigation system and estimated costs, 
Cost information and general renovation requirements on individual 
components were also provided by numerous other suppliers. 
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I. INTKODUCTION, 4PPROACH, AND SUMMARY 
In addition to the obvious economic benefits of renovating recovered 
space program hardware for reuse, this class of hardware may offer a 
significant schedule advantage by merit of its availability. In some cases,  
this availability permits performance of missions that would not otherwise 
be possible. This document covers the results of the subsystem analysis 
cbducted primarily to ascertain the technical feasibility of the renovated 
command module concept. 
T'.w feasibility of renovating a recovered Apollo command module for 
reuse':is technically dependent on the postrecovery condition or  status of the 
CiL, subsystems, materials, and structure. 
renovation required to return the recovered equipment to condition acceptable 
for reuse in the specific missions considered. 
the primary study areas  in the subsystem analysis. 
A l s o  of significance is that 
These two aspects formed 
Two general renovated command module (RCM) applications considered 
in the study an (1) RCM Spacecraft (using only Block 11 subsystems) for use in 
an AAP operational CM in a fourteen-day, low-altitude, low-inclination earth 
orbit, and (2)  RCM Laboratories (using Block I and 11 subsystems) based on 
the four reference missionsidescribed in Volume II. 
iunctional capability was specified. Instead, a spectrum of system functions 
(from complete dependence on the supporting Apollo command-service 
module (CSM) to complete laboratory independence) was used to provide 
cri teria for the dexelopment of subsystem building blocks "shopping list. I t  
The purpose of the "shopping list" is to provide a source of space-rated, 
available subsystems and components from which the subsystems complement 
of the RCM Laboratory could be generated when specific mission requirements 
were defined, 
No RCM Laboratory 
The approach taken in the subsystem analysis is shown in the logic 
diagram of Figure 1. 
Gemini V, VIA, and VII I  preflight and postflight subsystem data, the anti- 
cipated Apollo CM subsystem operational degradation was developed, 
this process, the operational environment profile and postrecovery operations 
were reviewed and the resulting physical effects on the subsystems and their 
components were ascertained. 
performance degradation. Nominal mission conditions were considered and 
a degree of technical judgment was applied in the performance of this status 
analysis. 
Beginning with Apollo Spacecraft O G 9  and 011 and 
In 
These, in turn, were related to functional 
- 1 -  
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On the basis of the required RCM subsystem performance and environ- 
mental requirements, the necessary renovation of the Apollo CM subsystems 
was detailed. 
reuse, If  "refurbish, ' I  or  
original cost was estimated for the required refurbishment. 
The subsystem components were categorized as to "test and 
renovation actions; a percentage of 
RCM Laboratory subsystem building blocks were identifiecl from those 
space-qualified items which might be incorporated with minimum testing, 
development, etc. Those requirements and constraints on the post- 
recovery operations which assis t  o r  make possible the subE quent renovations 
were also determined. 
Apollo Spacecraft 01 1 data constituted the basepoint of tile status 
analysis activity. 
transpor' 
shield 
slight charring, with the exception of the RCS roll thrustor areas,  in which 
serious charring w a s  caused by the dump-burn of the RCS propellant prior 
to splashdown. 
sections. 
Figures 2 and 3 show Spacecraft 011 after recovery and 
Dn to Downey. A s  can be seen, the c r e w  compartment heat 
-rered only minor degradation in the form of discoloration and 
This subject is fuither discussed in  the following detailed 
Figure 2 shows damage to the drogue chute cases incurred during 
r i s e r  deployment. 
type of damage, permitting reuse of the cases. 
Relocation of the r i s e r s  on Block I1 will eliminate this 
The status aralysis revealed that sea-water corrosion w a s  a major 
potential cause of degradation. 
structural cr material fatigue failure, safety-factor reduction, o r  
temperature degradation. Landing impact causes fluid system seal 
degradation, producing internal and external leakage. 
also affects the mechanical adjustment of devices such as calibrated 
regulators, meters,  tuned cavities, etc. The degradation of the c r e w  
compartment head shield is minor with the exception of a few small areas.  
The aft  heat shield may suffer various degrees of degradation, dependent 
upon the mission and reentry conditions. 
It also revealed that there w a s  no danger of 
The impact load 
On the basis of the number ~f subsystem components involved, and the 
assemblies where large numbers of small and low-cost items are  integrated 
into a subsystem part  (such a s  control and instrument panels), it w a s  
determined that renovation for the RCM spacecraft requires approximately 
25 percent of the spacecraft components to be replaced and 4 i  percent 
refurbished, while 28 percent can be tested and reused. , 
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IL STATUS ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
As stated in Section I, the major item in determining the technical 
feasibility of Apollo CM renovation is the status o r  condition of the CM 
subsystenis upon recovery after an operational mission. 
matter was given primary attention in the subsystem analysis and was 
identified as the status analysis. 
the CM environrtiental prafile data and the ApolloI Gemini postrecovery data 
which constituted the basis €or the detailed status analysis conducted in each 
subsystem area, The results of these analyses are covered in the following 
sections of this volume. 
used in each subsystem, the physical effects of the operational environment 
resulting from a nominal mission were determined. 
lated into component and subsystem performance capability changes, and in 
combined consideration with the effects of the postrecovery operations, the 
anticipated CM subsystem status was derived, In the majority of cases, no 
rigorous path leading to these desired conclusions was available, The con- 
servative and considered application of technical judgment was required, and 
used, in the conduct of the status analysis as well a s  a subsequent phase of the 
subsystem analysis: CM subsystem renovation requirements determination. 
Accordingly, this 
Latter portions of this section describe 
Considering the potentially susceptible materials 
These were then trans- 
: Results of the status a3dlySiE indicate that salt water corrosion pre- 
sents the most serious degradation factor, 
when nominally the sea water penetrates the interspace between the  heat 
shields and the pressure vessel, and enters the toroidal equipment bay. 
design provisions have been taken to seal against this invasion, and as a 
resul t  sea water also penetrates the core field of the stainless steel 
honeycomb substrata of the heat sh,alds. 
the honeycomb materials (PH 14-8 MOand 17-4 PH) a re  highly susceptible to 
corrosion. Laboratory tests  conducted during the studv revealed that flush- 
ing and neutralizing of this structure prior to 24 hours after splashdown was 
required i f  the structure was to be considered far reuse. Beyond this timespan, 
the corrosive action progresses to the point where pitting has occurred thruugh 
the coating of brazing material to the care material, Under these conditions, 
Efushing and neutralization is considered ineffective, since the galvanic action 
of this couple of dissimilar metals continues and eventually causes failure 
of the structure. 
recommended purging procedure discussed in detail in Section ID. 
Exposure occurs at splashdown, 
No 
As can be seen From Table 1 
These laboratory testsand purging t e s t s ,  resulted in a 
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. 
Mate rial CM Application 
Table 1. Corrosicin Due to Sea Water Contact 
Titanium 6AL-4V 
Inconel 718 
Steel 304L 
RCS tanks 
Oxygen tanks 
Tubing 
Aluminum 6061 
Aluminum 5052 
Steel PH 14-8 MO 
Steel 17-4 P H  
Aluminum 2014 T6 
EC S tanks, tubing 
HCB core 
Brazed HCB:: 
Edge members:: 
Bonded HCBA 
APressure vessel 
*Heat shield 
A simplified cumulative fatigue analysis was performed using con- 
servative assumptions to justify the simplifications made. 
structural damping was assumed. 
times at  maximum level to simulate this mildly Gamped structure. 
most fatigue-sensitive material used was considered throughout the analysis 
(epoxy-phenolic adhesive), and all loads were applied at  the maximum design 
level. 
reduction will occur, even after the performance of the subsequent RCM 
mission. 
F xtremely low 
Each of the loads was applied twenty 
The 
The result demonstrated that no fatigue damage or  safety-factor 
Table 2 shows the> design temperatures for the various CM materials. 
Also shown is the threshold temperature for the materials beyond which 
changes to the material physical properties occur. 
that all Spacecraft ( S / C )  011 temperatures were below the design levels, it 
can be seen that a nominal mission would result in no temperature degrada- 
tion to the CM materials. 
Coupled with the fact 
Fluid system seals may be degraded by the landing impact, thus 
resulting in internal and external leakage. 
elastomers employed in a manner where their elastic properties constitute 
It was concluded, however, that 
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Design 
L'emperature 
(OF) 
an essential characteristic of their function will be replaced during subsystem 
renovaticn. Therefore, this degradation in itself is  academic. The obvious 
secondary effects of external leakage (corrosion and coatamination) can be 
offset easily during postr ecovery operations. 
Ter,;perature 
Threshold for 
M ec hanical 
Property Changes 
( O F )  
Table 2. Temperature Effects on CM Material 
Mat e r ial 
Steel: PH 14-8 MO 
17-4PH 
304L 
CM Application 
Brazed HCB 
Edge member 
Tubing 
Aluminum: 2014T6 
5052H33 
6061T6 
Titanium 
6Al-4V 
Bonded HCB 
HCB core 
ECS tanks, tubing 
RCS tanks 125 
LWO 
600 
60cr 
609 
950 
1200 
__- --- 
1000 
1100 
1200 
Degradation to the heat shield is  dependent on the reentry conditions. 
It was determined that the virgin ablative material remaining after a nominal 
earth orbital mission is adequate for a subsequent RCM spacecraft mission; 
however, the material remaining after a nominal lunar mission is  not suf- 
ficient for reuse. Superimposed upon these consideraticns a r e  those that 
involve questions of the thermostructu.ra1 and aerothermodynamic qualities 
of the ablative material after mission and reentry environment exposure. 
Conservative conclusions indicate that the aft heat shii.ld can bc. rcnovittrd 
by the complete replacement of the used ablative material with new material. 
- 9 -  
SID 66-1853-3 
NORTH A M E R I C A N  AVIATION,  INC. SPACE and INIWRMATION S Y S T E M S  DlVIAlON 
This approach has been already demonstrated (Class 3 Apollo heat shiel ' 
repair) as feasible and, although cost sbvings a r e  not as great as  woul be 
achieved in some approach involving less renovations a significant cost 
saving results in the reuse of the stainless steel honeycomb substrate. More 
important, the renovation lead time i s  less than six months, whereas 
approximately two years lead time is required for a new heat shield. 
The status analysis also revealed that no significant degradation to the 
CM subsystems is anticipated due to exposure to the radiation, vacuum, v r  
me teC2 roid environment. 
APOLLO AiSD GEMINI POSTRECOVERY DATA 
Pctentially applicable Apollo and Gemini documentation was compiled 
and reviewed to determine the possibility of ascertaining the postrecovery 
status of the C L  mmand module subsystems by comparing the applicable pre- 
flight test results data with the postrecovery tesdinspection results data, 
and determine the effects of postrecovery operations on the CM subsystems 
and components. 
Current postrecovery test and inspection procedures were found to be 
inadequate to support the f i rs t  objective. This inadequacy did not, however, 
impose any serious obstacle to the RCM program since other practical limi- 
tations were found to make either evaluation and/or renovation of any 
assembled subsystem neither technically nor economically feasible. 
end, these evaluations and/or renovation must be  performed at  the major 
component level. 
In the 
The postrecovery operations effects were found to be degradation and 
damage caused primarily by corrosion, contamination, and handling. 
ing recovery procedures have been designed for safe, efficient recovery of 
the spacecraft, but these procedures contain no general provisions to mini- 
mize these degradation effects since renovation was not considered in their 
formulation. Early in the RCM study, it was deemed necessary to develop 
. - Zliminary recommendations for possible procedural changes to reduce 
these degrading effects. 
sequence as  presented herein was subsequently reviewed by the respective 
subsystem analysts and the various support activities. 
recommended recovery operations procedure is presented in Volume I V  
of this report. 
Exisi- 
The resulting recommended recovery events 
The resulting 
The follawing documents were compiled and reviewed to support the 
subsystem status analysis. 
1. MSC-G-R-65-4. "Gemini Program Mission Report - Gemini V" 
(October 1965) 
- 10 - 
SID 66-1853-3 
/ 
N O R T H  A M E R I C A N  AVIATION.  INC. , , SPACE rnd I NI.WRM.9TION S3YSTC:SlS DIVISION 
2. MSC-G-R-66-2. "Gemini Program Mission Report - Gemini VIA" 
(January 1 966) 
3. MSC-G-R-66-4. "Gemini Program Mission Report - Gemini VIII" 
(April 1966) 
4. MAC Report PS-186. "Corrosion Control Procedures for 
Recovered Spacecraft" (Revised 11 October 1965) 
5. Project Apollo Flight-Test Report - Spacecraft 009, NAA 
S&ID SID 66-150 (August 1966) 
6. Post-Flight Evaluation, Environmental Control System - 
Apollo S/C 009, AiResearch Report, SS-1917-R (13 3uly 1966) 
7. Apollo Recovery Operations Handbook, S /C  011. NAA S&ID - 
SID 66-326 (15 June 1966). 
8. ATR 521060. "Block I, Post Recovery Test, Baseline, a t  Downey, 
Command Module, S/C 01 1 and 012" (August 1966) 
These documents were considered to be representative of the types of appli- 
cable data currently being generaked during the Gemini and Apollo Programs. 
The listed documents consist of program reports o r  procedures relating to 
Gemini Missions V, VIA, and VIII and Saturn-Apollo Mission SA 201 (S/C 009) 
and published by NASA/MSC, McDonnell, NAA/S&ID and AiResearch. These 
reviews and related subsystem status analyses were further augmented by 
additional unpublished reports and letters, such as the certification test data 
for  the S/C 009 and 011 flight readiness r e v i e w s  (FRH's), S/C 009 post- 
recovery testing ATR's and TPS's, and several NASA/MSC and McDonnell 
documents relating to either corrosion control o r  to Gemini and/or Apollo 
equipment reuse or  refurbishment. 
Postrecovery Inspection/Test Results Data 
Review of the support documentation showed that the current Gemini 
and/or Apollo postrecovery inspections/test results data were inadequate 
for ccmparison with applicable preflight test results data to determine 
subsystem status. 
designed to (1) evaluate anomalies o r  failures discovered in flight, (2) deter- 
mine the occurrence of visually-detectable physical damage, and ( 3 )  uncovcr 
additional failures or  anomalies not previously detected. The resulting typcs 
of postrecovery test  data, therefore, provided limited useful support in 
determining subsystem status, particularly with respect to marginal o r  
partial performance degradations within specific equipments. 
The present postrecovery test procedures a re  primarily 
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It is possible to establish postrecovery test procedures that provide 
for measurement of all critical performance parameters. These measure- 
ments can then be compared with the like preflight acceptance data to detect 
most significant performance degradations at  the component level. It is 
doubtful, however, that detection of marginal degradations would enable 
judgements to be made of the future performance (and reliability) of these 
components. 
subject to wearout. 
Such capability is particularly lacking on components that a r e  
The current cumponent and/or subsystem tests for the Apollo hardware 
were devised to demonstrate only the specified operational duration of the 
applicable hardware. 
tion of the wearout failure distributions for the equipment. This data can 
only be acquired by testing several of each of these equipments to failure. 
Such a test program is prohibitively expensive, and i t  is doubtful if the 
possible cost savings that may result could offset increased cost. The 
potential for additonal life testing is further complicated by the questionable 
capability of duplicating the combilizd effects of environments and operations 
for the projected two-mission utilization. 
This testing does not provide data required for defini- 
A possible alternative to the additional testing discussed is analytical 
determination or  postulation of the characteristic wearout of the applicable 
equipment which would require an extensive study effort by the contractor 
and the respective subcontractors and supplier. 
empirical data on similar components and/or materials that may have been 
exposed to either like or relatable operating conditions. Such an analytical 
activity would, however,. most certainly be pushing the state of the a r t  in 
many or all of the areas  concerned. The results would, therefore, prove 
the acceptability for reuse of only those items that might contain unexpected 
and unduly conservative derating factors and design margins. It should be 
noted that this approach has been recommended herein for "requalification 
by similarity" for limited, specific items that were not considered to contain 
sigiificant or critical wearout failure modes. 
This study could utilize 
The preceding discussion coverzd the problems inherent in evaluating 
The desired possibility of postrecovery test procedures to 
simple components (i. e. , valves, pumps, relays, etc. ) for reuse, ostensibly, 
without rework. 
determine the status and reuse capabilities of entire subsystems is more 
difficult. The Apollo command module subsystems are  characteristically 
complex, using and producing multiple and varied inputs and outputs. 
also utilize numerous redundant and alternate modes to perform their 
functions. 
automatic checkout equipment (ACE) currently being used would be required 
to measure every input and output parameter. 
determine the existence of certain failures such as  an individual check 
They 
Equipment of either equal or greater complexity than the Apollo 
Even the ACE cannot 
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valve failure in a parallel, redundant application. 
number of interactions that e.:ist within each of these subsystems further 
complicates this evaluation procedure. Finally, for this test procedure to 
be of practical value, it  would be necessary to subsequently retain and main- 
tain an entire subsystem intact and assembled within the command module 
for the entire renovation period. 
and reworked in a clean, environmentally controlled area in order to 
minimize potential system degradations. 
‘The nearly infinite 
This would require that the CM be stored 
In view oi the problems and costs associated with implementation of 
It was, 
either of the two alternative postrecovery test procedures previously 
discussed, neither method was deemed to be practically feasible. 
therefore, concluded that a more practical approach would have to be used. 
This approach consisted of revising the postrecovery procedures to reduce 
potential corrosion, contamination, damage., and subsequent removal of the 
equipment to permit, a s  applicable (1) testing and reuse, (2) refurbishment, 
or  (3) replacement. Decisions concerning specific equipment a re  discussed 
and presented in later sections of this report. 
Gemini and Apollo Flight Anomalies 
A compilation was made of the inflight and postflight anomalies 
reported in the mission reports for the Gemini V, VIA, and VIII, and thc 
Apollo S/C 009 and 01 1 flights. The results of this compilation were summa- 
rized and a re  presented in Table 3. 
to determine any significant trends in these anomalies that might be of 
potential use during RCM study. 
corroded coaxial switches and connectors, open fusistor/fuses in the pyro- 
technic circuits, and residue coating on windows, the reported anomalies 
appear to be either random occurrences or  the result of design deficiencies. 
Several anomalies were reported on tape records the Gemini flights; however 
a different type recorder is used on Apollo. Only one anomaly was reported 
Lvhich could have potentially affected crew safety. The electrical malfunction 
which resulted in a flight control anomaly on Gemini VIII caused a mission 
abort. 
been useful in establishing the refurbishment requirements. 
The purpose of this activity was to attempt 
With exception of repeated instances of 
In general, no significant anomaly trends were found that might have 
A further attempt was made to determine i f  any relationship existed 
between the total mission hours, number of inflight anomalies, and number 
of postflight anomalies. The resulting values were: 
1. Gemini V: 191 hours - 12 hours inflight, 9 hours postflight, 
2. Gemini VIA: 25. 9 hours - 4 hours inflight, 9 hours postflight 
3.  Gemini VIII: 10. 7 hours (aborted) -4 hours inflight - 15 hours 
postflight. 
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These data fail to indicate any significant trends that might be potentially 
use id  to the RCM study. They appear to indicate, however, a lack of 
complete kyiowledge of the inflight anomalies to support the postflight eval- 
uation (note Gemini V results) and/or a lack of consistent reporting and 
inspection procedures. 
Gemini VIII  postflight evaluation might also be indicative of either greater 
damage due to loads imposed during the mission (the vehicle achieved a roll 
rate of approximately 300 degrees per second) or a more thorough postflight 
examination. 
The larger number of items reported on in the 
Postrecovery Operations Effects 
Review of the postrecovery procedures and results data previously 
discussed leads to the following conclusion and recommendation. 
Apollo postflight recovery and test procedures should be revised to: 
Existing 
1. 
2. 
3.  
4. 
Minimize potential damage, contamination and corrosion to 
potentially reusable hardware keeping in mind that the primary 
purpose of the current procedures is to recover data required 
to qualify the Apollo for an LOR mission 
Provide reasonable assurance that applicable critical components 
have the capability to perform sLtisfactorily when exposed to at  
least the nominal environments of the subsequent, planned mission 
Ensare positive means of reidentification of equipment to eliminate 
their possible reuse on more critical missions 
Eliminate separations of all possible interfaces by development of 
test procedures specifically designed to determine the status of 
subsystems, or  significant portions thereof. 
Item 4 is  particularly desirable and advantageous where welded, soldered, 
and bonded joints a re  used, but may not be possible where analysis indicates 
a need for replacement or refurbishment due to potential wearout, replace- 
ment of elastomers, or inability to check out specific critical components. 
To assist  in satisfying the preceding conditions, listings were prepared 
of the reported Gemini recovery events (Table 4). 
reviewed by each of the effected activities and the recommended recovery 
events sequence for the Apollo RCM w a s  developed (Table 5). 
The preceding data was 
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Event 
Table 4. Gemini Recovery Events Sequence 
~ 
Ground Elapsed 
Time 
1. Touchdown (29 August 1965) 
2. Swimmer team deployed 
3. Flotation collar attached and inflated 
4. Swimmer - flight crew voice contact made 
5. Crew egressed (left hatch) and boarded 
helicopter 
6. Carrier retrieved spacecraft 
190: 55: 14 
191:38 
191:45 
191:58 
194: 50 
7. Specified postretrieval procedures 
performed: 
Equipments removed, cleaned and packaged aboard prime 
recovery vehicle included: Voice tape recorder, inertial measurement 
unit (IMU), attitude control maneuver electronics (ACME), computer, 
auxiliary computer power unit (ACPU), horizon sensor electronics, 
PCM tape recorder, programmer, instrumentation package No. 2, 
high-level and low-level multiplexers and undefined flight c r e w  and 
expe riment equipment s. 
All on-board film and certain equipments were expedited to 
Cape Kennedy and Houston by special flights from carrier.  
Visual Inspections and observations were: 
a. No excessive heating effects 
b. Two deep gouges in heat shield 
c. Both windows had moisture between glass layers. Protective 
covers were emplaced 
- 16 - 
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Event 
Table 4. Gemini Recovery Events Sequence (Cont) 
Ground Elapsed 
Time 
d. Hoist loop door and recovery light funtioned properly. 
e. Left-hand hatch w a s  closed but not locked. Right-hand 
hatch w a s  locked. 
condition 
Both hatch seals appeared in  excellent 
f. Spacecraft interior w a s  exceptionally clean and all 
equipment was stowed 
g. A l l  spacecraft power, except recovery light, w a s  off 
h. Drogue mortor was safed (pins) and ejection seat D-ring 
w a s  stowed 
i. Moisture found i n  both footwells 
8. Spacecraft off-loaded a t  Mayport Naval Station 
(30  August 1965) 
GEMINI VI 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 .  
6. 
7. 
a. 
Touchdown (16 December 1965) 
Swimmer team deployed 
Flotation collar attached and inflated 
Flight crew stayed in S I C  - opened left hatch 
Spacecraft on car r ie r  and secured 
Postretrieval procedures (similar to GT-V) 
performed 
Spacecraft off - loaded a t  Mayport 
(20 December 1965) 
RCS deactivation (took approximately 16 hours) 
25: 51: 24 
26:  14: 34 
2621 : 34 
26: 3 3 :  34 
26:57: 34 
- - -  
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Event 
Table 4. Gemini Recovery Events Sequence (Cont) 
Ground Elapsed 
Time 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Touchdown (17 March 1966) 
Swimmer team deployed 
Flotation collar attached and inflated 
S/C hatches opened (flight crew returned 
to ship) 
S/C secured on destroyer (U. S .  S. Mason) 
(On-board films and tapes removed) 
S/C off-loaded a t  Okinawa (18 March 1960) 
RCS deactivated*+ (20 March 1960) - no 
time recorded 
GEMINI VIII* 
10:41 
10:54 
11:30 
11:48 
14: 15 
31:29 
- - -  
:$Secondary impact area 
:::+For safety - C- 130 transport to Mainland (pyrotechnic safing not 
noted, but assumed) 
~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~  
Table 5. Preliminary Apollo RCM Recovery Events Sequence 
Flight Crew to Perform Following Events Pr ior  to Touchdown: 
1. Obtain cabin a i r  sample subsequent to reentry and prior to 
opening of steam vent line to atmosphere. 
2. Subsequent to CM RCS purge system activation (helium 
pressure 5 100 psi) and prior to impact: 
a. Turn off CM RCS propellant isolation valve - 
A and B control switches 
b. Turn off either CM RCS dump or  Logic switch 
3. Shut down nonessential CM systems and, i f  time permits, 
record status. 
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Table 5. P r e l i m i n a r y  Apollo RCM Recovery  
Even t s  Sequence (Cont) 
Events  Sequence at Recove ry  Area:  
1. Touchdown 
2. Deploy s w i m m e r  t eam 
3. S w i m m e r s  plug heat  shield vent hole, inspec t  CM, and  a t tach  
and inflate flotation co l l a r  
4. Establ i sh  s w i m m e r  - fl ight c r e w  1;oice contact  
5. Fl ight  c r e w  deact ivate  r ecove ry  a ids  and r e c o r d  s t a tus  
6. F l igh t  c r e w  r e c o v e r y  al ternat ives:  
a. P r e f e r r e d :  F l igh t  c r e w  r e m a i n  in  CM with hatches closed 
and postlanding ventilation s y s t e m  operating. 
b. Alternate:  F l igh t  c r e w  e g r e s s  i f  r e q u i r e d  by rough seas, 
a s t r o n a u t  i l l nes s ,  postlanding ventilation p rob lem o r  
s p a c e c r a f t  r e c o v e r y  delay. U s e  following sequence: 
(1)  Open outer  and inner  c rew c o m p a r t m e n t  a c c e s s  hatches 
(or f o r w a r d  tunnel a c c e s s  hatch,  if requi red) .  
S w i m m e r s  ma in ta in  CM with hatch downwind, i f  
po s si ble . 
(2) Fl ight  c r e w  deact ivate  postlanding ventilation sys t em.  
( 3 )  Fl ight  c r e w  e g r e s s  to life r a f t  f o r  hel icopter  re t r ieva l .  
(4) S w i m m e r s  c lose  and la tch open h i tches .  
7. S w i m m e r s  d i s a s s e m b l e  H F  Antenna and stow VHF Antenna 
(spec ia l  tools r e q u i r e d )  and r e m a i n  with CM until r e c o v e r y  
ship a r r i v e s .  
8 .  Hoist  CM aboard  r e c o v e r y  ship and moni tor  f o r  radiation. 
9. P l a c e  CM on r ecove ry  c rad le .  
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Table 5. P r e l i m i n a r y  Apollo RCM Recovery 
Even t s  Sequenct? {Cant) 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
Wash down opt ics  and CM RCS a r e a s  (if requi red) .  
Inspect ,  note,  and r e c o r d  s ta tus  of top deck pyrotechnic  
devices  (safety a n d / o r  remove  i f  requi red) .  
Obtain cabin a i r  sample .  
Open c rew compar tmen t  ou ter  and inner  ha tches  (flight c r e w  
e g r e s s  if  s t i l l  i n  CM). 
Inspect  for  leakage of RCS propel lants  and inst igate  continuous 
monitor ing.  
Implace plast ic  she l t e r  Lent ove r  CM and provide f r e sh ,  
des i cca t ed  a i r  under  p r e s s u r e .  
Check control  and display set t ings against  checklist .  
Shut down remain ing  CM sys t ems .  
Remove c a m e r a s ,  f l ight r e c o r d e r  a n d / o r  tapes  and package for 
sepa ra t e  shipment.  
P l ace  desiccant  i n c r e w  compar tmen t  and c lose  and s e c u r e  
inner  hatch. 
Remove af t  heat  shield and af t  bulkhead t h e r m a l  pads. 
a f t  hea t  shield and toroidal  equipment  bay with boi ler  water.  
I n s e r t  purge f i t t ings in  aft heat  sliizld honeycomb subs t ra te .  
Vacuum purge af t  hea t  shield with deionized water .  
F lush  
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Vacuum purge a f t  hea t  shield with alcohol, then liquid freon.  
Dry  aft  compar tmen t  equipment  bay and heat  shield with w a r m ,  
d r y  a i r ,  i n s e r t  desiccant ,  rep lace  aft  hea t  shield,  and sea l  all  
he a t  shie Id cpeni q s .  
P l a c e  protect ive c o v e r s  ove r  a l l  CM windows and optics.  
Re tu rn  CM ( she l t e red )  to f o t w a r d  a rea .  
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Table 5. Preliminary Apollo RCM Recovery 
Events Sequence (Cont) 
~~ 
Events Sequence at  Forward Area: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Remove shelter and place CM on dock. 
Remove CM to remov2, safe area,  
Safety pyrotechnic devices. 
Decontaminate reaction control system. 
Purge and dry environmental control system. 
Reinstall access doors, hatches, seals and protective 
cover( s). 
Transport CM to S&ID, Downey (air transport recommended) 
Events Sequence at  S&ID, Downey: 
1. Place CM in sheltered, remote, safe area. 
2. Remove top deck pyrotechnic devices and p l ~ g  or  cap 
resulting openings. 
3 .  Remove heat shield access doors. 
4. Remove RCS pyrotechnic devices. :$ 
5. Remove outer crew compartment hatch and install protective 
cover on window of inner hatch. 
6. Remove heat shield windows. 
7. Remove aft heat shield. 
8. Remove RCS engines, plugging all resulting openings. 
9. Remove crew compartment heat shield. 
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Table 5.  Preliminary Apollo RCM Recovery 
Events Sequence (Cont) 
10. Clean exterior of CM. 
11. Transfer CM to environmentally-controlled clean room for 
subsequent removal of equipment. ** 
I 
I 
*RCS and pyrotechnic safety aspects must be investigated. 
**Sequence of reniovals, criteria for checkout, and protection of 
interfaces and packaging and/or shipping requirements a re  not yet 
defined. 
APOLLO COMMAND MODULE ENVIRONMENTAL PROFILE 
Oae major cause of subsystem performance capability degradation is 
The 
the environmental stresses imposed during mission operations. 
all available environmental data pertaining to the CM were reviewed. 
apnlicable portions were then compiled and used a s  a base for the status 
analysis. 
Accordingly, 
Since the study required that only nominal Apollo operational conditions 
be considered in the status analysis, the level value contained in the Apollo 
Environmental Specification (Refeuence 1) were adjusted *a reflect this 
guideline and represent a realistic profile. 
section present this derived environmental profile and pertinent environmental 
observations from Apollo S/C 009 and 011 flights. 
The followir portions of  this 
Environmental Profile Summary 
The environmental conditions generally applicable to all the CM sub- 
Subsequent to these, discussions regarding the individual systems follow. 
subsystems are  pi esented. 
Axial Acceleration 
The axial acceleration depends on the launch vehicle. The Saturn IB 
(launch of S /C 009 and 011) produces a maximum sea level thrust of 1.6 s 
l o 6  pounds for the first stage, followed by 2 x 10 
single J-i engine of the S-IVB. 
g loads of 4.0 and 2. 7 g, respectively, as compared to the 4. 9 g load espccted 
for the Saturn V configuration just before S-I1 ignition. 
obtained from Reference 4 is  presented as Figure 4. 
5 pounds of thrust from the 
These combications produced masimum 
The time profile 
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Storage KSC KSC 
Altitude (min) (min) ( m a 4  Criteria 
Ground -10 F 35 F 170 F Not exceeded by more than 
3 feet -15 F 28 F 110 F (3 days) a t  location 
- 
10% of most extreme month 
Acceleration 
L 
Figure 5 presents the maximum spectral densities of the accelerations 
expected on the structural subsystems. 
Reference 1. 
These curves were obtained from 
Vibration 
Vibration upon launch is expected to be the maximum condition. These 
levels of vibration a re  related to the sound pressure levels shown in Figure6 
and obtained from Reference 1. 
Temperature and Static Pressure 
The temperature of the space and ground environment a re  external 
parameters a s  presented in Table 6. 
a r e  as presented in the U.S. Standard 1962 Atmosphere applicable to alti- 
tudes up to 300,000 feet where direct conductive heat transfer to a vehicle 
is significant (except on entry at  high velocity). 
Detailed air temperature profiles 
Table 6. Ground and Surface Air Temperature Extremes 
Expected and acceptable temperature range profiles for the cummand 
module crew compartment are presented in Figure 7. 
Heat Shield 
The heat shield in early Apollo flights is heavily instrumented for 
temperature, pressure, heat flux, char depth and ablation. Figure 8 pre- 
sents a list of measurement points on the S/C 009 heat shield, with theoretical 
(specification) values for the peak levels expected. 
Temperature- time histories were computed for entry according to 
the S/C 009 trajectory and are presented in Reference 4. Higher heating 
is expected for S/C 01 1 and for lunar entry, however, the S / C  009 and 
S/C 011 heating should bracket the range of conditions for orbital entry. 
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COMMAND MODULE 
EXPECTED MAXIMUM LAUNCH VIBRATION 
EXPECTED MAXIMUM ENTRY VIBRATION 
. * * . I . .  
1 o3 
FREQUENCY (CPS) 
Figure 5. Maximum-Acceleration Spectral Densities on Apollo CM 
Structural Subsys tems 
180 
FROM: 11.222.4 45 90 180 365 710 1.4K 2.8Kt 
Extemai Aft of X, 1060 
External Fwd 
Internal Aft 
Internal Fwd 
Crew Compartment 
6K 
TO: 22.4 45 90 183 3 5  710 1.4K 2.8K 5.6K 11.2K 
Octave Band Frequencies (cps) 
Figure 6. Apollo CM Launch Acoustical Levels 
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Location - 
Z Y  
A :tual maximum heating rates expected are between 160 and 
190 Btu/ftz/sec. On S/C 009, the three tension-tie rods were unsealed (the 
RTV sealant was omitted) and they melted flush with the fiberglass pad 
surface. Scorching extended through to the substructure around these regions. 
600 F 
Predicted 
(in. ) 
At location 271, at  the stagnation point, for S/C 009, the temperature, 
char depth, discoloration, and heating rateu exceeded predictions based on 
wind tunnel data. Other points indicated conservative design. 
sents the predicted and S / C  009 observations. 
Table 7 pre-  
Predicted 
(in. ) 
0.08 
0.11 
0.08 
0.13 
0.13 
Peak pressures and heating ra tes  on S/C 009 were not observed due 
to the power drop a t  1635 (70 seconds after entry). 
that the peak values were within those expected, excep: for the stagnation 
point. 
to the laminar theory (Riddell) prediction of 188 to 300 Btu/ftZ/sec. 
Pr ior  data indicated 
Peak heating rate at the stagnation point is 164 Btu/ftz/sec compared 
Measured 
(in. ) 
0.06 
d. 02 
0.19 
0.02 
0.04 - 
Pressure  time history for the command module is taken at 36 points 
on the heat shield. 
for maximum conditions. A maximum of 12.5 psi& was observed. 
preceding pressure agrees to 1 percent with the predictions tor stagnation 
pressure based on equilibrium real air behind a normal shock and wind tunnel 
data at Mach 10, and attack angle of 22 degrees. 
pressure was 930 pounds per square foot or 10 percent less than planned. 
All valid S / C  009 pressure :-nt asurements were surveyed 
The 
Peak entry dynamic 
71 0 
0 0  
-71 0 
0 39 
0 71 
Table 7. Heat Shield Performance ( S / C  009) 
0.39 
0.42 
0.38 
0.45 
0.45 
Depth 1 Char Depth (1000 F) 
(in. ) 
~ 0.47 0.25 0.32 
0.35 0.29 0.21 
0.35 0.26 0.21 
0.37 0.32 0.22 
0.38 0.32 0.25 
Structural Environment 
Stress. 
maximum allowade loads are presented in Tables 7.1-11 and 7.1 --;lI ..f 
Reference 4. 
F-rward longeron and aft heat shield s t ress ,  and I' >rcL 7t of 
All loads were well within tolerance, indicating more than 
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Parameter 
W a t e r  -glycol: 
Evaporator outlet 
Cabin radiator outlet 
adeyuate design. The CM/SM tension tie rod s t ress  measured not more 
than 41 percent f u l l  load allowable as an example of the point of greatest 
s t r e s s  on the command module. 
1 
Min Max Min Max 
(" F) (" F) (OF) (OF) 
42" F 48 26.4 57 
70" F 80 52 67 
Dynamics. Detailed data are presented in Chapter 7 of Reference 4 
for command module dynamics observations from S/C 009, showing that 
the acceleration spectral density exceeded that expected a t  1200 cps for a 
dynamic pressure of 800 pounds per square foot a t  Mach 2 . 1  for points on 
the inner structure for S/C 009. 
density a t  250 cps was four times that expected for 790 pounds per square 
foot pressure at a location on the SLA near the RCM point of attachment). 
(During supersonic flight, the spectral 
Environmental C ont rol Subs y s  tem 
Critical Temperature Profiles. ECS operation is critical to tempera- 
ture of the water-glycol outlet-coolant circuit evaporator, glycol inlet, and 
cabin temperature. The ECS temperatures are presented i n  Table 8. 
Table 8. ECS Temperatures 
Permitted 
Range S / C  009 Observed 
Temperature extremes noted are indicative of problems other than 
externally induced environmental extremes. 
P res su re  Profiles. Cabin pressure regulation on S/C 009 was5.65 psia, 
a ?  compared to the 5 i 0 . 2  psia specified. 
of salt water leaked in through the steam duct outlet part  and cabin pressure 
relief valve. 
Following touchdown, an amount 
Spacecraft Windows. Contamination of windows appeared on landing 
or on entry; however,these windows should be acceptable for reuse after 
cleaning. 
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1 
Helium Fuel Oxidizer Helium Fuel Oxidizer 
3478-4104 66-185 61 -285 60-69 63-65 63-65 
RCS System (CM) 
The CM-RCS operated successfully up to electrical system failure 
a t  1641 seconds after start. 
for the S/C 009 flight are presented in Table 9. 
The CM-RCS temperature and pressure data 
Table 9. S/C 009 Temperature and P res su re  
I Tank Pressures  (psia) I I Tank Temperature (OF) 
C M  Structure Temperatures at Touchdown 
The following data was derived by analysis, and provides environ- 
mental conditions in which components and subsystems within the CM must 
survive and perform properly. Consequently, the severest  of most probable 
environmental conditions were incorporated into the analyses to generate 
conservative answers and provide for undefinable variables, 
Figures 9 and 10 present temperatures of the cabin structure a t  touch- 
The mean structure temperature down for a maximum heat load trajectory. 
a t  beginning of entry was 82. F and the entry period was 0.42 hours. 
mean structure temperature at  touchdown was 105 F. 
levels shown are the maximum values reached and will continue for a period 
of 1 hour after touchdown for a land landing; *or a water landing, the period 
will vary from 15 minutes to 1 hour, depend ng on the time the hatch is  
opened and turbulence of the water. 
The 
The temperature 
Temperatures in the aft equipment bays of the toroidal section between 
the heat shield and the cabin varied from 150 to 160 F a t  touchdown and could 
increase to 200 F after touchdown because of soakback. 
back temperature and period will vary with the type of landing. These tern- 
peratures a r e  based on the current heat shield design which is to be revised 
as a result of flight data. 
heating rates will permit a thinner, lower-weight heat shield. 
heat shield will result in less  virgin material remaining during reentry and, 
consequently, higher temperatures i n  the aft equipment bays. Therefore, 
the values presented should, at  best, represent nominal temperature levels 
and not maximum values. 
Again, this soak- 
1nte:pretation of flight data and recalculation of 
The thinner 
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MAIN DISPUY CONSOLE 
I 
RND LEFT 
EQUIP ---- BAY EQUIP BAY 
I 
HATCH 
<-  ' 116 110 
94 105 91 
LEFT EQWP BAY LOWER EQUIP BAY RIGHT EQUIP M Y  RIGHT 
LEFT SEAT TOP 
BOTfOM = 105 
. / RIGHT SEAT TOP 
BOTTOM = 1 I6 I 
1 1 9 /  I 
\ 'I" 143 I 141 
126 I 
I I 1 
Y, 3 42.00 Y, = 42.00 
Fiture 9. CM Cabin Structure Temperatures at Touchdown, Lunar Mission, 
Structure Exposed to Cabin Air 
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Figure 10. CM Cabin Structure Temperatures at Touchdown, Lunar Mission, 
Structure Not Exposed to Cabin Air 
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Dose Component 
Probability of Encounter (Percent) 
Region 
1. Lower equipment bay 
2. Parachute compartment 
3, RCS fuel tank 
4. RCS oxidizer tank 
5. RCS engine valve seat 
Apollo CM Subsystems Space Radiation 
The Apollo command module subsystems will be subject to solar 
particle events, the solar wind, geomagnetically trapped particles, and 
secondary radiations. The significant dose contributions to certain important 
interior regions of the Apollo command module during the 14 day lunar mis- 
sion are given in Tabla 10. The values given in the table were previously 
reported in Reference 5. The general locations of the dose point3 are given 
in Figure 11. The solar wind, which is encountered outside the geomagneto- 
Solar Protons Trapped 
and Alphas Particles Total Dose 
1 0.1 100 1 0.1 
I 
6.241 59.3 0.079 6.32 59.4 
51.1 487.0 0.37 51.5 
36.1 344.0 0.27 36.4 
8 .94  85.2 0.11 9.05 
55.7 531.0 0.40 56.1 
Table 10. Doses (Rad) to Interior Regions of Apollo CM 
From Fourteen-Day Lunar Mission (Reference 5 )  
K 
1,. Lower Equipment Bay 
2., Parachute Compartment 
3. RCS Fuel Tank 
4, RCS CxZirer  Tank 
5. RCS Engine Vclve Seat 
Figure 11. Locations of Regions in  Apollo CiM a+ 
Which Doses are Evaluated 
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sphere, produces a maximum time intep-ated flux or 4.8 x 10” proton-cm-2 
with energies between 0.3 and 10 kev. 
Trajectories and instnunentation of S/C 009 and 01 1 were not intended 
to provide correlatior 
lunar mission. Ther- . no immediate co elation of tbis data based on 
the results of these suborbital missions is forthcoming. 
* adiation levels with those predicted for the Apollo 
Observations of Apollo Environment (S/C 009 and 011) 
The natural and induced environment experienced by S/C 009 were 
basically in all respects to the projected environment. The most important 
deviations were a result of the lower-than-planned entry velocity and lower 
resultant heating. No subsystems except possibly the ECS subsystem have 
been found significantly marginal in ability to perform the objectives of the 
missions, The operational period before malfunction expected for the ECS 
subsystem may be exceeded on the launcn pad a s  was the case in S/C 011. 
Spacecraft Flight Trajectory Parameters 
Figure 1 2  presents the inertial and relative velocity profile for the 
S/C 009 mission, indicating that mission phasing can be accomplished close 
to  schedule. 
2 degrees; longitude and latitude was within 0.5  percent of planned trajectory. 
Booster burning cutoffs were diff-rent than planned, thus a given altitude 
was reached later than expected 2nd maximum entry velocity was one part 
in 27 less than planned, 
The inertial flight path angle was as programmed within 
Dynamic pressure, maximum g load, and Mach ;lumber is presented 
Maximum heating in Figure 13 for the entry portion of the S / C  OO? flight. 
rates for the flight were 1css than expected, at least partially, as a result of 
the r edxed  entry velocity. 
Btu/ft2 / sec. 
The maximum heating rate fer S/C 009 was  ‘64  
Acceleration spectral density curves obtained from S/C 009 flights 
were all within expected levels during launch, except for measurement 
number AK025ID for vibration on the SLA skin radial pdr el, which is near 
the point where the RCM lab is to be carried. Vibratim level at 250 cps 
at this point was found to be three t imes the expected level (specification 
3r 2 g/cps. Maximum load factor on S / C  GO9 was 14. 3 g. 
Figure 14 shows CM/SM fairing tcmpersture to be well below antici- 
pated levels during the launch period. 
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M a x  
400 
Preliminary Data From Apollo S / C  011 Flight 
The major objective for both S/C 009 and 011 flights was to qualify . 
Both flights were suborbital but with entry the heat shield for manned flight. 
velocity increased above normal orbital return entry velocities (25,400 feet 
per second for S/C 009 and about 28,000 feet per second for S / C  011). 
Although S / C  01 1 entered with a higher velocity, a shallower entry angle 
was used so the spacecraft would skip back out and cool somewhat before 
final entry. 
therefore, for S/C 01 1 than for S/C 009, however, the heat soak was longer 
with correspondingly higher temperatures on the pressure vessel structure. 
NASA data analysis indicated that S / C  011 met all major objectives for the .  
flight, with high heating rates about one-half those experienced on S/C 009. 
The peak heating rate and maximum temperature was less, 
Tables 11 and 12 include results of preliminary quick look analyses of 
telemetry data from KSC, Antigua, and Canarvon. 
Time 
During boost 
Table 11. Selected Temperatures From S/C 011 
~~~~ ~ ~ ~ 
Subsystem Area  
SM to LEM Adapter 
SLA outer panel 
CM-PCM 
S-band power amplifier 
VHF/AM XMTR 
S-band transponder 
C-band transponder 
Collins signal conditioner 
ECS space radiator outlet 
ECS glycol evaporator 
outlet (F 00 18) 
(F 0017) 
Suit supply 
Cabin 
Static inverter 
(C 0179) 
(C 0178) 
(C 0177) 
(C 0176) 
(C 0175) 
Min 
89 
110 
104 
46 
35 
40 
40 
30 
56 
75 
79 
80 
Temperatures (OF) 
Time - 
Boost 
Boost 
Boost 
Boost 
T + 500 sec 
T t 550 see 
T t 100 sec 
T t 500 sec 
Boost 
Boost 
Boost 
Boost 
Boost 
90 
111 
106 
110 
105 
90 
49 
50 
53 
77 
80 
105 
90 
107 
140 
Boost 
Boost 
Boost 
Boost 
Boost 
Boost 
Boost 
T t 120 sec 
T t 200 
Launch 
Boost 
Boost 
Boost 
Boost 
Boost 
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Pressure  
Table 12. Selected Pressures  From S/C 011 
Time Subsystem Area 
~~ ~~~ - 
B fuel manifold 
B oxidizer manifold 
A fuel manifold 
A oxidizer manifold 
Cabin pres  sur e 
B a r 0  static reference 
200 psia 
185 
190 
190 
16 psia 
6 psia 
14. 15 psia 
0.0 psia 
(then went negative) 
Boost 
Loost 
Boost 
Boost 
O n p a d T = O  
at T t 150 sec 
On pad T = 0 
a t T +  130 
Miscellaneous comments regarding the Apollo S/C 011 flight are the 
following: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
3 Tension tie maximum force density = 8 - 11 x 10 psi  
Landing struts showed no stroking 
Electrical loads were 20 percent lower than expected 
Communicatil IS w e r e  all normal and complete 
On-board tape sync problems can be corrected 
EDS-bending moments on SM/CM were normal 
CM windows were clear up to  entry, but right-hand window became 
obscured by condensation between the heat shield and pressure 
vessel region of depth after entry. Movies show a cherry-red 
ablator on windows during entry. 
S / C  009 Failure and Stress  Items Reported 
Report No. I Measurement No. I Remark 
SID 66-487 
SID 66-485 C 14A7, 8 I 
I 
CM propellant tank bladder leaks, 
250 cc/3.5 sec (130/15 min ok). 
Open circuited. 
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Report No. 
SID 66-519 
SID 66-520 
SID 66-539 
SID 66-540 
SID 66-563 
SID 66-564 
SID 66-576 
SID 66-576 
SID 66-576 
SID 66-588 
SID 66-601 
SID 66-619 
SID 66-620 
Measurement No. 
CA 0415s 
CE 0035P 
CA 7650P 
CA 1149P 
CA 1172P 
CA 1177P 
w 
Remarks 
HF recovety beacon inoperative after 
impact (part did not fail, but possible 
power problem). 
HF recovery beacon inoperative after 
impact (part did not fail, but possibly 
power problem) 
Strain sensor failed at T t 183 sec 
(problem external to sensor) 
Pressure  sensor shorted with 17.0 volts 
out (Zener diode failure) 
Low range acoustic transducer failure 
due to  mishandling prior to flight (may 
be indicative of over voltage) 
Pressure-shift in calibration by 2% 
Pressure (heat shield) calibration shift 
(transducer problem) 
Pressure  (heat shield) calibration shift 
(transducer problem) 
Pressure  (heat shield) calibration shift 
(transducer problem) 
System A fuel helium relief valve burst 
disc ruptured (design pb) 
CM RCS engine valve degradation effects 
normal 
HF beacon failure due to salt w,$er - 
reduction of radiated power 
VHF/AM transmitter modulation wave- 
form distortion (ok) 
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Rep or t No. 
SID 66-638 
SID 66-687 
SLD 66-696 
SID 66-699 
SID 66-710 
SID 66-711 
SID 66.-712 
SID 66-713 
Measurement No. 
A l l  heat shield 
Instruments 
u 
Remarks 
~ 
Thermocouples inoperate after T t 1625 
sec (power failure). 
shield below 0.2 inch (sea level). 
shield saturated with water and salt 
(conductive! ). 
flight). Salt water intrusion renders 
sensors inoperative without drying 
(electrically ok but calibration shifts). 
Some 5% d 2 6 %  W thermocouples 
shorted & b  1000"-1400 F. 
point, heat shield backface reached 
Char on aft heat 
Heat 
(Still drying 30 days after 
At stagnation 
180-200 F. 
CM RCS propellant solenoid valve 
(oxidizer valius) leaking 50 cc/30 min 
(failure due to causes during flight or 
after landing) 
V16-327280 bolt assembly damaged in 
flight but not due to tension-tie explosive 
separation. 
Windows contaminated with sodium, etc. 
(salt water and dirt) but part deposited 
in flight (2 0% transmittance). 
C02 and Freon mono-F in CM atmos ok 
but 300 ppm methyl alcohol toxic with 
14 day exposure when found a t  Downey 
(hatch had been opened already). 
of fuel and Teflon should have been present. 
Traces 
Water-Glycol pH and NaMBT inhibitor 
ok. TEAP inhibitor 1. 75% (1. 670 ok) 
(possibly e r ro r  in preparation). Particu- 
late contamination 6 x allowable picked 
up from S / C  plumbing. 
Waste water contamination minimal. 
Cabin pressurization leak 0.4 lb/hr to 
14 lb/hr from flight data. (Presa eelief 
valve cracks open at 5.58 psi to 
5.40 psi). 
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Report No. 
SID 66-722 
SID 66-723 
SID 66-731 
SID 66-732 
SID 66-745 
SID 66-814 
SID 66-810 
Measurement No. 
u 
Remar ks 
Side ablative hatch ground support type 
of gear had excessive rust  and lead tape 
seal had large indentations resulting in 
525 in. -pounds torque being needed 
instead of 100 to disengage hatch. 
Impact struts and ribs showed no 
stroking or damage. Uprighting system 
not even used and showed no damage. 
Crushable ribs showed no crushing. 
Thirty-seven of forty-five ordnance 
devices had fired properly: eight did not 
fire due to circuit short which tripped off 
the breaker. 
No structural failures or secondary bond 
failure. 
in  heat shield but extreme discoloration 
noted in each of three tension t ie bolt 
holes in  aft heat shield and some on inner 
structure aft longer on fittings. 
corrosion on main hatch mechanism 
pinion. 
can. 
hand umbilical fitting. 
Heat shield instrumentation: pressure 
transducer shift in calibration; indica- 
tions of transducer leakage into reference 
vacuum through diaphragm (header). 
(Fault has been avoi3ed in later pro- 
cur ement ). 
No evidence of structural failure 
Excessive 
Tear in right-hand drogue mortar 
Delamination and breakage in right- 
The CM/SM umbilical was burned and 
shorted during entry which caused 
numerous shorts and malfunctione to the 
CIA (The SCS solenoid drivers may have 
been damaged). 
In 2-1/2 hours in the ocean, three pints 
of sea water got into the crew com- 
partment through the steam vent and 
cabin pressure relicf valve. 
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Report No. 
SID 66-943 
Me as ur ement No. Remarks 
Umbilical short during entry caused 
overload on wire attached to G 2 3  T El-12,  
power to MESC, CP; and PLSC blew 
at T + 1635. 
and breaker No. 18 supplying logic IIBlI 
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Ilf, STRUCTURES AND MATERIALS 
This section covers the structures and materials renovation feasibility 
aspects of the Apallo CM as related to subsystems. 
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY STRUCTURE 
For the purpose of this study,the primary and secondary structures 
are considered as subsystems of the CM. 
Re pais Feasibility 
Repair or replacement will be required for those structural components 
which were designed for entry heating or water impact, and were intended 
for a single flight mission. The structural components which fall into thirs 
category are: 
Boost cover 
Forward heat shield 
Aft heat shield 
Crew compartment heat shield 
Crew couch shock strut cores 
Shock attenuation panels 
Aft corn partm ent crushable core s 
Structural components for which the impact loads are critical but can 
be expected to tolerate this environment with tittle ox 123 damage are: 
The command module inner strristurc 
T?-e equipment support structure 
The crew couch and supporting struts 
Repaii and Replacement of Structural Components 
Boost COT and Forwara Hest Shield 
The boost cuver is ejected following boost, and the forward heat shield 
is ejected before parachute deployment. 
must be replaced for command module reuse. 
These components, therefore, 
SID 66-f853-3 
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Crew Compartment Heat Shield Substructure 
Any damage the crew compartment heat shield subsubstructure will 
probably suffer'at the time of impact can be repaired by standard repair 
methods. The structure should be inspected for weld cracks, damage to 
upper and lower rings, and overall distortion. 
to detect core -to-facesheet voids in the steel honeycomb sandwich. 
X-ray inspection is required 
Aft Heat Shield Substructure 
It is possible that the aft heat shield substructure may suffer exten- 
sive damage in the impact a rea  which would involve failure of the steel 
facesheets and crushing of the honeycomb core. Damage of this nature 
will probably be concentrated in one 90-degree segment, and this can be 
repaired by cutting out the segment along the weld lines and replacing with 
a new paiiel. "he remaining area is inspected for YYeld cracks, damage to 
the upper ring, and overall distortibn. 
aetect core-to-face sheet voids in the steel honeycomb sandwich. 
X-ray inspection is required to 
C r c w  Couch Shock Strut Cores 
If any stroking of the crew couch shock struts takes place during 
impact, the crushable cores must be replaced. 
Shock Attenuation Panels 
If a side load is experienced during impact, the shock attenuation 
panels may be damaged. Any damaged panels should be replaced. 
Aft C o m p  L'tment Crushable Cores 
The aft compartment crushable cores are intended to protect the 
inner structure in the case of high-impact loads in this area. 
of these cores can be determined by visual inspection and may be replaced 
as required. 
The condition 
The Cammand Module Inner Structure (Pressure Vessel) 
The command module inner s t r tc tUre  is expccted to suffer little o r  
no damage dilring impact, and any repairs required should be within the 
scope of current standard repair methods. 
integrity, however, a complete inspection will be required for bond 
dc .laminations, core-to-face-sheet voids in the hmeycomb panels, and 
cracks in the inner skin welds. 
meta! bonds would indicate that the honeycomb core may have been exposcd 
to sea water. 
To establish the structural 
Voids in the outer facesheet metal-to- 
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The Equipment Support Structure 
Equipment support structure tees and brackets bonded on the inner 
surface of the aft bulkhead may experience damage at the instant of impact. 
These items can be removed and replaced by standard repair methods. 
The Crew Couch and Supporting Struts 
The crew couch and supporting struts w i l l  not suffer any damage 
during a normal impact. 
FATIGUE ANALYSIS 
A conservative and simplified fatigue analysis has been made for the 
purpose of showing that fatigue would not become a problem until the struc- 
ture had been exposed to a large number of flight missions. The epoxy- 
phenolic adhesive used extensively en the inner structure is the material 
most sensitive to  fatigue. The damping response of the structure has been 
considered conservatively to be low, and this consideration is r t5ected in 
the number of load applications used; i. e. a single load application at a 
high s t ress  level has been taken 20 t imes by the structure before it is 
damped aut. This analysis is presented only as an indication of the low 
level of fatigue damage expected (Table 13) and to  demonstrate the accept- 
able nature of the existing 1.50 safety factor (Figure 15). All components 
exposed to significant stress levels during flight have been tested to the 
design ultimate load. Table 14 shows a list of such tests performed on 
various Apollo specimens. 
CONDITION OF RECOVERED STRUCTURE 
One of the basic objectives of the'Apoilo command module design was 
to provide a usable structure for a single mission. There is no structural 
significance to this requirement over the entire load spectrum of the mission 
until the instant of impact is reached. The most extreme loading that the 
vehicle can be exposed to during pre-launch handling, launch, boost, abort 
staging, docking, space flight, and entry will not exceed two-thirds of the 
material capability of all materials used in the structure. It follows that 
the structure may be subjected to all  of the loads in this spectrum for a 
great many times until the point of material fatigue is reached, say  after 
100 missions. At the instant of impact some areas  of the structure will be 
loaded to the ultimate capability of the material and, in extreme cases, to 
the point of failure. It is in these areas  only that the single-flight design 
objective is structurally significant. Structural components that may 
experience ultimate loads at the instant of impact a r e  the aft heat shield, 
the shock attenuation cores in the aft equipment compartment, the shock 
attenuation panels on the right- and left-hand lower equipment bays, tees 
and brackets bonded on the aft bulkhead of the inner structure in the impact 
area,  and the couch attenuation strut cores. 
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Table 13. Cumulative Fatigue Damage 
Condition 
Ignition 
Boost 
M a x q a  
(Vibration) 
Staging 
Abort 
Impact* 
Ultimate Stress 
Level (percent) 
67 
67 
67 
5 
50 
67 
67 to 100 
Load n 
Applications 
20 t 
1st 
20 
so00 
20 + 
0 
10 t 
N 
20,000 
20.000 
20,000 
(100) (lo$ 
1 (10)6 
20.000 to 10 
20,000 to 10 
n /N 
0.001 
0.00075 
0.001 
0.00005 
0.00002 
0,0005 
W O O  percent stress level applies to aft heat shield at the point of 
impact. 
G n/N = -00332 
N required for zero margin = 20,000 (. 00332) = 66.4 
Stress  level at 66.4 cycles = 100% 
100% 
67% 
Required factor =- = 1.50 
NOTE: These values a r e  approximate and are based on limited data. 
Their presentation is intended to indicate a degree of mwni-  
tude only, and to demonstrate that a vehicle subjected to the 
load spectrum of a single flight suffers no fatigue damage. 
t The low damping response of the structure is conservatively assumed 
to result in the quoted number of cycles at fu l l  load. 
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NUMBER OF LOAD CYCLES 
Figure 15. S/q Curves of Command Module Materials 
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Table 14. List of Tests Performed on Various Apollo Capsules 
Specimens 
004-A 
004-A 
004-A 
004-A 
O f  *-A 
004-A 
004-A 
004 
004 
004 
004 
BP 28 
007 
006 
Test 
Thermal 
Static Load 
Main chute deployment 
Drogue chute deployment 
Crew couch attachment 
Pilot mortar 
Abort condition 
Lef t  and right hand equipment 
Thruster load condition 
Drogue chute mortar 
Burst Pressure 
Water Drop 
Nos. 91, 92 
Nos. 97, 39, 101 
Water Drop 
Nos. 100, 102 
Vibration 
Remarks 
See TR 251003 
See Note 1 
Tested to ultimate 
Tested to ultimate 
Tested to ultimate 
Failed at 165% of limit 
Tested to ul t -hate  
Tested to ultimate 
Tested to ultimate 
12.9 psi for about 
two minutes 
See Note 2 
See Note 3 
Satisfactory 
See Note 4 
Notes: 
1. Three main parachute deployment tests were performed, each with 
the design-ultimate load modified by a temperahtre-correction factor. 
Said load was applied in three different directions: over the tunnel, 
straight out, and normal to the longeron. At the third test, failure 
satisfactory because the temperature-correction factor as a w e d  
was conservative. 
. occurred at  14 percent of limit. However, that was considered 
2. Boilerplate model, except for aft bulkhead, aft heat shield, and 
crushable ribs, which a r e  production articles. 
Same a s  Note 2, with plumbing, tanks, and crushable rib fittings 
installed. 
3. 
4. The test performed is equivalent to a vibration exposure encountered 
in about 19 missions. 
different from flight specimens as  regards equipment installations, 
e. g . ,  gross weight, etc. 
However, the test module is significantly 
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Degradation of the structure that may be considered significant will 
result from exposure to the following environments: landing impact, post 
operational handling, and exposure to sea water and other corrosive media. 
Degradation due to landing impact will be local in area and subject to repair. 
Degradation due to post operation handling can be avoided. Degradation due 
to corrosion, i f  not prevented o r  controlled, could result in the total loss 
of the structural capability of the basic structure. 
CORROSION INVESTIGATION 
Postflight evaluation of the 009 and 011 CM crzw compartment and 
heat shield structures and the metal and electrical components of the control 
and support systems indicated that corrosion degradation might be the 
primary limiting factor governing their potential structural and operational 
integrity. 
The CM is weighted to be mahtained in a vertical position subsequent 
to splashdown and until recovery aboard ship. Sea water enters through 
the heat shield hatch and side ports in the crew compartment heat shield 
and fills the space between the heat shield and the crew compartment to a 
level above the joining plane of the a f L -  and side-heat shields. 
remain in the ocean for an indeterminate period and additional time may 
expire before the space is drained. Currently no provisions have been made 
to drain the sea water or to flush the flooded area. The crew compartment, 
systems materials and equipment, and brazed heat shields thus are exposed 
to prolonged immersion in the corrosive sea water media. 
The CM will 
The potential-reduced reliability of the systems, the potential degra- 
dation of the mechanical properties of the crew compartment structural 
materials, and the potential structural damage to the brazed heat shields 
a r e  serious consideraticns in this refurbished CM study. 
laboratory studies were therefore conducted: the first,  to evaluate the 
potential effect of corrosive damage on the mechanical properties of the 
core and facing sheet; and the second, to determine the feasibility of flushing 
the assembly and neutralizing the corrosive effect of the sea water. 
Two comparison 
EFFECT OF CORROSION ON MATERIAL PROPERTIES 
Major consideration with respect to the reuse of the structure and 
components of Apollo command modules has been directed toward corrosion 
prevention. 
protective coatings (per NAA Engineering Drawing V17-000024) precludes 
o r  retards corrosion. Nevertheless, corrosion deterioration can occur to 
certain components, assemblies, and structures during flight and by exposure 
to sea water after earth reentry, 
Material selections for kpollo components and the use of special 
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Aft Brazed Heat Shield Constructions 
The aft brazed heat shield is the structure most vdnerable to sea- 
water corrosion. The general construction of the heat shield and i ts  relative 
position with respect to the crew compartment structure is illustrated in 
Figure 16. The ablative material is an epoxy-phenolic resin formulation 
reinforced and lightened with strategic fillers and a fiberglass honeycomb 
matrix. 
The face sheets and honeycomb core of the heat shield structure are 
PHl4-8, a precipitation, hardenable stainless steel. 
was selected because it affords high strength and corrosion resistance. 
The corrosion resistance of PH14-8M0 is intermediate between that of the 
18-8 grades of stainless steel and the lesser corrosion resistant 12 chromium 
grades, such as type 410 stainless steel. Adherence of the face sheets to 
the honeycomb core is achieved by furnace brazing. Figure 17. The 
braze alloy used is the LTCM alloy, a silver braze alloy with nickel filler 
(20 percent by volume). The Apollo honeycomb braze detail is illustrated 
in Figure 17. 
The PH14-8M0 material 
The core material of the assemblies proposed for refurbishment 
contains perforations of 0.008 inch diameter spaced at 0.375 inches 0. C. 
Brazed fillets a r e  formed at the top and bottom face sheet to honey- 
comb core interfaces and a thin film braze deposit is adhered to much of 
the honeycomb core cell walls during the braze cbcle and heat treatment. 
Evaluation of Postflight Hardware 
The S / C  009 aft heat shield was not available for critical examination 
A detailed evaluation of the aft when the RCM study contract was initiated. 
heat shield from S/C 01 1 was therefore undertaken to determine th,: effect 
of extended contact with sea water on the quality and strength of the core and 
braze attachment. 
The Apollo S / C  01 1 CM flew and was recovered 25 August 1966. The 
weight of the command module had increased 560 pounds. 
to its absorption and entrapment of sea water. 
remo. ed 16 September 1966. 
from the aft heat shield, starting 24 September 1966. Segments for the 
corrosion evaluation were removed, at the locations designated in Figure 18, 
between 1 and 5 October 1966. 
This is attributed 
Segments for thermal analyses were removed 
The aft heat shield was 
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0 BONDED ALUMINUM HONEYCOMB 
INSULATION BLANKET 
ABLATIVE INSULATION 
Figure 16. Basic Apollo Command Module Structure 
CORE 
Figure 17.  Brazed Honeycomb Sand\\ ich Detail 
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SPECIMENS 1 A N D  2 - PLUGS CUT A L O N G  CORE SLOT 
SPECIMENS 3 A N D  4 - PLUGS CUT IN OPEN FIELD OF CORE 
SPECIMEN C - CENTER CORRODED SECTION 
SPECIMEN B - INNER SKIN PEELED BACK 
Figure 18. Corrosion Study Specimen Locations 
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A visual examination was made of the representative core segments 
and several facts became immediately apparent. 
1. The core foil in all of the plug specimens, including all but 
two of those removed for thermal evaluation, did not contain 
perforations. 
2. Corrosion withiri the brazed assembly was limited to surfaces 
which had been in direct contact with the entrapped sea water. 
The sea-water contact was limited to the outermost nodes and 
czlls of the PH14-8M0 core. The corrosion was identified by 
discoloration (brownish- red) and minute pitting. 
3.  The central section of the assembly, which still contained 
entrapped sea water 20 days after splashdown and moisture 
after 30 days, showed the greatest discoloration and pitting. 
4. The unexposed cells evidenced no corrosion. 
5. The heat shield construction was not representative of the later 
Block I and Block 11 assemblies proposed for  refurbishment. 
Labor ator y T e st Program 
When it was determined that the postflight evaluation of the S/C 01 1 
heal shield would not be representative of the proposed refurbished assem- 
blies, an  alternate test program was instituted. 
Spec imen Preparation 
A PH14-8MOhoneycomb sample 2-1/2 in. thick by 3-1/2 by 9 in. was 
taken from the trimmed area of an early nonperforated-core heat shield 
configuration and prepared for test a s  follows: 
1. The test panel was cut into six pieces 2-1/2 in. thick by 3-1/2 
by 1-1/2 in. , and one facing of each segment was removed. 
2. All of the pieces, including the removed facings, were saved 
for immersion tests. 
Expo sur e C ondit ions 
A l l  tests were conducted in a saline test solution (ASTM D1141) with a 
Local sea water was CL, *bina.tion of chlorides representative of sea water. 
not 'sed because of unknown contaminations imposed by sewage and 
commercial effluents. 
, 
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Four of t'. : segmex:ts were submerged to one-half their depth, and the 
One segment, for each test cells filled to a like depth, in the test solution. 
condition, was remwed and the entrapped fluid dumped after 1 hour, 3 hours, 
24 hours , and 74 hcur s. 
Two unexposed segments were saved for control standards. 
Specimen Evaluation 
Photographs were taken of the control and exposed test specimens. 
The control specimen i s  shown in Figure 19. The specimens exposed in the 
test solution for one hour and for three hours a re  also represented by 
Figure 20, since there was no visual evidence of corrosion. The specimen 
exposed for 24 hours is shown in F i g  
seventy hours is shown in Figure iL. 
-2 2 1. The specimen exposed for 
Sections of the specimens from the area where the meniscus flow of 
the test solution extended up the cell wall (above the fluid level') were removed 
and mounted for microscopic examination. Sections were also taken from 
the face-to-core brazed joints that had been completely submerged for the 
various exposure periods. 
depicted in Figures 23 through ?9. The pertinent reproduction data a r e  
noted. 
The pertinent micro and macro photos a re  
Conclusions end Recommendations 
The following general conclusions and recommendations can be drawn 
a s  a result of these tests fortificd by additional test C:ta from Armco Steel 
Corporation, the developers or' the PH14-8Mo alloy. 
1. The control specimen and those exposed for one and three hours 
show no evidence of corrosion products. Therefore, it is concluded 
that parts adequately flushed and neutralized after these periods 
of sea-water exposure a re  not deleteriously affected. 
2. The speciiriens exposed for twenty-four hours showed no evidence 
of intergranular corrosion but did evidence presence of corrosion 
products as  identified by local discoloration. If adequately 
flushed and neutralized, the parts could be reused with structural 
reliability. 
3 .  The specimens exposed for seventy hours showed no distinguishable 
intergranular corrosion. However, the  corrosion products were 
noticeably increased as  evidenced by local discoloration. Aleo, 
there was visual evidence of minor local pitting which had not been 
discernable in the particular photomicrograph inzde of that area 
of the specimen. 
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Data Dbtained from Armco stated that notable pitting of PH14-8 MO 
material was evident after immersion in ocean water for four 
days. It was also determined that, once initiated, the corrosion 
is e ssentislly self -perpetuating. 
Therefore it is concluded that the critical immersion time is 
between 24 and 74. Also, based on ibis limited test data, the 
maximum allowable exposure time prior to neutralization must 
be limited to 24 hours. Heat shield assemblies exposed to sea 
water or residual chloride deposits longer than 24 hours cannot 
be used for structural applications. 
4. Residual chlorides when exposed to high relative humidity are 
equally, or more corrosive, to PHl4-8MOmaterial than full  sub- 
mergence in sea water. Therefore, reuse of the heat shield after 
any exposure to sea water is contingent upon a satisfactory 
flushing and rieutr alization sy s tem. 
PREFLIGHT CORROSION INHIBITION TREATMENTS 
The principal concern of this portion of the report is the determination 
of methods to minimize the corrosion effects of sea-water exposure on the 
CM structure and systems materials by use of minimum preflight precautions. 
There would be sufficient lead time, with most of the Block II vehicles, to 
permit institution of simple preflight treatments which will be very effective 
in minimizing potential corrosion damage i f  an early NASA approval were 
r e ce ive d . 
Specific sealing requirements and recommended modifications of the 
brazed heat shields, to minimize corrosion and implement neutralization 
of the corroding chlorides, a re  described with the proposed postflight 
neutralization studie s . 
Corrosion of the external surface of the crew compartment and systems 
materials can best be minimized by the following procedure. 
1. Apply RTV sealers on all  exposed bare aluminum st. ucture and 
conformal coatings to all electrical terminal attachments with 
particular care. 
2.  Mist-spray all adhesive-primed structure, plumbing, and storage 
equipment, and electrical terminals with an approved silicone 
material in an air -dry suspension medium before installation of 
the heat shield. The same material may be applied to the inner 
surfacf of the heat shield before installati jn of the insulation. 
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As an alternate method, an approved coating could be applied 
to the metal details at an earlier stage of fabrication, and the 
final mist-spray application would then be localized. 
3.  Serious consideration should also be given to development of a 
method to seal the edges of the insulation blankets thus preventin? 
sea water saturation and the subsequent difficulty of eliminating 
the chlorides. 
POSTFLIGHT NEUTRALIZATION OF CORROSION MEDIA, 
LABORATORY STUDY 
Purpose 
The external surfaces of the heat shields may be adequately neutralized 
by the postrecovery flushing procedures described later in this report. 
Development of a feasible means to remove the sea water from within the 
cells, neutralization of the active chlorides, and establishment of a non- 
destructive inspection technique were the principal objectives of a preliminary 
investigation undertaken in support of this RCM study. 
SDec ime n P r e D a r  at ion 
It was ascertained that a direct correlation between the corrosive 
attack on the aft heat shields of S / C ' s  009 and 01 1 and the Block 11 vehicles 
was impossible because the core in the early heat shields was not perforated. 
A brazed heat shield panel, which had perforated core, was therefore 
obtiined for this investigation. The core configuration was identical to 
that of the production heat shields. 
however, was l/Z-inch thick instead of 2-1/2 inches. None of the later 
material was available. The test panel was approximately 15 inches in 
diameter and a hole was drilled through the center of one facing. 
part, for attachment of a hose, was centered on the hole and welded to the 
drilled face. 
flow of the test fluids through the exposed core. 
The depth of the core in the test panel, 
A tubular 
The edge of the panel remained unsealed to permit uniform 
T e st Pr ocedur es  
Panel flow and purge tests were conducted with the test set up illustrated 
in Figure 31. 
1. Flow tests were conducted to determine the minimum static head 
pressure at which sea water would f i l l  all the cells, and the min- 
imum positive and/or negative pressure required to maintain a 
constant flow of purging fluids through the panel. It was deter- 
mined that the best uniformity of fluid circulation was obtained 
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D I A PERFORATED VACUUM 
A / CORE HCB SAMPLE 
\ TEST SOLUTION 1 
Figure 31. Flow and Purge Test Equipment 
by submerging the panel in the purging fluid while maintaining 
a negative pressure on a port attached to the center of the panel. 
2. The purge and neutralization tests were conducted with four 
purging solutions in the following sequence: 
First ,  de-ionized water; second, isopropyl alcohol; third, 
Freon-TF liquid; and finally liquid nitrogen. 
then dried by baking for approximately one hour at 16'0 to  200 F 
under a partial vacuum. It was ascertained that several volumes 
of purging fluid were required for each state of neutralization 
and drying. Subsequent to the final drying, a segment of the 
panel face was removed to visually inspect and chemically test 
for  uniformity of purge and possible residual chlorides. 
The panel was 
Results and Recommendations 
1. Both positive and negative flow pressures were determined to be 
the minimuni acceptable when the liquid flowed continuously 
without a i r  bubbles. The minimum positive pressure was deter- 
mined to be 1 psig. 
inches of Hg. It was also determined that all cells of the core 
would fill when the panel was submerged under six inches of 
The minimum negative pressure was three 
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sea water. It was therefore concluded tr-at the surface tension 
of the sea water would not prevent the core cells f rom being filled, 
and little or no pressure head was required t o  completely f i l l  
the core of the heat shield. 
2. It required six changes of demineralized H20 to reduce the 
chloride content of the effluent of the test panel to less  than 
10 parts-per-million of H2O. 
purging fluid were elso used. 
panel, it was ascertained that no chlorides were entrapped and 
the feasibility of the process was substantiated. However, before 
this process can be applied for a proposed refurbishable heai. 
shield it must be proven on a representative full-sized (or 
quarter-segment) heat shield and modified for shipboard oper- 
ations. 
stored in a controlled environment. The high-humidity, saline- 
containing mist environment would. induce active new corrosion. 
Six changes of each subsequent 
Upon examination of the stripped 
Subsequent to purging arid dryink, the panel must be 
MODIFICATION OF FLIGHT HARDWARE 
Aft Heat Shield 
To adapt this purging process to a full-size heat shield, the assembly 
would require modification prior to making the initial flight and before inating 
the aft heat shield to the side heat shield in a final assembly. The minimum 
modification for purging would consist of rhe following: A minimum of one 
vacuum-port attachment must be provided at  the centroid of field areas  of 
the core in each segment of the brazed heat shield. A single port should be 
provided at  the center of the assembly to permit introduction of the purging 
fluids and equal distribution around the edges of the perforated core. Some 
peripheral seal of the edge members may be required to minimize vacuum 
leaks at  the spotwelded- and riveted-edge members. Thr? vacuum ports and 
center port may be plumbed to permit ease of access on board ship, even in 
a partially disassembled condition, thus minimizing the time the core is 
exposed to sea water. 
the ballast sheets located on the inner surface of the aft  heat shield. 
The added weight may be compensated for by trimming 
These modifications may be varied to permit trepanning either face of 
the heat shield, in strategic locations , and attaching valve-stem type ports 
for the flushing operation. 
vacuum-bag techniques. 
negated. 
The valve stems would be held in place by standard 
The need of permanent plumbing would thus be 
Crew Compartment Side Heat Shield 
The current configuration of the side heat shields has been examined, 
The core material in these assemblies i s  also perforated. The edge members 
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have had 3/32-inch diameter holes drilled through, to the core, to permit 
circulation of inert gases around the periphery of thc individual t>anels a s  
part of the weldiqg fabrication procedures. 
The lower portion of the heat shield is submerged in sea water after 
splash down, and in its present configuration the core cells in that portion 
may become filled with sea water. 
prior to initial flight by plug welding the holes and/or by adequate use of RTV 
type sealing compounds. 
points which might permit seepage of sea water into the structure. 
cedure should also be provided to  vacuum-proof test the assembly and prove 
the adequacy of the seal. 
flight inspections. The adequacy of the sealing method should also be tested 
on a flight vehicle prior to the Block II vehicles. 
Therefore, the panels should be sealed 
The assembly should be carefully sealed at all 
A pro- 
The proof test should also be adaptable to post- 
PROCEDURE REQ TJIRING N3 FLIGHT HARDWARE iJ20DIFICA.TION 
A relatively simple purging prc-edure not requiring flight hardware 
modification, but instead the removal of the aft heat shield aboard ship, i s  
outlined below. 
After recovery, and prior to 24 hours after splashdown, the aft heat 
shield is  separated from the spacecraft and the thermal insulation blankets 
a r e  removed. After this, the accessible regions of the spacecraft, which 
were exposed to the sea water, a r e  thoroughly flushed with deionized water. 
The residue water is then remolrtd from the heat shield by means of 
the vacuum system used for purging. 
the heat shield. The four purge fittings a re  then installed in each of the 
honeycomb quadrants in the prescribed locations (at 0.59 radius from the 
center). The manifold connecting these fittings to the vacuum system i s  
then installed (Figure 32), and the flushing begins. 
of 8.5 volumes, is poured into the aft heat shield and the vacuum systerr. 
activated. A tarpaulin cover should be placed over the heat shield when the 
volatile fluids (isopropyl alcohol and liquid freon) a re  being used. 
manner the aft heat shield honeycomb is  sequentially flushed with deionized 
water (chloride getter), isopropyl alcohol (water getter), and finally liquid 
freon (very volatile alcohol getter). 
of each flushing fluid is  used. 
This obviates the necessity for tipping 
Purging fluid, consisting 
In this 
Approximately 40 gallons ( 8 . 5  volumes) 
POST FLIGHT STRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS MATERIAL EVALUATION 
Evaluation of the crew compartment and the heat shield structures for 
additional flight missions is  contingent upon thorough postflight inspection 
f o r  corrosion and latent structural damage. The reliability of the support 
, 
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1-
systems i s  also contingent upon detection and elimination of potential 
corrosive degradation. In many imtances local repairs may be made to 
refurbish the stiucture or  system ic - reliable service. 
Postflight Inspection for Corrosive Damage 
Latent damage to the structure and systems materials, attributable 
to immersior. in sea water, cannot be determined by visual inspection alone. 
Local non-destructive test methods may be used to detect the presence of 
chloride deposits. Suspect parts may then be evaluated by proof- and local- 
limited destructive tests to supplement the visual analysis. These tests are 
not complicated, and subject items are not too extensive in number, 
Crew Compartment 
The external surfaces of the aluminum facings have been coated with 
a modified epoxy adhesive primer. Cqrrosion of the aluminum materials 
will therefore be localized in areas where the prime coat is damaged and 
where hairline s -ratches or voids occur in the primer, The salt crystals 
and residue must be flushed from the surface of the primer, and a fluores- 
cent or equivalent spot checli must be made to ascertain if aluminum material 
has been exposed throughthe primer and thus subjected to the corrosive sea 
water. 
stripped and the extent of the corrosion damage evaluated. 
external surface of the crew compartment must be thus inspected. 
If a positive exposure is indicated, the prinizr must be locally 
The complete 
If corrosion has started in the faying surfaces between edge members 
and facings or between facings and doublers, the suspect bond joint must be 
stripped, to remove thc Lorrosion, and prepared for rebonding. 
repair is  not made, the corrosion could perpetuate and permeate the entire 
joint and abutting structure. 
If this 
Electrical Terminals 
K T V  type elastomers and conformal coatings have been 2:Dplied to some 
of the electrical terminals subsequent to securing the electrical leads. 
However, the coating application has not completely encapsulated some of 
the terminals and corrosion is inevitable after sea-water immersion. 
chemical spot-check method may be used to detect the presence of corrosive 
. .laterial. A l l  suspect to1 niinals should also be checked electrically. 
The 
B r a z cd I le at Shie Id s 
It is assumed that adequate 1 ovisions have been made to seal the side 
heat shield and modify the aft heat shielrl f o r  
rccomrnended revisions arc  descri'wd 8 
,:t.ri covery flushing. The 
. r~~ scction of this report. 
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The following procedure shall be fdlowed when conducting a postflight 
inspection and evaluation of the modified heat shields for repair and 
refurbishment. 
1. Deionized water shall be pumped through the individual segments 
of the aft heat shield and a silver nitrate precipitation test shall 
be conducted to detect the presence of chlorides. If the sidewall 
has been immersed in sea water, it shall again be leak tested to 
determine the adequacy of the original panel sealing. A seal 
failure shall necessitate a precipitation test  being run to detect 
the possible presence of chloride within the sandwich core. This 
will require postflight modification of the panel for attachment 
of purging parts. 
2. X-ray inspect the steel honeycomb substructure to ascertain the 
presence of face-to-core bond voids, weld cracks, damage to 
upper and. lower rings and vertical structure, and overall 
distortions . 
Postflight InsDection for Structural Bond Damaee 
The bonded crew compartment structure has been designed to  meet 
the stipulated parameters for lunar flight. Any areas  of lwal destructive 
damage may readily be observed by visual inspection and necessary repair 
procedures instituted. 
Latent damage to  the bonded structure cannot, however, be readily 
ascertained by visual examination. Pertinent proof loading, nondestructive 
test techniques, and local destructive tests must be conducted to supplement 
the visual analysis of the qualified postflight inspection team. 
Inspection of the crew compartment for structural damage by use of 
the production ultrasonic techniques, using immersion or squirted water 
for signal transmittal, should be avoided at all cost. Sealing of the complete 
compartment to prevent water seepage into the sandwich is impractical, i f  
not impossible. 
the current methocis a re  not adaptable to the completely bonded structure. 
Bond evaluation by ultrasonic methods using a small transducer and local 
coupling agents is impractical for the large iireas requiring inspection. 
Many areas  will also be inaccessible to :he probe equipment. A combination 
of the following methods is therefore recommended. 
Detection of water inside the sandwich is very difficult and 
1. Remove all unwanted shelving, compartments, and attaching 
clips before inspecting for cracks in bond lines and delaminations 
in face-to-core bonds. This must be done carefully to prevent 
damage to the sandwich. 
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2. Apply torque proof loads, a s  originally applied in proofing the 
bonds on the production command modules, to the channels, clips, 
and fittings which will be subjected to  shear, tension and torque 
loads during the proposed missions. This proof loading should 
also be completed before inspecting for cracks and delaminations. 
3. Check all channels, fittings, and attaching clips to determine 
presence of cracks in the bondlines around the edges of the 
secondarily bonded details. Visual inspection and use of feeler 
gages may be used to detect larger voids in conformance with 
NAA Specifications MA0606-006 and MAO606-014. The size of 
the voids must be checked against the production records of the 
spacecraft being refurbished. 
reason for removal and replacement of the secondary bonded 
detail. 
Any increase in void size shall be 
Many cracks may not be readily discernible by visual inspection, 
particularly in the areas  made relatively inaccessible by attached 
equipment, plumbing, and electrical harness installations. These 
a reas  may be checked for cracks by a dye-penetrant procedure. 
Proper material selection shall be made to  prevent damage to 
the bond or  details. Areas indicating cracks or voids shall be 
subject to engineering review to determine the necessity of detail 
removal and replacement. 
4. After all defective secondary bonded details are removed, the 
assembly shall  be checked for face-to-core bond delaminations . 
The initial check should be made by regulated tapping, using a 
serrated rowel with an amplifier pickup attachment. 
amplified signal may be fed through earphones or  a speaker 
system. 
a plzstic material to prevent damage to the metallic faces. 
This system of detection has been used successfully by NAA for  
quality control of production bonding. 
areas  a re  readily detected. 
The 
The edges of the serrated wheel shall be coated with 
Gross voids and suspect 
The suspect areas  shall be further inspected by use of pulse-echo 
equipment csing direct couplant for the transducer -to-bond 
coupling. 
will not contaminate the a reas  where subsequent bonding may be 
revtired. 
couplant which will permit detection of the couplant contaminated 
areas and simplify the cleaning procedures. 
Care shall  be taken in selection of a couplant which 
A fluorescent t race element m a y  be added to the 
5. Voids detected by the above procedures sliall be subject to engi- 
neering evaluation and proper repair procedures shall be instituted. 
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6.  When large areas  of the crew compartment require repairing, the 
face-to-core bond strength of the outer facing shall be proof tested 
by the established trepanned-tensile-test techniques. The number 
and location of the test specimens shall be determined by engineering 
review . 
7. After all repair an? rebonding is completed, the escape hatch 
and tunnel hatch shall be replaced and the crew compartment 
shall be pressure tested in conformance with the original struc- 
tural requirelxnts .  Any leaks shall be traced and the suspect 
area delineateu. Complete refurbishment of the hatch seals may 
be necessary. 
ReDairs (Bonded Structure) 
In some instances, void repairs may be accomplished by paste or  
foam adhesive in conforr,lance with NAA Specification MA0606-006. In other 
instances, the outer facinq and delaminated core may be removed and 
replaced with new materials in conformance with established repair pro- 
cedures (NAA S&ID PUB 5434-18).  
core-to-face bond strength commensurate with bonding to precured adhesive 
residue on the inner face df the crew compartment. 
the old adhesive and adequate recleaning of the base metal is difficult to 
accomplish without inflicting additional damage to the surrounding core 
during the cleaning process. Some additional effort should be expended to 
refine the repair procedures to accommodate the epoxy-phenolic adhesive 
systems. The core splices may be adequately achieved with the approved 
epoxy-phenolic foam o r  paste materials. 
Allowance shall be made for reduced 
Complete removal of 
Subsequent to completion of repairs and rebonding, the trimmed edges 
of the structure having bare aluminum exposed shall be covered with an RTV 
sealing compound. An additional corrosion-inhibiting coating may be applied 
over the entire structure to improve the corrosion resistance. 
Postflight Evaluation of Brazed Heat Shields 
Ablator Refurbishment 
Localized repairs of the ablator nisy be accomplished at  S&ID. 
repairs can be best accomplished at  Avco where the assembly must go for 
resizing to the new aerodynamic conto:ir. Minor localized gutting of the 
ablator may be repaired by removing the charred material and applying 
lightweight putty type ablation materials, such as Avco 5026-39, Dow 
Corning DC-325, or Emerson Electric's T500-111. 
ablator can best be repaired by locally removing all ablator and core 
Major 
Major repairs to the 
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d o r c e m e n t  down to the stesl sandwich face. New material may then be 
,,-plied in the original sequence (i. e., bonding unfilled core to metal substrate 
and filling with Avco S026-39), and sizing to the aerodynamic contour, 
Crew Compartment Side Heat Shield 
The salvaged crew compartment side heat shield assemblies from 
S/C 009and 011 indicated no serious damage to the steel sandwich structure. 
It may therefore be expected that this structure, properly sealed before 
tliyht, would also be usable with possible minor repairs. This assumption 
is contingent upon satisfactory results from the postflight inspection for 
cor r os ion. 
Aft Heat Shield 
The aft heat shield will probably experience the greatest damage, due 
to impact. However, every effort should be made to salvage the structure, 
if at all possible. The toroidal section may be removed in segments and 
locally replaced. Damaged pie-shaped segments may be removed and new 
segments welded in place. 
Every effort should be made to mate the same heat shields with the 
matching crew compartment, since indexing of the crew compai'tment-to- 
heat shield channels is not identical for all spacecraft. 
PLASTIC BOOST PROTECTIVE COVER 
The boost protective cover is jettisoned after take off and must therefore 
be replaced with a new assembly. 
that the replacement assembly will probably require new fixtures and tools 
for fabrication. Each cover is custom tailored to match a specific command 
module. 
configurations. Allowance must also be made for fabrication of new core- 
forming fixtures by the core supplier. 
critical and forming cannot be accomplished on a rework basis. 
Special note should be taken of the fact 
The RCM will be of a different contour than any of the Block 11 
The core-forming techniques a re  
POSTRECOVERY OPERATION REQUIREMENTS 
The current recovery procedures were established commensurate with 
the requirements of a single flight mission. 
not protect the heat shields or the structure and systems materials from 
the corrosive effect of sea water. 
between splash down and recovery on board ship, but includes subsequent 
action of sea water entrapped in the heat shield a i d  saturating the insulation, 
and the high-relative humidity and high-chloride content environment during 
transport to dockside. 
The procedures, therefore, do 
The exposure is nat limited to  the time 
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If postrecovery procedure modifications equivalent to the following a re  
introduced, much of the structure and the systems material, which is 
currently subject to corrosion and subsequent scrappage, may be usable for 
later flights. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
The escape hatch of the inner compartment should be relocked, 
if possible, a s  soon ascthe astronauts a re  out of the CM. Internal 
corrosive conditions would be further minimized if desiccants 
wer * placed inside the cabin. 
Subsequent to recovery on the deck of the carr ier ,  the aft heat 
shield should be removed, to permit removal of the saturated 
thermal pads and facilitate flushing of the space between the side 
and aft heat shields and the inner compartment. Fresh water, 
Preferably demineralized, should be used. A spray rinse would 
not be effective because of the type and amount of insulation within 
the space. 
The aft heat shield should be thoroughly flushed and neutralized in 
accordance with an approved procedure commensurate with that 
evaluated in the preliminary corrosion studies and included in 
this report. 
The aft  heat shield, subsequent to flushing and drying, or a sub- 
stitute fairing shall be attached to the aft end of the CM to prevent 
damage to the thin facings on the crew compartment aft bulkhead 
during transport. 
Corrosion would be further minimized if the complete compartment 
werz dryed a t  160-200 F (in a simple portable oven) for 3 to  6 
hours, subsequent to flushing and neutralizing, and placed within 
a contr olled-humidity tent during trans - shipment. 
EXPLORATORY TEST REQUIREMENTS, CLASSIFICATION TESTS 
There a r e  two basic classes of exploratory testing which must be con- 
sidered to establish the integrity of the materials used in the basic CM 
structure, and those of constituent individual systems used to  achieve the 
mission objective. One type of test determines the effect the initial flight 
has had on the basic properties of the materials. This type of test  needs 
to be conducted only once on a piece of representative or actual flight 
hardware which has been subjected to all the parametric variables of the 
initial flight mission. The information thus obtained can be applied for 
all  future hardware from identical flight missions. The second type of test 
must be repeated for every flight vehicle to asaure the reliability of later 
flights. 
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Single Term Tests  
Those tests required to establish a process for purging and neutralizing 
the aft heat shield have been described in  a previous portion of this section. 
There a r e  several other single-term tests which should be conducted 
to evaluated systems and components for potential multiple-service opera- 
tion o r  for single-term use in the proposed RCM environment. 
Reaction Control System Engines 
The following general tests should be conducted to qualify the SM-RCS 
for proposed RCM Laboratory service requirements. 
1. Qualification of the entire subsystem to the extent necessary to 
assure  satisfactory operation under the conditions of exterior 
mounting to which it will be exposed. 
may be possible. 
Qualification by similarity 
Z. Qualification of pressure vessels for the additional mission time 
to which they will be exposed under pressure. 
Additional development verification of the RCS engines is not recommended 
a t  this time. 
of total burn time and cycles have not been defined. If it is determined 
that these requirements exceed the capabilities of the current engines, a 
determination regarding additional testing should be made a t  that time. 
The RCM laboratory attitude control requirements in terms 
Command Module RCS Pres su re  Vessels 
Postflight analysis of the RCS fuel tanks of S/C 01 1 revealed the presence 
of internal corrosion and excessive contaminant particles. 
more postflight system tank should be checked out before receiving approval 
for the RCM mission. In addition, pressure vessels similar to those which 
will be reused should be qualified for the cumulative total of the original 
mission plus the 14-day RCM spacecraft mission. 
At least one 
Cold Plates 
1 .  The cold plates on CM's 009 and 011 were nol of brazed construc- 
tion. 
and examined before being approved for the RCM mission. 
A flight article of the brazed configuration should be sectioned 
2. Note: NAA has experienced corrosion with cold plates in which 
contaminated ethylene glycol had been circulated. 
experienced corrosion of cold plates from ethylene glycol residue 
i n  water. 
NAA also 
Improved methods of flushing must be provided. 
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Plumbing Lines: 
I t  has been concluded that replacement constitutes the optimum renova- 
tion approach in regards to plumbing lines. 
Windows 
The optical characteristics (light transmission and UV absorption) 
will have to be determined for  the windows (i. e., the window panes of the 
outer structure and inner structure) of the recovered Apollo command 
modules selected for RCM usage. 
Visual examination of S/C 009 and 001 windows performed a t  S&ID 
disclosed deposits of residues on the outer panes. 
S / C ' s  009and 01 1 were forwarded to NASA-MSC (at the request of NASA) 
for comprehensive study purposes. 
The windows of the 
Preliminary evaluation of the S /C  01 1 by NAA revealed that the residue 
deposits were restricted to the window pane of the outer structure (Figure 33) 
and indicated that the residue may be removed b y  washing. 
postflight evaluation a t  S&ID has not been completed. 
be completed on a subsequent flight. 
However, the 
The evaluation should 
Thermal Control Coatings 
The RCM will require new radiator locations. The new thermal 
control coating will likely be required based upon a new solar absorptance/ 
emittance ratio (as/ Q ) requirement. The white coating (Type 2-93, zinc 
oxide pigment in potassium silicate binder) used on the Apollo radiators 
will be used to the greatest extent possible, probably in conjunction with 
another coating also known to be stable to space environment. 
control coatings selected will have to be subjected to development verification 
and to component-verification qualification tests. 
The thermal- 
Latching Mechanisms 
Tests should be planned for those subassemblies, such as the latching 
mechanisms for the crew hatch, which are non-lubricated and where the 
RCM missions will require extended use for these assemblies. 
Latch type mechanisms such as those used for the crew hatch might 
have to be re-designed for the RCM missions. 
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Vacuum Sublimating Mate rials 
Considerable data reflecting environmental laboratory testing of dry 
film and viscous lubricants, non-metallic materials, and any materials in 
general which are subject to significant sublimation in  vacuum, are available 
and are supplemented b y  actual satellite experience. 
r ials,  lubricants, etc.,  similar to those used on Apollo are available, and 
indicate the suitability of these materials for  vacuum exposure compatible 
with the RCM mission length, qualification b y  similarity would be employed 
to reduce the amount of required testing. 
Where data for mate- 
Dry Film Lubricant 
Tests dhould be planned to determine the adequacy of the Apollo designs 
which employ dry-film lubricants for the extended RCM applications. Limited 
sliding-friction tests should be conducted which represent the material com- 
binations and contemplated RCM applications. 
Solid dry-film lubricants are used for general Apollo applications 
where sliding friction is involved. 
lubricated surfaces, especially after long time exposure to space environ- 
ment, is  not known. 
The extended performance of these 
Viscous Lubricants 
The viscous lubricants currently used for Apollo applications must 
be re-evaluated on the basis of the extended mission parameters. 
approval cannot be construed as unlimited acceptance for  the alternate 
mi  ss ions. 
Current 
Nonmetallic Material Environment Testing 
The materials currently used within the Apollo CM have been approved 
on the basis of the current crew compartment environment and a maximum 
flight exposure of 14 days. 
The proposed environment is changed and many of the materials may 
prove to be time dependent. Therefore, the non-metallic materials must 
be re-evaluated to ascertain conformance to the flammability and toxicity 
requirements as noted in the Apollo Material and Producibility Bulletin 
Number 8. The tests shall be conducted in accordance with the governing 
NAA specifications (MA01 15-008 and MA01 15-009) with the exception that 
the test chamber requirements shall be modified to represent those of the 
extended mission, and the exposure time shall be extended accordingly. 
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Threaded Mechanical P a r t s  
Special endurance tests for fasteners and threaded mechanical par ts  
(to be subsequently designated) in line with their planned RCM extended use 
i n  space environmental conditions (vacuum, temperature) should be planned, 
Apollo contains a small number of fasteners and threaded components 
largely confined to linkage type mechanisms associated with controls and 
which were designed for short  time, limited usage. 
RCM will impose longer loading (stressed) times, extended cyclic loads, 
as well as the reuse of many of these components, 
It is foreseen that the 
Pyrotechnical Devices 
There a re  no requirements a t  present which involve vacuum exposure 
of pyrotechnics for longer than 14 days prior to activation; therefore, no 
additional qualification will be required. 
entail separation or  other pyrotechnic-activated functions after a longer 
exposure to the space environment, additional qualification may then be 
necessary. 
In the event that future missions 
Mulliple Term Tests  
Those tests required for corrosive and structure evaluation of the 
heat shields and crew compartments of all postflight vehicles have been 
described in a preceding section (Postflight Structure and Systems Material 
Evaluatiom) . 
The following tests,  although of acceptance: test stature, are mandatory 
to be assured of reliable material properties. Special note should be taken 
of the precautions which must be observed to be assured of requalification. 
The systems of particular importance are:  
Cold Plates 
The follow;!:,: tests should be planned for the cold plates of all recovered 
Apollo spacecrait: 
1. Re-acceptance test procedures for command modules being con- 
sidered for refurbishment should include analyses of test samples 
of the ethylene glycol solutions removed from the cold plale 
s y s  tem s. 
Cold plate systems whose solutions contain corrosive products o r  excessive 
quantities of water should 1101 be considered for rcfurbj shment. 
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Note: The water glycol fluid should not be drained 
unless the fluid can be completely removed 
from the cold plate system. The fu l l  water- 
glycol content should be retained and main- 
tained i f  the water-glycol solution can not be 
completely removed. The fluid when main- 
tained, should be periodically circulated in  
accordance with a planned schedule. 
Reaction Control System Pressure V e s s e l s  
The following general tests should '!e planned for all recovered reaction 
control system tanks selected for reuse in an RCM. 
1. A re-acceptance test procedure should be created and implemented 
for the RCS fuel, oxidizer, and pressurant tanks. Re-accc ptance 
testing of the propellant tanks should consist of a t  least  
a. Visual inspections (disassembled) 
b. Dimensional inspections (disassembled) 
c. Proof test (without bladder and. the other internal components) 
d. Leakage test (without bladder and the other internal 
components) 
e. Proof-cyclic tests (with bladder installed) 
f .  Leakage tests (with bladder installed) 
The exteriial tank surfaces and supplementary plumbing lines 
will have to be sprayed with fresh water to fully remove salt 
residues and then dried with isopropyl alcohol a s  soon after 
recovery from the original Apollo flight a s  is possible. 
tion, proper flushing, evacuating, and neutralizing procedures 
will have to be implemented to the RCS, itself, and to the indi-vidrid 
ta ti k s . 
In addi- 
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N. HEATSHlELD 
Figure 34 shows the three components of the heat shield. 
heat shield, whch is ejected prior to reentry, is not recovered and, 
therefore, must be replaced. As stated earlier,  the crew-compartment 
heat shield suffers only minor degradation, from reentry plasma errosion 
and heating. However, the R C S  propellant dump-burn prior to splashdown 
creates severe, but localized, charring (Figures 35 and 36). The 
degrzidation presents no serious renovation problem, since, at worst, the 
entire ab1at;on material can be replaced in these a reas  without undue 
difficulty. 
reentry trajectory and, since it bears the brunt of the reentry s t resses ,  is 
considered the critical heat shield component in this study. 
The forward 
The aft heat shield is degraded to a degree dependent on the 
A cursory analysis was  conducted of the ablator performance of the 
aft he2t. 
and the results correlated to S / C  011 data to within 10 peicent. 
tlie analysis will  be disccssed in the following portion of this section, having 
been summarized in Section I. 
The analytic model developed in the Apollo program was used, 
R e s u l t s  of 
ANALYSIS 
The cursory analysis consisted of determining the thermal and physical 
response at two locations on tlie heat shield (the stagnation and leeward 
points) for two trajectories; both have heat loads equal to or  greater than 
those for earth-orbital entry. A 28.5 kfps entry ( S / C  01 1 nominal) and a 
maximum-heat-load-lunar-return trajecsory were used, and nominal 
rather than design heating rates were used. 
were used in analyzing the ablator performance, and the S / C  011 Block I 
thicknesses were used to ascertain nominal S / C  01 1 heat-shield temperatures. 
Block 11 heat-shield thicknesses 
The RCM spacecraft ablator-thickness requirements were established 
(sized) for the 28.5 kfps entry by determining the ablator thickness required 
to protect the bond line to a maximum temperature of 600 F before o r  a t  
time of earth impact. 
Results of the analysis a r e  summarized in Figure 37. The NAA 
charring ablator program APD 11 3 was used for this analysis. 
Figure 37 also shows the relative position on the CM of the locations 
considered. 
for reference. 
The one-dimensional model used for analysis is also shown 
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Figures 38 through 43 depict the bond-line temperature histories for 
Figures 44 and 45 present the aluminum pressure- the cases considered. 
vessel temperature history for the 28. 5 Wps entry trajectory, with the 
ablator sized for this trajectory. 
not rise significantly in the cases where SC 011 final-machined ablator 
thicknesses and Block II thicknesses w e r e  considered. 
The pressure-vessel temperature does 
\ 
By comparison (in Figure 37) of the virgin material remaining after 
flight with the sized thickness determined for the 28. 5 kfps entry, i t  can be 
concluded that vehicles subjected to entry from earth orbit a re  potentially 
refurbishable from a thermal consideration. 
to other types of lunar-return entry trajectories such as maximum-heating 
rate trajectories, as opposed to the maximum-heating load trajectory that 
w a s  considered, it is determined that some Block II vehicles may be 
ref urbishable, based on individual mission conside radons. 
If this study were extended 
I t  should be stressed that this analysis and i ts  results are preliminary. 
Areas of perturbed flow remain to be considered. 
PRELWINARY HEAT SHIELD RENOVATION ASSESSMENT BY AVCO 
The appendix of this  volume contains the Avco report of the 
preliminary study of heat shield renovation. It was  conducted by Avco in 
support of the study, and categorized ablator renovation into three types: 
Class A. Direct reuse of the ablator without any operation on the 
ablator material 
Class B. Char removed and surface resealed 
Class C. All  the ablator material removed down to the substrate, 
and new ablator material installed and sealed 
Class C renovation is technically feasible since i t  constitutes an 
Apollo Class 3 repair. 
of this approach has been proved in flight. 
of Class A and B renovation has not been demonstrated and would require 
analysis of future Apollo heat shield char distribution, assessment of the 
thermostructural aspects of reusing ablator material, determination of 
aerotherrnodynamic performance of an ablator that has been once used, and 
the generation of production techniques to determine ablator status and 
salt water content and to preserve delamination. 
Class C techniques, the renovated heat shield would cost approximately 
65 percent the price of a new heat shield. If Class A and B techniques 
prove feasible, even greater savings will result from employing those 
Techniques and facilities exist, and the effectiveness 
The effectiveness and feasibility 
At the very worst, using 
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Figure 38. Bondline Temperature History, Location LOO, Block I1 
Thickness ,  HL- 1, Nominal l-IeatiiiK 
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F i g u r e  39. Bondline Temperature His tory ,  Location 210, Block II 
Thickness, HL-1, Nominal Heating 
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Figure  41. Bondline T e m p e r a t u r e  History,  Location 210, Spacecraf t  01 I 
Final Machined Thickness, 28 ,500-FPS  Entry Tra j ec to ry  
- 90 - 
SID 66- 185 3 - 3  
N O R T H  A M E R I C A N  AVIATION,  I N C .  SPACE and INFORMATION 8YSTEhlS DIVISION 
OWES tlSUClU?E WILL lEWPER41UPE 
4 - WTC9 FACE WEE1 (I - INNER FACE W E E 1  
F i g u r e  42. Bondlinc Temperature History, Location LOO, Ablator Sizc.cl i c i r ,  
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Figure  43.  Bondlinc Tcmperaturc  History, Location 210, Ablator Sized for, 
and Subjected t o ,  28,500-FPS Ent ry  T,-ajectory 
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Figure  44. Aluminum P r c s s u r e  V e s s e l  Temperature IIislory, Location .!Oil, 
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renovation approach. Another advantage is time. 
renovation is approximately six months, while lead time for a new heat shield 
would be about two years. 
time required to produce the honeycomb substrates. 
Lead time for heat- shield 
This difference is due to the retooling and setup 
SPACECRAFT 011 DATA 
Heat shield degradation data from S/C 011 provided a base point for 
consideration. 
at  Downey after recovery from flight. 
support imprints where the salt deposits have been disturbed. 
lights an important renovation consideration: even with the sea water baked 
out of the porous ablator material, the remaining salt will have some effect 
on the aerothermodynamic performance of the material if i t  is to be reused. 
I t  is suspected that this will improve the performance, but this would have 
to be investigated rigorously before the remaining virgin o r  reaction zone 
material could be used for subsequent missions. 
the ?hcto also reveals the prevalence of Class 3 repairs  and that the fabri- 
cation mode involves the assembly of gore sections. 
The S / C  011 aft heat shield is shown in Figure 46 as  received 
Evident in the photo are the dolly 
This high- 
A close examination of 
Figure 47 is a photograph of what appears to be abl’ator material 
separation in the S / C  011 aft heat shield in the stagnation region. 
examination i t  was found that the fissure was only one-half inch deep, and 
due to low de-isity material in the core gape splice. 
faster than that surrounding it. 
occur. 
from it, except that the surface recession and reaction penetration were some- 
what greater in the fissure. The degree of this difference from nominal 
can be appreciated when i t  is considered that the heat rate at the bottom of 
a fissure with a one to two aspect (width of fissure to depth of fissure) is 
l e s s  than one percent of that at  the surface. These anomalies, however, 
do have some effect on the renova)i.on considerations, since :he remaining 
virgin material in the vicinity of the fissure may be inadequate i f  the average 
thickness i s  marginal. 
Upon 
This material ablated 
This condition is r a r e  and will seldom 
Even so, no anomalous performance was observed to have resulted 
The fiber-glass edge members of the heat shield suffered little to no 
Virtually 
degradation on the S / C  01 1. 
heat shield edge member in the vicinity of the stagnation region. 
no discoloration is evidenced beyond the char level of the ablation material. 
Figure 48 shows a n  S/C 011 crew-compartment 
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V. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND LIFE SUPPORT 
Components of the environmental control and life support systems 
(ECS/LSS) are located in both the command module and service module. 
All S M  equipment items are lost during separation. 
of the space radiators plus their flow-control system. 
items, located in the CM, therefore, were studied. 
These consist mainly 
The remaining 
OPE RATIONAL DEGRADATION FACTORS 
During preliminary evaluation of the various sources of equipment 
degradation, it w a s  decided to delete the effectr of radiation and meteoroid 
environments from detailed analysis for the i d l '  owing reasons: 
1. The equipment inside the CM will be adequately SJrotected from 
radiation. 
2. Meteoroids can affect the ECS/LSS only during catastrophic 
penetration, in which case the CM would not be renovated. 
To reduce the data available into usable cr i ter ia  for evaluation of the 
degradation experienced by the ECS/LSS during a lunar mission, six pr i -  
mary parameters were chosen: temperature, pressure,  shock, corrosive 
contaminants, acceleration, and life requirements. 
Table 15 l ists  these parameters and gives the design and test  require- 
ments versus the study requirements. 
parameter is evaluated. 
In the following sections, each 
T empcr atu re 
The most crucial area of potential temperature degradation was 
reentry heating. 
Each component of the ECS/LSS was given a two-hour test  at 150 F during 
qualification testing. 
for two and one-half hours a t  a CM wall temperature of 150 F. The indi- 
cation here would lead to the assumption that since qualificat'ri tc;.. t.ing 
exceeds both t .  
degradation due to temperature exposure should be minimized. 
The estimated maximum temperature was only 126 F. 
During mission life testing the assembly was exposed 
temperature level and time of exposure, the perfor nance 
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Table 15. Evaluated ECLSS Parameters 
Design Requirement 
Storage 
-25 F to  105 F 
for 3 years  
Air Transportat ion 
-20 F to  140 F 
for 9 hours 
Operating 
50 F ground cooling 
60 F minimum space 
flight 
150 F maximum 
average during 
entry 
200 F maximum 
local a t  entry 
Normal  
5 psia  - 100% 0 2  
e H g  
for 96 hours  
78 g's with leakage 
not to  exceed 
10 cc /h r  
P o s t  landing vent 
valve and blower 
must  operate 
Environment of 
95*570 RH 
95*5% 0 2  
1% sa l t  fog 
20 g's  maximum 
Dynamic components 
Static components 
1,200 hours 
3,000 h o u r s  
salification T e s t  
Re quire m e n t 
2-hour soak at 
150 F for each 
component 
2 .5  hours a t  150 
on assemblies  
2-hour soak at 60 F 
430 hours a t  5 psia  
life t e s t  
200 hours at I ~ l O - ~ m m  
Hg life test 
78  g 's  shock t e s t  
Submerged in  
2-112 feet of sea 
water for  15 
minutes; combined 
02, humidity, and 
salt- spray  tes t  
20 g ' s  test 
863 hours mission 
life tes t  with 
limited maintenance 
~ 
Study Results 
15 F CM 
in te r ior ,  minimum 
126 F maximum at 
reent ry  
100 hours a t  
lxl0-4mm Hg 
~~~ - ~ 
No more  than 
20 g's 
~ ~~ ~ 
Not more  than 20 g's 
520 hours  
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Pressure 
During mission life tests a l l  equipment will be exposed to twice the 
length of time a t  5 psia and 1 x lO-*mm Hg than will be experienced during 
an Apollo lunar mission. 
to degradation in performance caused by vacuum exposure. 
The same conclusion could be drawn with respect 
Shock and Acceleration 
The estimate shock and acceleration load on equipment will not be 
greater than 20 g during an earth landing. The design and test  value of 
78  g for all assemblies will result in equipment that can withstand 20 g 
with little more than increased leakage or loss of calibration tolerances. 
Corrosive Contaminants 
The ECS/LSS equipment in the CM has been designed and tested to with- 
As stand corrosion resulting from the normally expected Apollo atmosphere. 
a conservative approach it is planned to replace all i tems exposed to sea  water 
or ur i re .  
Life Re qui r e men t s 
Thus, this source of corrosion need not be considered. 
A s  can be seen by examining Table 15, the ECS is life-tested almost to 
twice the anticipated Apollo lunar mission. 
of course, are the rotating members of pumps, fans, and blowers. 
The most crucial components, 
To sum up results of Table 15, it can be concluded that the ECS/LSS is 
designed and tested in excess of a single Apollo lunar mission; with proper 
renovation, this equipment contains enough reserve life for reuse in an RCM 
spacecraft or laboratory. 
ECS STATUS DUE TO FLIGHT AND POSTRECOVERY OPERATIONS 
In general terms,  the command module ECS is composed of four fluid 
circuits and controls, which provide the required function. 
a r e  two oxygen, pressurization, and suit loops; water collection. and distri- 
bution; and coolant circuit. 
circulation a r e  employed from active pumping to flow by pressure differential. 
The fluid circuits 
Within these circuits the various methods of 
To establish some indication of the subsystem and component status, 
and from this status define the general renovation requirements, the types of 
hardware contained in the ECS must be identified in order of effect on system 
performance 02, in this case, system degradation. By utilizing available 
information and data indicated by installed redundancy, component development 
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Category 
1. Rotating machinery 
history, and S/C 009 postflight data, Table 16 was constructed to show the 
four major categories and the types of hardware in each category and 
arranged in the order of decreasing effect on system performance. 
Type of Component 
Fans, compressors, pumps (all types) 
Table 16. Categories of Hardware in Order of 
Effect on System Performance 
3 .  Semi-active machinery 
I 
Solenoid and motor driven valves, 
check valves, hand valves, relief 
valves 
2. Active machinery P r e s  su re  regulators , modulating 
control, valves 
4. Passive machinery Sensors, electronics control boxes, 
flow limiters, tankage, heat 
exchangers, S/ C plumbing and 
ducting, filters 
I 
SUBSYSTEM STATUS AND ASSOCIATED PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION 
Rotating Machinery 
The critical rotating machinery in the CI’vI ECS is the coolant pumps, 
cabin recirculation fans, and suit compressors. The two areas  in the motor 
and impeller combination subject to degradation or failure are bearings and 
motor insulation. In the case of motor insulation, tests can be conducted to 
establish the status of this parameter and associated degradation. Bearings, 
on the other hand, present a different problem: the exact status cannot be 
determined by testing in the assembled condition; disassemble and inspection 
a r e  necessary to determine actual status. In the past, many companies have 
expended much effort to establish a method for determining or predicting 
bearing life with any degree of accuracy, which indicates that bearing status 
and associated component life is somewhat in question. However, noting 
S/C 009 post flight data entries for the water glycol pump assembly and the 
cabin recirculating fans in Table 17, indications are that flight environments 
and operating times caused little performance degradation, which could mean 
that flight environments such as those of S/C 009 will not degrade the water 
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glycol pumps and cabin recirculating fans beyond renovation. Since impact 
loading and boost vibration appear to  cause bearing problems, similar data 
from SIC 009 would be expected for all other S/C's due to similiarities in 
trajectory . 
There a re  no data in Table 17 for the suit compressor, since S / C  009, 
being unmanned, had no requirement for suit compressor. 
Included in the rotating category a re  the cyclic accumulators , which 
a r e  oxygen-pressure actuated. 
have indicated that the component is subject to  leakage due to material 
fatigue over extended operating periods. It would be expected that the com- 
bination of operation time and temperature exposure would cause leakage. 
In addition, the component might show contamination from being exposed to 
perspiration. 
Development history and flight test operations 
Active Machinerv 
ESS pressure regulators, including cabin-pressure relief and oxygen- 
demaixd regulators, can Le grouped for this discussion. The causes of 
failure a r e  contamination and failure of springs , diaphragms, and seals. 
Regulators illustrate somewhat the same unknowns as motor bearings in  that 
hsassembly is required to evaluate status to some degree of accuracy. 
Pressure  regulators operating at high pressures and controlling to relatively 
wide pressure tolerances a re  not expected to show much degradation in 
performance due to rugged internal construction. 
may cause leakage and, in some cases, necessitate recalibration and 
adjustment. 
The g loading of impact 
From Table 17 it can be seen that the higher pressure regulators, like 
the tank pressure regulator and the 0 2  pressure regulator assemblies, could 
pass ATP requirements after flight. On the other hand, the low-pressure 
oxygen in-flow valve and the cabin-pres sure regulator would require recali- 
bration or repair prior to reuse. 
The oxygen demand regulator is expected to  suffer some damage from 
impact g landing, Regulators of this type must be delicate in order to  per- 
form the necessary function at very low pressure differentials (approximately 
9 inches of water to 4.0  psi). In addition, norxxal usage requires that suit- 
circuit oxygen in the tnree-man suit conditron be vented through the relief 
port. 
established by suited operation and the number of times the relief function 
i s  required. 
This is a possible source of contamination, the degree of which is 
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One of the most critical components in the pressure regulation system 
is the cabin-pressure relief valve. 
during flight, hot incoming gases during entry, and salt  water after impact, 
degradation in performance, leakage, and, to  some degree, internal and 
external corrosion a r e  expected. 
Due to the valve's exposure to vacuum 
Table 17 indicates that the relief valve did not show any degradation 
i n  performance in the way of leakage and boost relief, but corrosion on 
external parts and some deviation in entry pressurization were observed. 
This would also be expected since S / C  009 did not experience the extended 
vacuum exposure of flight and the higher temperature conditions of lunar 
entry. 
The flow-modulating valves in the water-glycol loop are the cabin 
These components will see many operating cycles 
temperature control valve and the glycol temperature control valve across 
the radiator system. 
throughout the flight portion of the lunar mission and a r e  subject to wear of 
moving parts, internal leakage, and possible water -glycol contamination. 
External leakage is also expected as a result of impact g loading. 
The suit circuit bypass valve is expected to show similar effects as the 
low-?ressure regulator since j also operates on a very low pressure differ- 
ential. This component is a: .:ted to require adjustment as result of impact 
loading. In addition, the suit bypass valve is exposed to suit-circuit atrnos- 
phere during suited operation and, as such, could be expected to show 
contamination. 
temperature and vacuum extremes do not occur, and very little performance 
degradation is expected as a result of these environments. 
Also, as is the case of all suit-circuit components, high 
Semi - active Machinery 
This category of hardware is rugged and under normal mission condi- 
tions operates little; therefore, i t  would not be expected to be degraded from 
wear 3r mission life. 
structure in the CM that can be expected to reach relative high temperatures 
(200 F maximum) concurrent with impact. Thc combination of temperature 
and impact would cause deformation of seals and seats; therefore, internal 
ieakage is expected. External leakage is not expected to be a major factor 
in this type of hardware except for compoi..:nts that use gaskets. 
Some components in this category a re  located on 
Data shown in Table 17 under Back Pack Supply Valve, 0 2  Check Valve, 
and W;,te- Panel indicate the above status, 
that components were subjected to the maximum temperature environment 
at impact. 
However, it should be noted 
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As mectioned previously, the suit-circuit Components are not expected 
to show degradation from temperature and vacuum extremes. 
circuit check valves are expected to show contamination as a result of 
exposure to suit-circuit atmosphere. 
The suit- 
Passive Machinery 
With the exception of sensors and electronic boxes, these components 
are rugged and have no moving parts to cause wearing problems. In general, 
temperature and vacuum exposure should cause no degradation, with the 
exception of water tanks, which will be exposed to high temperature during 
en t ry  and to salt water after impact. These conditions would result in tank 
bladdcr damage and external corrosion and would require replacement of the 
entire tank. Both the suit-circuit heat exchanger and the glycol boiler con- 
tain metal wicking that could be expected to show contamination and corrosion 
after being subjected to perspiration from the crew. In addition, the metal 
wick might be damaged on impact. 
loading could also cause external leakage. 
Also, it should be expected that impact g 
Table 17 indicates that external leakage existed and that internal flow 
paths had been damaged, causing pressure to continue to drop. 
The considerations of leakage would also apply to the cabin heat 
exchanger. However, as can be seen from Table 17, the cabin heat exchanger 
survived the S /  6 009 flight environment without any functional degradation. 
Spacecraft plumbing and ducting would be expected to show some leakage 
as a result of impact. 
damage-repaired; however, it has been generally decided to replace all 
plumbing and ducting during renovation. 
give some indication of the leakage that can be expected and show little danger 
of secondary damage. 
The extent of leakage could be established by test  and 
The data on Table 17 for the ECU 
General Conclusions from S / C  009 Postflight Analysis 
The S / C  009 ECS was in relatively good working order, as illustrated 
by the types of rejections shown in the postfilght acceptance and system 
testing report (AiResearch Report No. SS-1917-R dated 13 July 1966). The 
major rejections a re  on the basis of flow, leakage, and calibration. These 
conditions a r e  attributed to the impact g loxling, since the flight environments 
of temperature and pressure and mission duration did not exceed the design 
requirements of the ECS hardware. 
Specific conchsions are shown in Table 17 under Remarks and 
C0r.m a t s  . 
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RENOVATION REQUIREMENTS 
Renovation requirements for individual equipment items a re  listed in 
Table 18. 
Since all of the part  numbers for Block I and II are not the same, the 
table has been divided into three lists as follows: 
List No. 1. 
Block II 
All equipment items common to both Block I and 
List No. 2 .  Additional equipment items applicable to Block I space- 
craft (List No. 2 plus List No, 1 will contain all items on Block I 
spacecraft). 
List No. 3. 
craft (List No. 3 plus List No. 1 will contain all items on Block II 
spacecraft). 
Additional equipment items applicable to Block II space- 
Part Numbers 
The numbers in the Part Number column of Table 18 fall into .three 
categories : 
All 800,000 ser ies  numbers are AiResearch par t  numbers. 
All  nomber prefixed ttME" or "V" are NAA part  numbers o r  
In some cases, an item will have both an AiResearch and an 
applicable drawing numbers. 
NAA part number . 
Refurbishment Description Coding 
After study of the refurbishment requirements of the various types of 
equipment items, i t  was found that the various types of activities could be 
placed i n  four categories, requirements consisting of any one or combination 
thereoi: 
Code 1. Disassemble, inspect, and clean all parts; reassemble, 
incorporating new seals, jackets, diaphragms, flapper valves, 
and springs. 
Code 2.  Check calibration and/or recalibrate to obtain operation and/or 
control a t  proper tolerances for temperature, pressures,  
flows, etc. 
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Code 3. 
Code 4. 
Replace all bearings on rotzrting members. 
Check for corrosion caused by ethylene glycol or other 
operating fluid. 
These code numbers identifying the refurbishment required are entered 
under the Description column in Table 18. 
Percent of Original Cost 
The figures in this column are based on assuming 10 percent for 
assembly and assembly with no testing of the renovated item included. 
die  - 
Item Numbers 
The number appearing in the Item Number column of Table 17 are those 
found on AiResearch schematic drawing 848149 for Block I and 848150 for 
Block II. 
POSTRECOVERY OPERATION REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS 
The general ECS postlanding recovery procedures and constraints are 
concerned with the RCM ECS/LSS fluid systems and the reuse of installed 
plumbing and ducting. To achieve this goal, the following procedure is 
followed: 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
Immediately upon its recovery, the ethylene glycol circuit shal l  
be continuously circulated by use of ground support equipment on 
board ship, at the forward area and during transportation to manu- 
facturing. 
To maintain the cold plates in a usable condition, they must be 
processed to the original dry-shipment condition immediately upon 
reaching manufacturing. 
and following the applicable paragraphs of existing process speci- 
fication MA0201-5144. 
This can be done by using normal GSE 
After the flushing, cleaning, and drying a re  completed per the above 
specification and the components to be renovated are removed, the 
plumbing lines should be pressurized with dry nitrogen and capped. 
Pr ior  to reinstallation of components, process specifications for 
line cleaning should be followed. Specifications a re  as follows: 
MA0206-0128 for 02, MA0206-0174 for W/G, and M~0206-0175 
for H2O. 
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It ehould be noted that the above requirements consider the cold plates 
as  part of installed plumbing. 
potential corrosion tendencies of cold plates and heat exchangers. Efforts 
to date have indicated that corrosion occurs when the coolant is ailowed to 
stand in equipment, such as cold plates, with small  volumes and large 
surface areas .  
Apollo ECS experience has indicated the 
The primary cause here is utilization of inhibitors in the small volume 
of coolant, resulting i n  corrosion caused by noninhibited coolants. 
preclude this situation, circulation should be maintained until the system can 
be properly cleaned and dried. 
To 
EXPLORATION TEST REQUIREMENTS 
A number of tests could be run on the first suit-circuit heat exchangers 
and glycol evaporators to ascertain the extent of degradation of the wicking 
material and porous plates. 
and then disassembling or  cutting up the first units received to  obtain finite 
data on the extent of degradation. 
savings on subsequent units. 
These tests would consist of performance-testing 
This procedure might result in considerable 
Further savings might be made by exploratory testing to evaluate the 
effect of degradation on the elastomers in semipassive items, such as hand 
valves, solenoid valves, check valves, and relief valves and especially 
backup-type check valves as used in the glycol circuit to close the line if  the 
hand valve is not closed before separation of the CM from the SM. 
Certain hand valves that do not have free internal elements subject to 
damage during impact loading may benefit greatly from exploratory testing. 
Most of these type items can stand some increase in internal leakage and 
sti l l  operate satisfactory i n  the system, but no increase in external leakage. 
Inspection and renovation of first items of these categories may indicate that 
no or little renovation i s  actually needed. 
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CONDITION uF RECOVERED SYSTEM 
The Apollo electric power system (EPS) and sequencing system (SS) 
have been investigated to determine the feasibility of reusi:: them in a 
renovated command module spacecraft (RCMS). In general, the EPS equip- 
ment should be in good condition after a flight. This, of course, assumes 
that the EPS has operated normally during a flight and that there has  been 
no physical damage to the equipment. The SS control components, on the 
other hand, have a serious lifetime limitation and should be replaced. A 
summary of the results of this investigation is shown in Tables 19 :md 20, 
along with a recommendation of each component's reusability. Included in 
Table 19 a r e  some service module components which a r e  listed to identify 
the equipment that may be required a s  new items in a renovated command 
module laboratory (RCML). 
PHI  SICAL EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENT 
The physical environment to which the EPS and SS a r e  exposed does 
not significantly contribute to the degradation of the equipment. With the 
exception of some wiring harnesses and connectors, the EPS is contained 
within the crew compartment. Thus, the environment to which it is 
exposed is less  severe than the e> srnal space environment. 
The natural environments , including radiation, micrometeoroids, 
and vacuum, a re  not cause for a great deal of concern. The radiation level 
to which the EPS and SS will be exposed is predicted to be several orders  
of magnitude below that necessary to damage the equipment. Micromete- 
oroid damage also has not been considered too seriously as a subsystem 
operational problem. If a micrometeoroid should have sufficient energy 
to penetrate the command module and damage a piece of the EPS or  SS, 
the command module would probably be damaged to a point where a suc- 
cessful reentry is questionable. 
compartment has been estimated to be loo4  mrn Hg due to spacesuit leaks, 
This vacuum will occur during extravehicular activities and should not exceed 
100 hours during a flight. The qualification tests for the equipment simulated 
this environment, and the results did not reveal any adverse effects. 
The vacuum environment in the crew 
The induced environment, such a8 vibration, shock, and temperature, 
called out in the Apollo Environment Specification (Reference 1) has been 
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very close to the data obtained from S/C 009. Vibration data from air- 
frame 006 tests did not exceed the requirements called for in the EPS cquip- 
ment design. The inverter and battery charger are potted inuide the case 
and the components a re  supported and clamped by the potting material. The 
motor-driven switch contacts are locked firmly in place by the internal cam 
mechanism and a re  well able to withstand the vibrati-n. Devices using the 
same basic mechanism as the Apollo motor switch have successfully survived 
shock and vibration requirements greater than those specified for the Apollo. 
Shock within the command module has been ascertained to be less than 
the 78 g called out in the equipment design requirement. This high shock 
level was called out to  ensure crew safety and should normally occur in the 
command module impact area. An inverter at Westinghouse was subjected 
to the 78-g shock a d  was still in pod condition after the test. Because of 
the similarity of construction, bo* the inverter and battery h g e r  should 
withstand the shock of impact with no degradation of performance. 
The thermal analysis described in Section It was performed using 
upgraded data from S / C  009 to determine the temperature of the structure 
during reentry. 
components will be exposed. As can be seen, the inverters are mounted in 
the location of greatest heat. The inverters a r e  also the largest active heat 
producer: that a re  candidates for reuse in a 'iter flight. Data from the 
S/C 001 flight show that the inverter temperature never exceeded 140 F, 
which is well within the operating limit. 
ment should not affect the operating lifetime of the reusable EPS hardware. 
Table 21 shows the temperature to which several EPS 
Therefore, the temperature environ- 
The wiring harnesses, in general, should be in good condition. Cable 
connectors a re  generally moisturepoof and lockwired in place to the equip- 
ment. 
primer and then potted with a silicon rubber material. 
crew compartment on S / C  009 and S/C 011 appeared brand-new after their 
flights. 
harsher environment and must be carefully checked before use.' Of course, 
the CM/SM umbilical harness must be replaced. 
in the aft compartment appeared to be in good condition. 
S / C  011 revealed salt deposits on some of the harnesses, and a few connectors 
shawed signs of corrosion on their external surfaces. 
apparent on the pins of the connectors that had been disconnected, but one of 
them did have slight deposits of a white material on the front surface. 
this is  residue from sea water or matter that came loose after the connector 
had been disconnected is not known. 
codd be used again with little refurbishment. If proper recovery techniques 
are  used to minimize the effects of corrosion, this shwld be the case on 
sub sequent flights. 
All exposed terminals a r e  first conformally coated with a silicon 
The cables within the 
The cables external to the crew compartment a re  exposed to a much 
The remainder of the cables 
Examination of 
No currosion was 
Whether 
In general, it appeared that the wiring 
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T8bh 21. Compoahnt Support Structure Temperatures 
C l U 1  
C14A2 
Cl4A3 
C l U 7  
Cl4A8 
c14A12 
C14A13 
Cl4Al6 
CliBTCl 
c1m1 
c1-2 
C1-3 
C15A5 
Location 
Central lower equipment bay 
Aft RH equipment bay 
Aft lower equipment bay 
Aft RH equipment bay 
Aft RH equipment bay 
Aft RH equipment bay 
Aft RH equipment bay 
Aft R?i equipment bay 
Aft lower equipment bay 
Aft lower equipment bay 
Aft lower equipment bay 
Aft lower equipment bay 
Aft RH equipment bay 
Temperature 
(F) 
93 
110 
134 
110 
110 
110 
110 
81 
132 
135 
132 
139 
110 
It may be posrible to refurbirh the feedthrough connectors that parr 
the electrical rigaalr out of the crew compartment. The feedthroughs contain 
pyrotechnic devicer that deadface reruitive wirer durir.g reentry be separating 
two rets of coamectorr. Once actuated, the p b r  within the Unit are exposed 
.d are rubject to the effects of sea water during postlanding operations. 
However, no tertr have been performed to arcertain the effects of sea water 
or firing of the pyrotechnic device on the reliable life of the feedthrough. 
Costa for the additional qualification and refurbishment could earily exceed 
the replacement cost. Instead of performing these necessary testa, it is 
recommeded that new units be used. 
It is evident that the environment to which the EPS and SS are exposed 
have a minimal effect on the hardware. The stringent requirements imposed 
by crew safety criteria have resulted in a conservative design philosophy. 
The only enVironment that has not been included in the design and qualifica- 
tion testing i s  the postlading environment. However, effective poatlanding 
techniques axmi lesr stringent design criteria for a renovated command module 
would minimize the effect of the lack of the postlanding requirement. 
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DEGREE OF DEGRADATION FOR ONE MISSION 
Equipment operation provides the most serious limitation to  reusa- 
bility. Certain items in the EPS and SS have limited lifetimes and must 
be replaced. The reentry and postlanding batteries are of the silver oxide 
zinc secondary-battery type. These units have a guaranteed charge/ 
discharge lifetime of six cycles and are insufficient for consideration for 
use in a second flight. Because the battery cells are sealed into the 
battery case, the unit cannot be refurbished. The pyrotechnic batteries 
a r c  a silver oxide zinc primary-type battery and are not intended for 
reuse. Once discharged, they must be replaced. Fuses  and circuit 
breakers are system protection devices. Even though they have passed 
all qualification tests for reliability and crew safety, a single unit may 
have been damaged or degraded by the original flight. It would be extremely 
difficult, perhaps impossible, to reliably locate one of these units. In 
order to preserve reliable system operation of subsequent flights, there- 
fore, it is recommended that all  fuses and circuit breakers be replaced 
during refurbishment. The fuses in the power-factor correction assembly 
(C14A8 and the fuse box (C14A12) are potted in place and are extremely 
difficult to replace. It is recommended, therefore, that the power-factor 
correction assembly and fuse box be replaced, especially since their . 
design is extremely simple. 
The equipment used in the sequencing systems is also life-limited. 
The sequencers fire the Apollo pyrotechnics; in doing so they operate their 
output relays at, or beyond, their contact current ratings. For  this 
reason, the operation of the sequencers has been limited to 100-cycles, 
including all preflight checks. Refurbishment of the sequencers controllers 
is not economically feasible. The construction of the units consists of 
modules potted in place in a case. Replacement of the output relay modules 
would require an estimated 75-percent teardown of the unit. In addition, 
there is a strong possibility that some nf the other modules and intercon- 
necting wiring would be damaged while potting material was being dug out. 
For  the9 
system C- ?ration, it is recommended that these units be replaced. 
reasons and because of the critical nature of the sequencer 
The inverters have been designed and qualified to  a 1200-hour life- 
time. During checkout operations, the inverters, rather than GSE power, 
a r e  usually uaed as the a-c source. Estimates of inverter on-time have 
been as  high a s  1500 hours for a mission checkout and flight to date. No 
data have been directly taken on this factor, but observed operating 
procedures substantiate this estimation. This estimate is confused by the 
fact that at most only two inverters can be on at  one time, and no informa- 
tion is available as to  whether this checkout time is performed on one of 
the three inverters or equally shared. 
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Use of the same inverter on a second 14-day misrion would require 
an inverter with a 30-day operating life. Studier performed on the Apollo 
Extension Study ( U S )  program recmmended a modified inverter to 
increase the reliability of the unit for a 30- to 45-day mission. The major 
change to the inverter is to change the output transistors to  a higher 
rated unit. 
To avoid modifying the inverter for possible reuae, certain changes 
in preflight operation should be investigated. First, the on-time of an 
inverter should be logged. Second, the a-c power should be provided by 
GSE during the checkout and preflight aperstiona, except during inverter 
checkout. U s e  of these techniques would appreciably increase the flight 
lifetime of the inverters and pinpoint the inverters that achieve virtually 
no on-time because of redundancy. 
The battery chargers, on the other hand, are not operated continuously 
during checkout or  flight. These units are qualified for a 1000-hour life 
and should have ample capability for reuse. 
Motor switches also do not approach their operating lifetime limit. 
The design requirement is for 1000 cycles of operation, and switches of 
similar design have operated many thousands of times. Actual operation 
on the spacecraft has been estimated to be l z s s  than 100 cycles; therefore, 
life should be no problem with the motor switches. 
POSTRECOVERY OPERATION REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS 
Postflight operating procedures and constraints can be utilized to  
enhance the probability of survival of the reasable EPS equipment. In 
general, the equipment is sealed or potted snd needs no special handling. 
A postrecovery washdown and corrosion cc,ntrol would minimize the prob- 
lems of sea water contamination of the wixe harness in the aft  compartment. 
In addition, procedures should be established to  prevent probing of potted 
terminals, cutting of wires, or disturbing of the wire harness in any way 
during the postflight operations. 
also be held to an absolute minimum. If a -connector must be disconnected, 
it should immediately be placed in a plastic sack with a desiccant and 
sealed for protection. During postflight checkout, i f  a-c power is required, 
an a-c ground power unit should be used to preserve the operating life of 
the inverters . 
Disconnecting any connectors should 
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RENOVATION REQUIREMENTS 
Refurbishment of the EPS equipment should include the following 
operations : 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 .  
6 .  
7. 
Remove the EPS assembly from the spacecraft and examine the 
equipment for any signs of physical damage. Protect all con- 
nectors disconnected from the equipment by placing them in 
plastic bags . 
Refurbish the repairable hardware. Table 22 summarizes the 
major components included in the EPS subassemblies. 
the exception of the fuses and circuit breakers, these compo- 
nents should not require replacement. None of them a r e  stressed 
or  operated near their design limits and all are well-protected 
from the environments. 
With 
Do not attempt repair of the inverters and battery chargers. 
If a postflight inspection reveals any physical damage, the unit 
must be replaced. 
Functionally test all units. If a unit does not pass its functional 
test, it must be repaired or replaced as described in operations 2 
or 3. 
Inspect a l l  wiring for nicks, abrasions, cuts, scratches, or 
discoloration due to heat. If a wire is damaged it must be 
replaced. If the potting on a terminal shows signs of damage 
or tampering, it should be removed and the terminal inspected. 
Any necessary wiring revisions should also be incorporated at 
this time. 
than necessary. They a r e  extremely complex and any undue 
disturbances will greatly complicate the renovation processes. 
The harnesses shodd not be disturbed any more 
Perform a continuity check when work on the harnesses has 
been completed. All connectors must be checked end-to-end to 
ensure that there has been no degradation from the first flight 
or miswiring. 
Replace equipment in spacecraft and perform normal checkout. 
EXPLORATORY TEST REQUIREMENTS 
It is not anticipated that special tests will be required to  evaluate the 
condition of the EPS components. Normal functional tests will pinpoint 
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the operational status of the equipment. The reusable EPS items primarily 
consist of diodes, relays, motor switches, and potted electronic packages. 
Motor switches and relays would be checked by continuity and operational 
tests which a r e  a normal part of a functional test. Examination of the 
component schematics indicates that there would be no special problems 
in checking these items on the completely assembled component packages. 
Diodes and electronic packages are static eolid-state devices; consequently, 
there is no reliable method for evaluating or predicting their degree of 
degradation. If these devices pas8 their respective functional tests with 
results that a r e  within tolerance and correlate with the data that was 
originally obtained, it should be possible to reuse them with complete 
confidence . 
IN-FUGHT MAINTENANCE 
The availability concept or in-flight maintenance cannot be effectively 
applied to the power system. The EPS was originally designed with a 
redundancy concept in mind. If one component in a critical circuit should 
fail, another one can normally be switched into place. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In summary, the EPS should be in good condition after a flight. With 
the exception of the batteries, the high-cost items a r e  reusable and most 
NAA assemblies can be refurbished. The only items recommended for 
general replacement a r e  fuses and circuit breakers, and this is for crew 
safety purposes rather than because of a definite operational or lifetime 
limitation. Examination of S/C 009 and S/C 011 wiring shows that a s  much 
as 95 percent of the wiring harnesses could be reused. The SS, on the 
other hand, cannot be recommended for reuse or refurbishment because 
the units are operated near their design limits and have been assigned a 
definite lifetime by the Apollo Reliability Group. They a r e  also difficult 
to repair or refurbish. 
The investigation has been directed toward the reuse of the EPS in 
a Block If RCMS. The recommendations set forth in this section a r e  also 
valid for a Block I or  Block If RCML. Since the equipment would be 
installed in a new configuration for a laboratory, the wiring would be new 
but the system components would remain the same. When the EPS com- 
ponents have passed their respective functional tests, the EPS hardware 
is fully capable of being used in a laboratory with the same limitations a s  
imposed on a renovated spacecraft. 
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VII. COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA 
SYSTEM DEGRADATION 
Tab: ? 23 summarizes the probable degradation effects of various 
environmental and operational factors upon the Apollo CM to communications/ 
data equipment. These factors include exposure to vacuum, radiation, 
meteoroids, temperature extremes in space, launch and reentry heating, 
structural loading and dynamics, humidity, salt atmosphere, operational 
wear, and postlanding operations. 
abbreviations indicates a probable significant degradation for the designated 
equipment. As indicated in the table, no communications/ data equipment is 
expected to suffer significant degradation from exposure to vacuum, radia- 
tion, temperature extremes of space, and launch phase temperatures. This 
is because communications/data components a re  either not exposed to these 
factors or  a r e  designed to withstand them. The spacecraft antennas a r e  the 
only communications/data components exposed to meteoroid environment. 
Probability of damage to these antennas by meteoroid impingement is con- 
sidered to be romote. 
catastrophic. 
An "X" in the column under the various 
If such damage occurs, the result could be 
Degradation occurs to the VHF recovery antennas, their release 
mechanisms, and the H F  recovery antenna as a result of operational pyro 
deployment. These antennas are located on the outside of the CM, and 
additional degradation might occur as a result of overexposure to salt  
atmosphere after landing. 
degraded i f  postlanding handling techniques cannot be controlled. 
antennas on both SC 009 and 011 were broken in the recovery hoisting opera- 
tion from sea to deck of vessel. 
The H F  recovery antenna may be further 
The H F  
The SCIN antennas a re  degraded by heat during reentry (see Figure 49). 
The tZ SCIN is virtually incinerated and the -2 SCIN is charred to a point 
where the R F  radiation pattern will, in all probability, be affected. 
Both the S-band omniantennas and the C-band transponder antennas a re  
designed to survive the heat of reentry, 
S/C 011 showed evidenceof charring on the C-band antennas in the aft heat 
shield. 
the reverse side of heat shield. 
operation. The char was diagnosed a s  a phenolic residue from the ablator 
and was removed by subjecting the quartz face of the antenna to a polishing 
Postflight visual inspection of 
The antennas w t r e  removed by compressing the quartz cylinder out 
No problems were encountered in this 
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Equipment Block Idontlfication Supplier 
HF t r ~ r e e i v o r  II ME478-0065-0003 C O U .  
VHF/AM tranrceiver JI ME478-0067-0003 Collin. 
I ME478-0023-0003 Collinr 
VHF recovery beacon II ME478-0069-0003 Collin# 
I ME478-0023-0003 Collinr 
5 - h d  e q u i p a t  11 ME478-0070-0003 Collins 
I ME478-0026-0003 Collinr 
5-band power amplifier 11 ME478-0066-0003 Collins 
1 ME478-0020-0003 Collinr 
Audio center II ME473-0086-0003 COuin8 
c I ME473-0021-0003 Col?ins 
V X F  triplaxer 11 ME-456-0040-0001 Collinr 
1 ME456-0013-0013 C O U S  
Premodulation II ME478-0068-0003 Collin# 
procerror I ME478-0021-0004 Collins 
Signal conditioner ff ME901-0713-0012 Autoneticr 
I ME901-0081-0003 Collinr 
Data storage equipment II ME435-0035-0003 Collinr 
I ME435-0013-0035 Collin6 
PCM talemetry II ME901-0719-0003 Collins 
PCM telemetry No. 1 I ME901-0083-0002 Collins 
PCM telemetry No. 2 I ME901-0083-0102 Collin# 
Zentral timing XI ME456-0041-0030 General 
cquipment I ME456-0006-0034 Time 
Jp-data link X ME470-0101-0001 Motorola 
I ME470-0014-0007 Motorola 
relevirion equipment 11 SID65-96 GFE 
I ME901-0090-0020 RCA 
:-band aatennar(4) II ME461-0005-0004(2) AMECOM 
I I M  -0002( 1) AMECOM 
11 -0005(1) AMECOM 
I -0O02(1) AMECOM 
I -0004(2) AMECOM 
I -0005(1) AMECOM 
-IF recovery II ME481-0049-0002 Dehavilaad 
I ME481 -0049-0007 Dshavfl-d 
Primary 
Degradation Factor. 
V R M T L R E  S X SA OW PI 
X 
X 
X X 
X X 
X 
X 
X X 
X X 
X 
X 
X X X 
X X X 
X X X 
X X X 
X X X 
x X X 
x x x  
x x x  
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Key to Abbreviations: 
V = Vacuum 
R = Radiation 
M Meteoroidr 
T = Temperature extramar in apace 
L = Launch phase heating 
S = Structural loadings and dynamicr 
H = Humidity 
RE = reentry 
SA = Salt atmorphere after landing 
OW = Operational wear 
PL = Portlanding operationr 
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operation using a commonly available lapping compound. 
therefore that the S-band omniantennas can be removed from the heat shield 
and refurbished by a simple operation. Because of relatively critical clear- 
ances however, the antennas can easily be degraded by physical damage 
during the operations of aft hezt shield removal. 
degraded by salt corrosion i f  sea w d e r  penetrates into the aft heat shield 
area. 
It is concluded, 
The antennas may also be 
The electromechanical data storage equipment is expected to be affected 
significantly by operational life limitations, as well a s  by exposure to vibra- 
tion and shocks of the flight and landing. 
degradation include tape wear, bearing wear, lubricant migration resulting in 
dry bearings, belt wear with the subsequent possibility of breakage or  slip- 
page, braking mechanism wear due to ON-OFF cycling, and mechanical 
misalignment of recording heads and capstan drive elements. 
Mechanical parameters causing 
The survival beacon is designed to withstand salt water immersion for 
a period of one hour and to then operate within specification for t!ie life of 
the battery. Since this is a GFE item, no firm data a r e  available at N-4A/ 
S&ID. It is believed that the survival beacon, i f  deployed, will have to be 
replaced. 
requiring replacement. 
If it is not deployed, however, the batteries are the only items 
The RF cables located in the vicinity of the heat shield might be 
degraded by changes in dielectric properties resulting from heat during 
reentry. 
sleeving as a reed:  of a rapid change from  SF.^ e cold to reentry temper- 
ature. 
might be caused by the humidity and salt atmosphere. 
Also, cracks might develop in the ccnnectors' heat-shrinkable 
If cracks do occur, further degradation of cables and connectors 
The R F  and video cables will be exposed to potential damage during 
renovation operations. 
Block I spacecrafts .:hows a history of failures and require. .,axdling care  
in excess of normal procedures. 
In particular, the RG-180 RF cabto, used on the 
The following communications /data equipment anits employ vacuum 
tubes: the VYF/AM transceiver and VHF recovery beacon of BlOc!i I; and 
the S-band power amplifier, TV equipment, and C-band transponder of both 
Block I and II. The performance quality of vacuum tubes is expected to be 
adversely affected by structural loading and dynamicr, especially the shock 
of landing. It is probable that these componmte will be operative after 
CM recovery; however, confidence in their reliability is low because of 
mechmical stresses induced by shocks and vibration. 
probably will be most pronounced in the hot filament structure of the tubes. 
In addition, at the time of recovery, the operating time of the S-band power 
amplifier TWT and the C-band transponder magnetron will constitute a 
significant fraction of the usual life of these tubes. 
There s t reares  
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The VHF triplexer and the S-band diplaxer (which is a part of the S-band 
power amplifier equipment) are mechanical devices having critical dimension 
tolerances affecting frequency response of tuned cavities. Consequently, it 
is very probable that the cavir s will  require retuning after the devices have 
been subjected to flight vibrations and shocks. 
As previously indicated, the HF and VHF recovery antennas, located 
on the S/Cupper deck, might be degraded by overexposure to salt atmosphere. 
The effect of salt corrosion on the remainder of the communications/&ta 
subsystem wil l  depend upon the extent and nature of salt water intake into the 
cabin interior while the capsule is afloat in sea water. S / C  009 and 011 were 
equipped with sealed hatches, and it was not necessary to remove the hatch 
covers to permit crew egress. As a result S/C 009 and 011 cabin interior8 
showed no visible traces of salt water o r  atmosphere corrosion. 
It is expected that the television equipment lens system will be reusable. 
However, as a result of structural loading and dynamics, some lenses might 
be broken, chipped, scratched, or misaligned. 
POSTPECCpVERY CONSTRAINTS AND REQUIREMENTS 
The HF and VHF recovery antennas are located on the upper deck and 
a r e  exposed to salt atmospnere. The HF antenna can also be easily damaged 
during the recovery operations and was broken on both S/C 009 and 01 1 during 
the hoisting of the CM. This damage was allegedly caused by rotation of the 
CM about the axis of rotation of the hoisting cable and rigging. Two possible 
means of preventing the breakage might be considered. The first, i f  safety 
measures permit, would be removal of the HF antenna by the recovery team 
swimmers while the CM is still in the water. Admittedly, this method has 
areas which reguire further investigation, such as the ability of the swim- 
mers  to stand on the flotation bag while performing the operation. 
approach would be the attachment of additional ropes to the hoisting rigging 
to prevent rotation of the CM during the hoisting operation. This method 
does not represent as positive an approach as might be desired, since it 
might be difficult to effectively man the rigging for the distances from the 
decks of the various Navy vessels. 
the HF antenna could then be removed when the CM is aboard ship. Desalini- 
zation, anticorrosion preservation, and packaging for shipment to Downey 
would then follow. 
A second 
If the second approach proves feasible, 
Because of their smaller size, the VHF recovery antennas a r e  less  
likely to be damaged during hoisting. 
that they will be unusable because of salt water corrosion, 
antennas on S/C 01 1 were visibly corroded, probably beyond the point of 
refurbishment. 
However, there is a strong possibility 
The VHF recovery 
The VHF re, >very antennas should be desalinized, preserved 
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with a suitable material, and possibly covered with a plastic protector. 
They should then stowed per the Recovery Manual Instructions. These 
operations should be performed immediately after the CM is hoisted aboard 
the recovery ship. 
The exterior and interior of the D6E (Data Storage Equipment) is 
particularly susceptible to salt corrosion. Per present Recovery Manual 
instructions, this equipment is removed from the CM after the spacecrait 
is hoisted aboard the recovery ship. The D6E is then opened and inspected, 
and the magnetic tape is removed. The disassembled parts a r e  then rein- 
stalled, and the B E  is placed back in its normal location within the CM. 
This procedure exposes the E E  differential pressure valve to a 
salt-laden atmosphere for the duration of the CM stay aboard ship o r  near 
the seacoast. 
D6E with dry nitrogen. 
with the dry nitrogen, this procedure would inhibit corrosion. 
could then be packaged with desiccant material and shipped separately to 
Downey. 
A remedial procedure would be to purge the interior of the 
By replacing the moisture-laden salt  atmosphere 
The D6E 
If the aft heat shield is removed on the ship, these components 
exposed by the removal (the R F  connectors and cables, as well as the rear  
portions of the S-band omniantennas) should be desalinized and protected 
against corrosion and potential physical damage. 
Appropriate means and procedures are required for the desalinization 
and anticorrosion preservation of the remaining communications/data 
equipment located within the CM. 
RCM SPACECRAFT EQUIPMENT COMPLEMENT AND RENOVATION 
REQUIREMENTS. 
Table 24 summarizes the equipment complement and renovation 
requirements for an RCMS. 
communications/data subsystem with the exception of the C-band transponder, 
its antennas, and the flight qual recorder (FOR). 
required since it flew as  a backup to the S-band system during the proving-in 
phase of the S-band development. The FQR is no longer required since this 
item was used for qualification testing of various hardware items during the 
S/C development phase. 
The equipment consists of the basic Block II 
The transponder is not 
A large majority of the communication/data subsystem should be 
capable of reuse with little or  no refurbishment. Proof of this will be estab- 
lished by subjecting the designated equipment to a "pre-acceptance" type test 
wherein all critical functional parameters a r e  inspected for original 
tole r anc e s . 
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W 
A s  can be seen from the table, both the HF and VHF recovery antennas 
a r e  marked for replacement. 
techniques in the recovery operation itself will be required to prevent damage 
to the HF antenna. 
length of time they a r e  exposed to salt atmosphere. This is an indeterminate 
quantity at this time. 
refurbishment will be possible. New storage covers, reefing cords, and 
pyro charges are all that will be required. 
New GM recovery procedures and improved 
Reuse of the VHF recovery antennas depends upon the 
However, if timely measures can be taken, low-cost 
Contact with the DSE supplier disclosed that nominal overhaul of the 
Turn- listed parameters could be made at a cost of about $5000 per unit. 
around time would be about 30 days, and the supplier would assess the 
remaining life expectancy in operating hours of the unit. 
Renovation requirements beyond those depicted in the table concern 
If the heat shield with 
the aft heat shield. 
associated antennas mounted in the aft heat shield. 
the antennas removed is reused for future RCM spacecraft, it will be neces- 
sa ry  to plug the mounting holes where the antennas penetrated the heat shield. 
An alternative course would be to leaye the unused antenna in the heat shield. 
However, this has an undefined element of r isk i f  the antennas .are.broken 
or cracked, as the damage might remain undetected. 
The Block 11 system utilizes a C-band transponder with, 
INDEPENDENT RCML - BLOCK I - EQUIPMENT AND RENOVATION 
REQUIREMENTS 
Table 25 summarizes the renovation requirements and Table 26 pro- 
vides the anticipated equipment complement and physical characteristics - 
for an independent RGML - Block I. 
Block I communications/data subsystem with the following exceptions: There 
are no HF o r  VHF recovery equipments since the laboratories a r e  not 
required to reenter the earth's atmosphere. 
the FQR a r e  not required because these a r e  used only in the early S / C  
development phase. An additional item of equipment is required, however. 
This is the rendezvous radar transponder and associated antennas. 
equipment is needed on rendezvous missions only. 
The equipment consists of a basic 
The C-band transponder and 
This 
In addition to those depicted in the table, renovation requirements for 
the Block I laboratory include incorporating the rendezvous radar trans- 
ponder (RR/T) and antenna into the Block I RCML. 
has an impact on the Block I controls and displays panel and the ECS cooling 
loop, 
Block 11 vehicles and requires coldplate provisions for cooling. 
antenna srrould be in proximity to the transponder electronics to minimize 
R F  losses in the waveguide. 
This requirement also 
The Apollo RR/T is mounted within the service module fairing on 
The RR/T 
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INDEPENDENT RCML - BLOCK II - EQUIPMENT AND RENOVATION 
REQUIREMENTS 
Table 27 summarizes the renovation requirements and Table 28 
provides the equipment complement and physical characteristics for an 
independent RCML-Block II. The equipment is identical to the Block I1 
vehicle communications /data subsystem with the following exceptions: For 
the same reasons as  in the Block I laboratory, there is no requirement for 
H F  and VHF recovery equipment, C-band transponder, and the FQR. There 
is a requirtment, applicable to rendezvous missions only, for a rendezvous 
transponder and associated antennas. 
designed for the RR/T, VHF scimitar, and S-band omniantennas. 
must be provided with coldplate cooling and its antenna must be mounted in 
proximity to the electronics enclosure to minimize R F  losses. 
New mounting provisions must be 
The RR/T 
The VHF scimitar antennas a re  mounted on the service module for the 
Block XI vehicles. 
well  as new mounting provisions will be required. 
Since they a r e  not recoverable items, new antennas as  
In all probability, the heat shield will not be used for RCML models. 
Consequently, an alternative means for mountinp the S-band omniantennas 
must be provided. 
plane and mounting provisions equivalent to those provided by the aft heat 
shield. 
The replacinp shroud or structure should provide a ground 
EXPLORATORY AND SPECIAL TESTS 
Exploratory testing for  communications/data equipment is limited to  
analysis or diagnosis required to determine the general nature and the 
approximate degree of degradation. 
various selected parameter tests wil l  constitute the array of exploratory tests 
for communications /data equipment. 
Visual inspection, go/no-go tests, and 
Figure 50 illustrates a flow chart depicting the testing for RCML 
communications/data equipment. 
the types of selected parameter tests that wil l  have to be performed. 
renovation certification would be required for the RCMS communications /data 
equipment. In both cases, however, acceptance-type test  will  be the means 
for requalifying all equipment. 
Table 29 gives a preliminary estimate of 
Supplier 
No firm need can be identified at  this time for special tests on 
communications/data equipment. 
adv'isable. 
However, the following tests might be 
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1. In the RCML, the heat shield probably wi l l  not be used and will  be 
replaced by some type of shroud. The shroud shape and the char- 
acteristics of the material used for the shroud in the immediate 
vicinity of the S-band omniantennas of Block II and the SCIN antennas 
of Block I wi l l  affect the radiation patterns of the antennas. Similar 
considerations apply to the rendezvous and V H F  scimitar antennas 
which in Block I1 a re  located on the SM. 
tion, these antennas will  probably be mounted on the cruciform 
structure. Thus, antenna radiation pattern tests might be required. 
The purpose of the tests would be to ascertain the correctness of 
RCML design modificatir,ns. 
recurring and could probably be conducted on scaled-down models. 
In the RCM lab configu 3- 
The tests, therefore, would be non- 
2. The output of the PCM telemetry contains information on the char- 
acteristics and status of various CM subsystems and components. 
This suggests the possibility of using the PCM teleme r y  as a test 
equipment to obtain rough diagnostic data on the subsystems degra- 
ciation and renovation requirements. 
limited to the CM components which would not be damaged by the 
application of power. 
and components under test would have to provided. 
This test would have to be 
Means for supplying power to the subsystems 
SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES 
Communication/data capabilities vary only slightly among the three: 
versions of the RCM vehicles. 
be summarized as  follows. 
The functional capabilities of the RCMS can 
The basic functions performed by the corxmunications /data subsystem 
are: time, voice, command, television, telemetry, tracking and ranging, 
recovery and scientific data storage, and transmission. 
Timing function and signals a r e  provided by the central timing equip- 
ment and a re  used to synchronize various data trains within the spacecraft 
subsystem equipment. 
Voice function is  provided by the audio center working in conjunction 
with the VHF equipment, HF transceiver, premodulation processor and S-band 
equipment. 
Command function is provided by the up-data link operating in conjunc- 
This func- tion with the premodulation procsssor and the S-band equipment. 
tion permits updating the central timing equipment and the guidance and 
navigation equipment, as  well as  furnishing real-time commands to the 
spacecraft subsystems. 
- 1 6 3 -  
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Television coverage of spacecraft activity can be implemented by use of 
the TV camera in conjunction with the wide-band moddation provisions of the 
S-band equipment and premodulatiofi processor. 
Telemetry capability is provided by the PCM equipment working in 
conjunction wi'ih the signal conditioning equipment, the premodulation proc - 
essor, and the S-band equipment, 
Tracking and ranging functions a r e  provided by the coherent transponding 
capabilities of the S-band equipment. 
Recovery aids a re  provided by both t:ie HF transceiver and the VHF 
recovery beacon. 
operation, amplitude -modulation voice operation, and C W beacon operation. 
The HF transceiver is capable of single side-band voice 
Scientific data transmission is accomplished through the use of the 
premodulation processor and S-band equipment. 
and instruinmtation equipment a re  not provided. 
Scientific data acquisition 
The voice, PCM data, and scientific data can be recorded by the  data 
storage equipment for subsequent playback and/or transmission through the 
premodulation processor and S-band equipment. 
The functional capabilities of Block I and II independent RCML's a r e  
identical to those of the RCMS except that no recovery functions a r e  provided 
in the laboratories, while the transponding capability for rendezvous missions 
i s  included. 
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VIII. DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS 
The major environmental hazards to the display and controls (DIJLC) 
and instrumentation equipment will  be vibration, high temperature, and high 
humidity. It is safe to assume that environmental degradation wil l  be small 
unless the CM has been subjected to extreme levels of any of these param- 
eters. 
the design-mission levels already experienced o r  anticipated. 
in the ECS which permit high humidity for extended periods will  require 
careful assessment of components for reuse. 
hazards leads to the following conclusions: 
Extreme levels may be taken to mean levels considerably higher than 
Malfunctions 
An analysis by environmental 
Hard vacuum should affect no components lastingly, unless it is 
maintained for excessive periods. 
Radiation will tend to degrade electroluminescent material. It 
will also temporarily degrade the operation of equipment using 
semiconductor devices. 
cause permanent degradation of semiconductors would provide 
a personnel hazard. 
A radiation level sufficiently high to 
Meteorites will result in damage only through direct hits on the 
main display console (MDC). 
most likely, would be catastrophic. ) 
(This is highly improbable but, 
High temperatures wil l  cause potential or  eventual de gradation 
of nearly all types of components and definitely reduced reliability. 
Temperatures must go considerably higher than anticipated, e. g. , 
coldplate failure, in order to cause degradation. 
Low temperatures wil l  have little effect unless they a re  accom- 
panied by vibration or impact. 
Vibration may affect meters  (as noted), circuit breakers, incan- 
descent lamps, connectors, and floodlights. Extreme levels of 
vibration will render all of these items suspect. 
Impact (high levels) will  affect the same items affected by vibration, 
and the same caution applies. 
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8. Condensation wi l l  affect certain low-current, AT-type switches, 
circuit breakers, and connectors which, i f  not hermetically sealed, 
may be subject to moisture invasion with attendant dielectric 
changes. 
It is rather difficult to assess operational degradation of MDC items 
on the basis of complete panel assemblies. Since similar items appear on 
different panel assemblies in varying numbers, it is preferable to analyze 
potential degradation by components and to extrapolate refurbishment 
requirements from anticipated degradation. 
Switches appear to be one of the main problem areas with regard to 
present life expectancy. Rotary switches have the highest reliability and 
will most likely be good for reuse in extended missions without refurbishment. 
Bush-button switches, although present on several panels, are rarely used 
during a mission and then only when a manual backup function is required. 
One exception to this criterion is the Master  Alarm (MA) reset switch, which 
will  be operated from time to  time during the mission. 
covered separately under Caution/ Warning ( C / W )  System. 
small number of operations, the performance degradation of the push-button 
switches may be assumed to  be not highly significant. 
This switch wi l l  be 
Based upon the 
Toggle switches present an entirely different situation. Their opera- 
tional life expectancy is presently in doubt and considerable difficulty has 
been experienced in obtaining suitable toggle switches for the Apollo mission 
environment. 
Design problems have included internal actuator contamination, actu- 
ator breakage, melting, and contact shorting among others. Life testing 
has  not been satisfactorily performed on present switches, although it must 
be anticipated that by the time of Block XI flight-article production, a satis-  
factory supply of toggle switches with a life test of several  mission periods 
will  be available. 
A major problem in estimating the degree of potential degradation is 
the lack of information regarding the number of operating cycles on any 
particular switch during preflight and mission operations. 
Circuit breakers of Block I1 apparently pose no problems for reuse. 
The only exception to this would be wherein the circuit breaker had been 
abnormally operated manually as a switch a number of times. 
pull of the circuit breaker slightly lowers  the current required to  tr ip the 
device and may result in premature operation of the device. 
Each manual 
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Vertical meters appear to be satisfactory for reuse, because the only 
potential operational degradation wil l  be an increare in  frictional e r ro r  due 
to the tight-pivot adjustment required for resistance to vibrational effects. 
Round meters a re  inherently more rugged and need to meet less  
stringent accuracy required (5 percent) than do vertical meters  (2 percent). 
The round meters rhould be available for reule, after undergoing only 
integrated-system checkout. 
Connectors may pose a problem because of potential damage inflicted 
during the removal and installation of panels. 
Event indicators may be broken down into electromechanical and 
incandescent ty -. Electromechanical indicators should not be significantly 
degraded bct p- ,;ently a re  experiencing some problems in operation, e. g. , 
both failure to respond and failure to return have been noted. 
Incandescent lamps follow a general pattern of predictable limited life. 
Especially significant is the correlation between color, temperature, bright- 
ness, and life expectancy, which a r e  functions of operating voltage versus 
design voltage. 
life must be sacrificed to some degree. 
In order to obtain a sufficiently bright warning signal, long 
Lighting may be broken down into three categories: integral, flood, 
and exterior. 
Integral lighting consists of electroluminescent (EL) panels bolted to 
the main display console and provides low-level illumination of the panel for 
switch legends, meters,  controls, etc. Brightness controls a r e  supplied to 
permit maintenance of dark adaption for crewmen (Block I1 only). 
Electroluminescent lighting in use suffers from continual degradation 
of total light output. This is believed to be a result of crystal structure 
changes through continual electron bombardment and the presence of trapped 
water in  the plastic. The amount of degradation is a function of voltage and 
frequency of the electrical supply and is accelerated by heating and radiation. 
The light output degradation follows approximately an exponential curve, the 
major diminution of light occurring during the period of preflight and accept- 
ance testing. See Figure 51. 
there will be a reduction of about 45 percent by the end of 150 hours of 
operation. 
temperature s . ) 
From the brightness at time of manufacture, 
(Even greater reduction will  result i f  operated at  elevated 
Based upon the light output at the s tar t  of a 14-day mission, there will 
be a 35-percent reduction in light at the end of the 14-day mission. 
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If the EL lighting is to be used for a subsequent 30-day mission (plus 
150 hours at checkout), there wil l  be only a 30-percent reduction from start 
to finish of this extended misrion. 
at  the finish of the original 14-day mission, i t  should be close to the same 
value at the end of 30 days. 
Assuming that light output is adequate 
Another consideration in EL life expectancy is the concept of constant- 
Considerably longer life is experienced brightness illumination (Figure 51 ). 
when the panel lamps a re  turned to a suitable brightness initially and then 
maintaining that light level by periodically increasing the input voltage with 
variable controls. 
Floodlighting is accomplished by fluorescent lighting which is not of 
the household type. 
that the floodlighting should follow the same restrictions placed on incan- 
descent lamps. 
About half of the lamps contain filaments which indicates 
Floodlight power supplies should suffer very little degradation. 
Postlanding beacon lightin: is designed for postlanding impact operation 
and has a very high probability of survival for reuse. 
exposed, however, the possibility of salt-water immersion o r  damage at 
time of retrieval is quite high. 
Since the beacon is 
Variable controls consist of rheostats used for lamp dimming, rotary 
(variable) transformers used for the same purpose, and potentiometers. 
Potentiometers are used in communications volume controls, squelch circuits, 
and for certain functions in the ECS. 
tion of any of the variable controls appears rather low and their reuse seems 
entirely feasible. 
The probability of operational degrada- 
The caution/ Warning (C/ W) system consists of a solid-state detection 
unit, an indicator matrix, and associated controls. Controls consist of 
toggle switches (as discussed previously with, all comments applying) and 
illuminated push-button switches. 
Master-Alarm (MA) push button and the push-button switches previously 
discussed is the number of cycles of operarion. 
must be operated to reset  the tone and lamp alarm each time any caution o r  
warning is given, a s  well as each time a lamp test is performed on the 
C/W system. 
The primary difference between the 
One of three MA switches 
The detection unit i s  a highly reliable unit not subject to  operational 
degradation, with the exception of long-term drift of warning levels and of 
the possible degradation of internal power supplies due to continuous use 
and mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) considerations. 
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Other indicators include the clocks and t imers,  altimeter, and G-meter. 
A l l  ' tems in  th i s  group wi l l  experience very little operational degradation, 
with one exception: the mission and phase t imers a re  G F E  electronic digital- 
readout clocks with EL characters. 
lighting also apply to the mission timers. 
The constraints regarding integral EL 
SUMMARY OF ANTICIPATED DEGRADATION 
Those items most likely to experience degradation during operation 
are: 
Electroluminescent lighting 
Fluorescent lamps 
Incandescent lamps 
Electromechanical event indicators 
Toggle switches 
Master -Alarm (MA) reset  switches 
Caution Warning Detection Unit (CWDU) power supplies 
Panel connectors 
Of the above-listed items, all incandescent and flue Wtescent lamps, 
event indicators, and the CWDU power supplies will  be definitely degraded 
and therefore are not candidates for reuse. 
be conditionally suitable for reuse based upon light output level. 
switches, M A  reset switches, and panel connectors will  be degraded a s  a 
function of the number of operating cycles. 
Electroluminescent lighting will  
Toggle 
RENOVATION REQUIREMENTS 
Since che number of operating cycles on any switch is not known and the 
toggle switches preseatly employed on the main display console (MDC) a r e  
marginal with respect to life-test requirements, i t  has been assumed that all 
toggle switches wil l  be replaced. 
procedure is outlined in a following section. 
In lieu of mass replacement, a testing 
M A  reset  switches will  require relamping and testing at  the switch. 
They may be replaced at  the same time as a re  the toggle switches mentioned 
above. 
Panel connectors should be replaced from a reliability standpoint. 
Since the connectors and approximately 50 percent of the panel connectors 
would be replaced, the panel wiring harness shoiild be replaced at  the same 
time. Table 30 indicates the number of each assembly com::.ri*t.rib affected 
by the renova. en activity. 
Figure 5 2  indicates the location of these items. 
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Item No. 
BK I1 MDC PAN, 1 
V36-761011 
BK I1 MDC PAN. 2 
V36-76 1012 
BK 11 MDC PAN. 3 
V36-76 1013 
Table 30. Arrembly Componeatr Affected by Reaovatioa 
Replacement Need 
45 toggle switches 
Abort indicator 
Engine indicator 
MA rwitch 
NO-AUTO-ABORT switch 
W i r e  h a r n e r s  
9 connectors 
70 toggle switcher 
19 event indicators  
2 C / W  indicator matrices 
9 connectors 
W i r e  ha rness  
62 toggle switches 
2 1 event indicators 
1 M A  switch 
10 connectors 
W i r e  ha rness  
BK I1 MDC PAN. 4 
V36-76 1014 
BK I1 MCC PAN. 7 
V36-76 1017 
BK I1 MDC PAN. 5 
V36 - 76 10 1 5 
3 toggle switches 
2 connectors 
W i r e  ha rness  
3 toggle switches 
4 connectors 
Wire ha rness  
3 toggle switches 
5 connectors 
W i r e  ha rne  ss 
~ 
BK 11 MDC PAN. 8 
V36-76 101 8 
BK I1 MDC PAN. 6 
B K I I  MDC PAN. 9 
V36 -76 1019 
BK I1 MDC PAN. 10 
V36-761020 
BK I1 MDC PAN. 11 X 
BK XI MDC PAN. 13 X 
V36-762065 
V36-762013 
10 toggle switches 
W i r e  ha rness  
5 connectors 
5 toggle switches 
2 connectors 
W i r e  ha rness  
8 toggle switches 
3 connectors 
W i r e  ha rness  
5 toggle switches 
2 connectors 
W i r e  ha rness  
_____ 
BK I1 MDC PAN. 98 X 
BK I1 MDC PAN. 99 
V36 -764099 
V36-764098 
BK I1 MDC PAN. 97 
V36-764090 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
5 toggle switches 
4 connectors 
W i r e  harness  
8 toggle switches 
1 connector 
W i r e  ha rness  
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POSTRECOVERY CONSTRAINTS AND REQUIREMENTS 
Appropriate means and procedures a re  required for the desalinization 
and anticorrosion preservation of the recovered CM and its components. No 
other constraints or  requirements for the postrecovery' operations appear to 
be applicable from the standpoint of the displays /controls subsystem. 
EXPLORATORY TEST REQUIREMENTS 
Figure 53 indicates the sequence of events in manufacture, assembly, 
and testing of electronic subsystems in the Apollo CM. The right-hand tin.s 
line indicates the normal sequence of a CM being built under initial procure- 
ment. The left-hand line indicates a tentative sequence for a recovered CM 
undergoing renovation. Circled numbers on the figure indicate items which 
may require clarification: 
0 Assembly manufacture applies to such items a s  MDC panels, 
all components of which have completed acceptance testing 
at  the various vendors from whom they a re  obtained. 
a r e  fabricated at Downey and a re  next tested by manufacturing. 
Items which a re  subcontracted assemblies do not undergo this 
nor the succeeding step. 
Assemblies 
@ This step is indicated in the event a system check is deemed 
necessary. 
to entry heat, must be removed and, preferably, replaced. The 
removal of this item is required to preclude electrical shorts 
in the various systems caused by a degraded umbilical. 
The GSE umbilical, which wi l l  have been subjected 
Power may be supplied to the command module through the 
refurbished GSE access connector, o r  the flight batteries may be 
removed and ordinary lead-acid batteries subsituted. 
@ With either a battery or external poweb, most CM subsystems may 
be exercised and the MDC used tomonitor performance. These tests 
may be used to provide information regarding the necessity for 
removal of subsystem assemblies for refurbishment. 
One specific test which may be made advantageously at this 
time is the check of EL integral-panel lighting. Because of the 
various peculiarities of the phosphorus required for white EL 
illumination, accurate photometric measurements a re  difficult, 
i f  not impossible, Color differences and brightness differences 
between various items on the MDC are obvious to the eye although 
not measurable by any present photometric equipment. This is 
because of the interrelation of color and brightness and the low 
light levels of EL panels, 
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The most satisfactory test  probably will  be a visual inspection 
by a trained technician having good visual acuity and color per-  
ception. Comparison of the various lighted elements at  different 
light levels wi l l  provide an excellent basis for decisions whether 
to reuse o r  to replace. Extreme variation in color or  brightness, 
scratches, spots, peeling, and flaking wil l  be cause for rejection. 
@ Before it can be assumed that it is not necessary to replace all 
toggle switches and the M A  reset  switches, each switch must 
first undergo vibration testing and then be tested for contact 
resistance, insulation strength, and operating force. Failure 
of a switch on any of these tests wi l l  indicate necessary replace- 
ment of the item. 
The CWDU will  be removed at this time, i t s  power supplies 
replaced, and a bench test  performed. Bench testing will  consist 
of a check of alarm limits, event outputs, M A  triggering, and 
output signals. 
@ Refurbishment of MDC panels consists of replacement of EL 
lighting, where necessary, defective or marginal switchea, and 
of all event iadicators (incandescent o r  electromechanical). 
refurbishment will have been partially accomplished by replace - 
ment of power s,ipplies. 
require replacement of affected modules, 
CWDU 
Further out-of-tolerance conditions wi l l  
@ Two blocks, system test and combined system test, have been 
duplicated under Operational Checkout Procedures (OCP). This 
duplication is for emphasis on calibration checks of displays and 
instrumentation. N o  change is anticipated in OCP's. Frictional 
e r ro r  in vertical meters may be determined at  the time of 
integrated checkout by checking zero setting, full scale deflection, 
and return to a mid-scale reading. 
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RENOVATED CM 
CM RECOVERY 
PROCEDURE 
L -- 
Sa% 1-0 
i GSE ACCESS 
POST RECOVERY 
SYSTEM TEST 
ASSEMBLY 
REMOVAL L=-J + 
ASSEMBLY 
SPECIAL 
TESTING 
@ , 
7 
REFURBISH 
ASSEMBLIES 
MFG CHECKOUT 
FINAL ATP 
INITIAL MANUFACTURE 
COMPONENT 
MANUFACTURE 
ACCEPTANCE 
TESTING 
MANUFACTURE a L - J  + 
MFG CHECKOUT 
FINAL ATP 
I 
b 
TOP ASSEMBLY TOP ASSEMBLY t 
MFG ------ 
INSTRUMENTATION OPERATIONAL 
AND DISPLAY CHECKOUT 
CALIBRATION PROCE URES 
CHECK 
COMBINED 
SYSTEM 
TEST I 
COMBINED 
SYSTEM 
L 
INTEGRATED 
SYSTEM TEST 
(PLUGS IN) 
a 
INTEGRATED 
SYSTEMTEST f 
(RUGS OUT) S&lC 
4 I 
Figure 53'. Test Requirements CM Asrrembly and Rencvation 
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IX. INSTRUMENTATION 
Operational instrumentation co sidered in this section covers the 
following measurements: (See Figure 54) 
Ch1800 T 
1803 T 
1806 T 
CA1809 T 
Heat shield bond temperature 
CC0188 P 
CF0006 P 
CRWOl P 
0002 P 
0003 T 
0004 T 
0005 P 
0006 P 
0011 P 
0012 P 
Battery compartment manifold pressure 
Surge tank pressure 
H, rank pressure and temperature 
Fuel tank pressure 
Oxidizer tank pressure 
2100 T 
2103 T 
2114 T 
2116 T 
CR2119 T 
Engine injector valve temperat. % -  2 
CSO220 T Docking probe temperature 
cso100 x CM-SM separation 
All  other items on the measurement list fall under one of the following 
c ateogor ies : 
1. R&D measurments: not required for operational instrumentation. 
2. Subsystem instrument;ition or measimements: integral part  of 
su' *, stems. 
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3. SM, LEM, adapter, booster, and LES instrumentation; not 
applic8ble. 
Of the twenty measurements to be considered, Numbers  CA1800-1809 
a r e  heat-shield bond-temperature sen80rs. They a re  located on the inside of 
the aft heat shield and may suffer degradation due to entry heating, although 
this is unlikely. These measurerients are similar to flight-qurlificrtion 
measurements and may be deleted in  the renovated command module. 
CC0188 battery compartment manifold prasrure  instrumentation wi l l  be 
reusable and will  suffer no degradation in operation. 
CF0006, CROOOl, 2, 5, 6, 11, and 12 instrumentation will suffer no 
operational degradation and may be expected to be reusable. Calibration 
may be rechecked during system pressurisation . CR0003, and 4 will 
experience no degradation and will  be reusable. 
CR2100, 3, 10, 14, 16, and 19 a re  temperature sensors that wil l  
undergo no deterioration and may be reused. These temperature sensors 
a re  bonded directly to the RCS engine-injector valves and may be reused 
only if the same RCS valves a re  reused. 
wil l  most likely r e s 4 t  in an unusable device. 
bonded temperature sensors. 
Any attempt to remove the devices 
This restriction applies to all 
Since Instrumentation devices a r e  sealed and potted, salt-water 
immersion may lead to some apparent degradation in the external appearance 
of the equipment even though its operation will be unimpaired. 
Instrumentation equipment, in general, appears to be reusable in all 
Replace- cases, when used in conjunction with the original CM equipment. 
ment of instrumented equipment employing bonded sensors wil l  generally 
require replacement of instrumentation. 
renovation requirements. 
Table 3 1 shows the instrumentation 
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X. LANDING, RECOVERY, AND DOCKING SYSTEMS 
SYSTEM DEFINITION 
For  the purposes of this study, the earth landing system consists of 
the crew couches, couch struts, and the uprighting subsystem (Figure 55). 
The three crew couches are designed as a single unit supported by a series 
of energy-absorbing struts. The energy of landing is dissipated primarily 
by crushing honeycomb in a cylinder and, secondarily, by friction of pads 
sliding on the cylinder. The uprighting system is designed to prevent the 
command module from floating in an inverted position after water landing, 
thus providing a more comfortable crew-seating position and easier  egress  
through the docking hatch. The system consists of three air bags initially 
stowed on the parachute deck and inflated at crew command. 
The recovery system (Figure 56) is composed of mortar-deployed 
drogue parachutes and Ringsail parachutes with mortar-deployed pilot 
parachutes. 
single fitting which is equipped wit\ pyrotechnic cable cutters to release 
the parachutes. The mains a r e  released a t  the discretion of a crewman 
after landing. Parachute-deployment sequence of events is automatically 
actuated by signals from the sequence controller and the pyrotechnic 
continuity verification box (covered in ection VI) which are located inside 
the command module. 
override by a crewman during the final minutes of flight. 
All  the parachutes a r e  attached to the command module at a 
The sequence controller is capable of limited manual 
The command module portion of the docking system consists of a 
probe mechanism which has  the capability of mitigating shock loads experi- 
enced during the docking procedure. The mechanism is attached to the 
docking tunnel structure by an adapter r ing  equipped with a circumferential 
pyrotechnic cutting device for operating the mechanism from the command 
module (Figure 57) .  
latches used to draw the L M  and CSM together to an initial position, and 
12 manual latches for final positioning. 
Built on the inside of this ring a re  four automatic 
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 
The performance of these systems cannot be degraded because of 
refurbishment and reuse of components. Many of these components a re  
considered crcw-safety items with reliability apportioned on this basis. 
These systems a r e  peculiar, however, in that many system components 
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completed and must be replaced'by new 
components, thereby providing better reliability than if  components were 
reused. Materials and designs which are used in the recovery and earth- 
landing system were selected to minimize the degree of degradation of the 
components to ensure operating reliability after exposure to the space 
environment. 
dates for refurbishment. 
This fact makes the components which a re  recovered candi- 
SYSTEM RENOVATION 
The following pages discuss system-refurbishment capability in terms 
of degree of degradation for each system component after exposure to the 
environment, and the requirements for replacing components which a re  lost 
during normal operation. 
Uocking Mechanism 
The docking mechanism falls into the lost-during-operation category. 
In the docked-orbital configuration, the docking probe is stowed within the 
command module, but prior to vehicle separation the probe is replaced in 
i ts  original position. 
ring is separated from the docking hatch structure by the pyrotechnic cutter 
and the docking mechanism is not recovered. 
module, therefore, must be equipped with a new docking mechanism. 
After hatch closure and vehicle separation, the adapter 
The renovated command 
Recovery System 
During normal recovery- system operation, the drogue parachutes a re  
severed from the command module at  high altitude and a re  not available for 
reuse. At main parachute deployment, the r i se r  of the pilot parachute is 
used a s  a ripcord to release the parachute from the retention bag. 
fact alone precludes the reuse of the bag on further missions since the fabric 
generally is damaged, 
drying, and inspection would nullify the benefit of reuse on this inexpensive 
i tem. 
This 
Even i f  damage were not swtained, removal, cleaning, 
The main parachutes may be disconnected from the command module 
at  the discretion of the crew. If this has happened, there i s  a chance that 
they can be recovered. The cost of recovery in this situation, however, is 
quite high relative to the cost of the parachutes, even when the parachutes 
can be located. 
command module, they will be saturated with sea water and probably will 
be colored by the dye marker. Cleaning and drying requires specialized 
equipment which is not readily available. 
of the parachutes has been decreasing a s  the command module weight has 
been increasing and this will result in increased minor damage to the 
Assuming that the parachutes remain attached to the 
Furthermore, the factor of safety 
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textile materials. 
performance of the parachute, repair would be very difficult. Parachute 
reuse has its application in cargo drops where parachute safety factors a re  
high and where occasional malfunction can be tolerated. But refurbishment 
and reuse is not recommended in Apollo manned missions f o r  these relatively 
inexpensive components. 
Although this damage is of little consequence to the 
The two drogue parachute mortars a r e  candidates for refurbishment, 
providing damage has not been sustained during parachute deployment. 
has been found after many recovery system tests and test flights of hardware 
that the mortar cases a re  subject to damage from the parachute r i se r  
(Figure 58). 
the muzzle a rea  is b;nt and torn, making it totally unsuitable for refurbish- 
ment. 
refurbished to the original condition. 
conditions wi l l  be minimal because the mortar is basically a metal assembly. 
Launch and entry heating have no affect on the mortar case. 
the mortar, i t  w i l l  be necessary to remove the unit from the command 
module, strip the unit, and thoroughly clean away salt and pyrotechnic 
deposits. A new sabot and end-closure cap wi l l  be required in addition to 
replacement of all elastomers in the in the unit. 
may be refurbished in a manner similar to that defined for the drogue 
mortars,  providing damage has not been sustained during operation. 
It 
For inrL nce, on spacecraft 011, the thin aluminum shell in 
When no damage is sustained from this cause, the mortars  may be 
Degradation due to space environmental 
To refurbish 
The pilot parachute mortar 
The parachutes a re  attached to the command module by individual 
r i se r  lines a t  the parachute attachment fitting, which is bolted to the CM 
structure on the Z-axis of the forward equipment compartment. 
of hardware contains five cartridge-operated cvtters with replaceable 
aavils for separating the parachute r i se r  lines from the command module. 
The unit will  degrade minimally in the environments to which it is subjected. 
Vacuum meteoroid and temperature have no efizct on the fitting, but pro- 
longed exposure to sea water may produce some corrosion in  the area of 
dissimilar metal contact. 
determined, since the Block I1 has not yet been flight-tested. Scuffing of 
the fitting surface by the r i se rs ,  however, is to be expected during the 
parachute deployment sequence. Refurbishment consists of removing the 
unit from the command module, disassembling, and cleaning. Scuff marks 
may be removed by grinding, 
e la s tome r s renewed, 
This piece 
Degradation due to operational use has yet to be 
Cutters and anvils should be replaced and 
The drogue parachute r i s e r s  a r e  cut during normal operation and 
must, therefore, be replaced, On the other hand, the main parachute 
r isers ,  a re  cut after landing, a t  crew option. It is recommended that these 
r isers ,  even i f  they a re  intact after recovery, be discarded. The difficulty 
of cleaning out salt deposits in the cable and cable fittings, which may cause 
subsequent corrosion, is the reason for this recommendation, 
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The earth-landing sequence controller is located in the lower equlpment 
bay. In this position, i ts  degradation due to environment is at  a minimum 
and, in fact, the controller is designed to function even after exposure to 
these environments, The functioning components consist of relays, solid- 
state timers, and switches operated by barometric pressure. Since the 
controller is functioned many times during checkout, it is recommended 
that all relays be replaced during refurbishment. However, a s  concluded 
in Section VI, the entire unit is best replaced due to its construction, The 
controller senses external atmospheric pressure at  the command module 
side wall +'.rough a 3/8-inch diameter tube, After landing, this tube could 
be under water for short periods of time and should be cleaned before reuse. 
Salt-water intrusion into the sequence controller wi l l  be cause to scrap the 
unit. 
cient water penetrated into the interior of the command module due to a 
malfunction in the pressure-equalizing valves. 
The possibility of this happening is remote but it could occur if suffi- 
The pyrotechnic continuity ve- ification base, located adjacent to the 
sequence controllei, is an integral part  of the recovery system control. 
The life of this unit is limited by the number of operational sequences or  
cycles to which the unit is subjected during checkout, and the same rationale 
applied to the controllers with a replacement conclusion apiiies here. 
Earth Landing System 
The upright system consists of three air bags stowed beneath the 
parachute and inflated to a low pressure by air from a reciprocating com- 
pressor. 
in tests in the vacuum chamber. 
ert ies due to a 14-day exposure, 
wi l l  degt..-.de the bag material only minimally. 
bags wi l l  be subjected to the action of the sea causing a general abraaion of 
the bag material, particularly in the area of bag attachments. For this 
reason, activated bags which have been used a re  not recommended for reuse. 
The bag-pressurizing system consists of the compressor and check and 
relief valves coupled together with aluminum tubing. 
drawn from inside the command module and pumped into the bags. Degrada- 
tion of the system from external environment during flight wi l l  be neglig-ole. 
Operational use of the compressor, however, will  graduzily deteriorate the 
unit and internal corrosion due to prtnp+ng salt water is also a possibility, 
The operatbg life of the compressor has been set  at  three hours, but time 
consumed during checkout of the compressor and the uprighting system 
generally amounts to a considerable portion of this life. 
cvnsists of stripping down the unit, cleaning, and inspection, The unit must 
be rebuilt with new elastomers and new valves. 
Degradation of the bags from exposure to vacuum has been defined 
Test results showed littie change in prop- 
Temperature extremes in the stowage area 
In operational use, the inflated 
In operation, a i r  is 
Refurbishment 
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.The rolennid d v e ,  pre8sure relief Vdve ,  8nd check v81w xmy be 
reuitd after cleaning, Jmrpction, UQLa replacement of elartomerr. New 
tubing should be installed b ab&& fh8 possitdllty of udng plumbing in 
which salt-water corrorioa hrr started. 
It h88 been estimated th8t the uprighting 8yrtem d l  be deployed in 
only 15 percent of bndizq8, relieving the requirement for rmjor refurbirh- 
ment. 
A8 the firet Block If crew coucher bve yet to be qualified, any 
aaalyrir of refurbishment capability d l  be iimited. Since the couches are 
designed for the hnd0~8ndimg case, huwever, low structurrrl Loulips 8880- 
ciated with water landing w i l l  preeent m obrtach to refurbishment. In fact, 
tests have shown that the eo& attenuation rtrut. w i l l  not stroke during a 
iulmi.ul water m. Degr8dalion of corrch lpla atruts dut €0 environment 
ir minimi&& by tlmir locationintht camxmad1pDoda4 and by the design 
ghilo8ophy which requires the couch 8y.m 80 fuactioa 8f&r e.xp08ure to 
tbrd envirorlanant The degree of structurrl degradation ir, tbarefore. 
expected ta be negligible. Om the &bar hmd, eynthetic orgamic materials 
w i l l  suffer degradation d y  from oparrtionrl use. Visibie wear, dirt, 
sQc,, w i l l  be causa to replace the crew re8traint h8mess and couch covering. 
T b s e  component. could not be reused if they have become saturated with 
w&ter. 
The struts mtut be removed ami disammmbled ad, in the event that 
&e swat show PO stroking, the unit may be rebuilt and recalibrated. Struts 
which have stroked may be rebuilt mrl calibrated, using psw crushable 
material, 
The components -which are recovered rnwt be stripped down for 
hapeetion a d  clrrrning during spacecraft refurbirhment. Therefore, nc 
special postrecovery operatioad coxmtrrink are required Hosing down 
the parachute deck or forward equipment bay with plrin water would, however, 
nmke removal and subsequent refwbi.hmcnt of component. a& easier a r k  
by slowing down corrorioa. 
An evrluation of refurbiebxnet capability is provided in rummary 
form in Table 32. 
OFF-NOMINAL CASE RENOVATION EVALUATION 
The following prragraphr discws some of the off-aomind cares 
where ryrtern refurbirhment may be rccom~irhed 
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The recovery system features fu l l  redundancy in drogue and main 
parachute s u b o y s ~ s ,  A single operating drogue parachute will meet all 
the applicrblt requirements of stakiliution and deceleration of the command 
module. A probawe cause of 8 .ingle drogue deployment failure would be 
frilure of the pyroinitiatioa in one of the mortars, Re fu rb iahen t  of the 
unfired mor- is possible, providimg the cause of malfunction can be def- 
initely pinpointed. Procedure for ruhrbishmant has been dercribed in 
previous discussions. 
Two main parachutes will  provide the command module with a landing 
velocity which is within the crprbility of an earth-landing system. 
probabb cause of 8 chute deploymcnt failure is failure of the pilot parachute 
mortar. In thirr case, the maha pack wi l l  be retained on the parachute deck, 
The parachute pack cannot be reused, however, because of deterioration 
from sea ornrtcr and the unknown problems associated with reuse after a 
8econd t h e  in space. 
The 
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Table 32. Doclcing Recovery and Earth-Landing System Summary 
of Refurbishment Evaluation 
I U E T H - m  
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-DING PAGE BLANK NOT RLMED. 
x f  GUIDANCE AND NAVIGATION 
The guidance and navigation subsystem forms the primary guidance and 
navigation control syrtem (PGNCS) for the spacecraft (Figure 59). The three 
pr;mary functions of the PGNCS are: 
1. Maintenance of an internal reference, which is used as a basis for 
measurements and computations 
2. Calculation of the position and velocity of the spacecraft 
3. Generation of attitude e r ro r  signals and thrust  c o m m a d s  necessary 
to maintain the required spacecraft trajectory. 
CONDITION OF RECOVERED SUBSYSTEM 
Degradation of the PGNCS due to orbital operation is limited to the 
specific assemblies described in the following paragraphs. 
Inertial Measurement Unit (MU) 
The IMU (Figure 60)  provides an inertial reference consisting of a 
stable member gimbaled for three degrees of freedom a d  stabilized by 
three integrating gyros and associated servos. 
is sensed by the'pulsed integrating pendulum accelerometers (PIPA) mounted 
orthogonally on the stable member. 
Acceleration of the spacecraft 
The degradation of the IMU, during orbit, is limited to increasing drifts 
due to bearing wear in the gyro assemblies and girxibal mounts. Run-time on 
the IMU is expected to be about 1400 hours at the end of a misrion. The gyro 
end-life is a function of bearing manufacture, gyro assembly, and operating 
conditions. The gyro end-life is not a readily predictable quantity. In dis- 
cussions, on the life expectancy of the IMU gyros John E. Miller, Deputy 
Associate Director of the Instrumentation Laboratory at Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, stated that failures have occurred in as little as 
200 horsrs of gyro operation while.other gyros were operating following 
SO00 hours of use. Mr. Miller recommended that gyro testing to the Apollo 
operational checkout procedures to be used as  gyro replacement criteria. 
Loss of power to the IMU heaters during landing and post recovery with 
subsequent cooling below plus 50 degrees F could cause damping fluid changer 
in the P P A ' s  (Reference 6). This change in damping fluid is not dertructive, 
but will require that the PIPA's be recalibrated. 
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pushbuttons. 
fore, a short life. Illumination of the white EL lamps is down 82 percent 
after 2000 hours use (Reference 10). 
These lamps have a high loss of illumination rate and, there- 
Blue phosphor EL lamps are m a d  to display numeric information on the 
DSKY (t, 0, 1, 2, 3, etc. ). 
decay rate that the white EL h l l P S 0  
down 65 percent after 2000 h-8 used. 
luminescent display on the navigation DSKY had a 3/4-inch crack in the 
upper right corner. (See Section VIII for further fiscussion of EL lamp 
characteristics. ) 
The blue EL lamps have a slower brightness 
Illumination of the blue EL lamps is 
In Spacecraft 011, the verb electro- 
Command Module Computer (CMC) 
The CMC performs space flight data handling and computations. 
CMC is composed of a general-purpose digital computer employing a core 
memory (Figure 66). 
degraded during flight, but must be replaced as it contains the mission flight 
dynamics, which are applicable only to  specific missions, and the celestial 
navigation coordinates that a r e  a function of time. 
The 
The fixed-core memory portion of the CMC is not 
Associated Equipment 
The condition of the following equipment is expected to be within opera- 
tional tolerance following a mission: power and servo assembly, coupling 
data unit, and indicator control panel. 
RENOVATION REQUIREMENTS 
Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) 
The IMU shall be checked for gyro drift and shall 
ing the * *quirements of the Apollo operational checkout 
The IMlj ;hall be functionally checked and then stored. 
activation time, before flight, the LMU shall be brought 
the P I P A  calibration performed. 
have any gyro exceed- 
procedure replaced. 
Upon the required 
up to temperature and 
Optical Assembly 
The optical assembly shall be dismantled and all components checked 
The optical assembly shall then be for contamination and transmissibility. 
assembled and adjwted, per specification, with all seals and degraded parts 
being replaced. 
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Display and Keyboard (DSKY) 
The DSKY shall be dismantled and all subassemblies checked to speci- 
The electroluminescent displays and keys shall be tested then fication. 
reused or  replaced. 
with all seals and degraded parts being replaced. 
The DSKY shall then be assembled, per specification, 
Command Module Computer (CMC) 
The CMC shall be tested to specification and the appropriate mission 
memory shall be installed. 
Associated Equipment 
The associated equipment and harnesses shall be checked to specifica- 
tion prior to  installation with the renovated assemblies. 
Guidance and Navigation System 
The guidance and navigation system shall be system-tested prior to 
installation in the command module. 
POSTRECOVERY OPERATION REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS 
Upon recovery of the spacecraft, AC Electronics (Reference 11) has 
recommended that heater powers be reconnected to the IMU assembly. 
addition of heater power should be accomplished by the use of GSE equipment. 
AC Electronics' recommendation states that the IMU should not be allowed 
to go below t65  degrees F. An investigation of flown IMU hardware, upon 
which the temperature level has not been maintained, should be conducted to 
ascertain i f  temperature control is mandatory or if recalibration will 01 er-  
come the cooling effects on the inertial sensors. 
The 
Upon recovery of the spacecraft, a complete washing of the exterior 
parts of the optical assembly shall be performed using demineralized water. 
A t  the earliest convenience, the optical assembly shall be removed and the 
area between the command module wall and the optical assembly bellows shall 
be washed with demineralized water and treated a s  required to  prevent con- 
tinued salt-water corrosion. 
EXPLORATORY TEST REQUIREMENTS 
Checkout of the IMU on the BME for catastrophic failure of any of the 
inertial sensing components i s  recommended. A l l  other failures, except for 
the known optical degradation, should be minor in nature and wil l  be covered 
in  normal renovation. 
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xIf* STABILIZATION AND CONTROL 
The Stabilization and control system (SCS) provides stabilization and 
control of the vehicle during rotational, translational, thrust maneuvers and 
attitude hold. 
system is used as a backup for the primary guidance and navigation subsystem. 
The assemblies a re  depicted in Figure 67. 
The SCS also functions as a strap-down guidance system. The 
CONDITION O F  RECOVERED SUBSYSTEM 
A discussion of the anticipated degradation of the SCS performance 
capability due to preflight, flight and postrecovery operations is provided 
below by end item. 
Gyro Assembly (Two Each Per  System) 
The gyro assemblies include three single degree-of-freedom rate- 
integrating gyros and the necessary electronics to provide output signals 
proportional to either angular displacement or angular rate. It is expected 
that the three gyro units in  each end item (six gyros total) will be degraded 
because of system operation in preflight test  and flight operation. The 
degradation is due primarily to worn bearings. 
maximum life of 2500 hours. 
The gyro assemblies have a 
Figure 68 depicts a typical integrating gyro. 
Gyro Display Coupler (GDC) 
The GDC provides interface between the gyro assembly and the com- 
mand module computer and the flight director attitude indicator (DSAI). 
The GDC is expected to experience performance degradation in the 
electromechanical stepper motor-resolver assemblies as a result of wear in 
gear trains. 
Display Electronic Assembly (DEA) 
The DEA provides the interface between the SCS displays and other 
components of the guidance and control system. 
The DEA is an electronic device and should be degraded only because of 
operating time incurred during preflight testing and flight operations. 
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Flight Director Attitude Indicator (FDAI) (Two each 
The FDAI displays attitude, attitude e r ro r s  and rate information. 
INIWRMATION SYSTEMS DIVISION 
D e r  svstem) 
The performance of the FDAI is expected to be degraded in the a rea  of 
the electromechanical drive assemblies because of wear in the gearing and 
slip-rings. 
Control Electronic Assemblv (CEA) 
The CEA performs summing, shaping, and switching functions of the 
sensor and manual input signals necessary to maintain stabilization and 
. control in all three axes. 
The CEA is an electronic assembly and should be degraded only because 
of operating time incurred during preflight testing and flight operations. 
Thrust Vector Position Servo Amdifier (SAA) 
The SAA controls the service propulsion system actuator assembly. 
The SAA is an electronic assembly and should be degraded only because 
of operating time incurred during preflight testing and flight operation. 
Solenoid Driver Assembly (SDA) 
The SDA controls the on-off function of the RCS and SPS valves. 
Attitude Set Control 
The attitude set control provides the capability to manually set desired 
attitudes for use in the attitude reference system. 
The device is an electromechanical assembly and may incur slight 
mechanical wear during preflight testing and flight operation. 
Gimbal Position/Fuel Pressure  Indicator 
The indicator provides a display of the angular positions of the pitch 
and yaw S P S  engine gimbals or of the S-II/S-IVB fuel pressure. 
also includes controls for manually positioning the SPS engine gimbals. 
The panel 
The device could incur performance degradation because of mechanical 
wear of the giriiba: position set control incurred during preflight testing and 
flight operations. 
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Rotation Control (Two each per system) 
The rotation control is a hand-operated device which provides rotational 
control of the vehicle. 
The device is an electromechanical aseembly and can be expected to  
incur performance degradation because of mechanical wear of the transducers 
and control linkage during preflight test and flight operations. 
Translation Cont r ol 
The translation control is a hand-operated device which provides control 
of vehicle translation in three planes. 
The device consists of a set of switches actuated by a single control 
handle. 
linkage during preflight tests and flight operations. 
The device can be expected to  incur mechanical wear in the control 
RENOVATION REQUIREMENTS 
Each electronic and electromechanical assembly shall be tested at the 
end-item level. 
investigated and repaired. 
Any out of tolerance indication or  malfunction shall be 
It may be possible to repair electronic assemblies which indicate an out 
These com- of tolerance condition by changing the gain and t r im components. 
ponents a re  located on top of the interconnect matrix assembly (Figure 69). 
A malfunction within a module will require removal of the cordwood-stacked 
module as  sembly. 
Electromechanical assemblies such a s  the FDAI, Rotation Control etc., 
may require replacement of gear trains and transducers because of wear. 
It is recommended that the gyro units of the gyro assembly be replaced. 
This recommendation is based on an estimated 1400 hours of accumulated 
operating time accrued during preflight test and flight operation for the first  
miss ion. 
Each assembly should be purged and recharged in accordance with 
current specifications. 
EXPLORATORY TEST REQUIREMENTS 
The two gyro assemblies should be tested on the BME for catastrophic 
failures which may have occurred in the gyro units. 
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Figure 69. Typical Block I1 Electronic Assembly 
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XIII. ENTRY MONITOR SUBSYSTEM 
The entry monitor subsystem provides a backup to the guidance and 
navigation (G&N) or SCS subsystem during thrusting and entry maneuvers. 
The entry monitor subsystem performs the following functions (Figure 70): 
(1) g-velocity entry theace for g onset evaluation; (2)  corridor evaluhtion; 
(3)  0. 05 g detection; (4) l i f t  vector direction; (5) range to go; (6) delta V 
measurements. 
CONDITION O F  RECOVERED SUBSYSTEM 
The operational environment during a normal mission should have little 
effect on the subsystem. 
environment and is located in the main display panel which is not subject to 
adverse environmental conditions. 
assembly is a low-use item, med  only during thrusting or entry, and i s  
expected to be operated for only thirty hours during a mission. 
aud servo assembly, used during entry, is expected to operate for only 
two  hours during a mission (Figure 70). 
The subsystem is sealed for protection L-om the 
The entry monitor subsystem electronic 
The scroll 
RENOVATION REQUIREMENTS 
The scroll in the scroll assembly must be replaced as the corridor 
limits vary from mission to mission and a permznent tract- i s  scribed upon 
the surface of the scroll during each mission (Figure 71). 
luminescent displays should be chdcked for light output to determine i f  
replacement is required. 
Lhe electro- 
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XW. REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM 
CONDITION OF RECOVERED SUBSYSTEM 
During the course of an Apollo mission, potential degradation of the 
command module reaction control system (CM R CS) performance capability 
can result from a number of conditions. These conditions are identified a s  
follows: 
1. Exposure to boost heating 
2. Exposure to structural and dynamic loading during boost 
3. Exposure to space vacuum 
4. Exposure to radiation 
5. Exposure to space temperature extremes 
6. Exposure to fneteoroid impingement 
7. System operation and propellant exposure 
8.  Exposure to reentry heating 
9. Structural and dynamic loading during landing 
10. Exposure to sea water 
11. Postlanding recovery operations 
For a normal Apollo 14-day lunar mission, no evidence exists to 
For longer mission durations (45 days 
indicate that any CM RCS component (Table 33) will be degraded by 
conditions of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. 
and up), however, certain unknowns exist with respect to the capability of 
some RCS components to withstand the conditions of 3 and 4. 
mission durations necessitate exploratory tests of the following to determine 
degree of degradation: 
Longer 
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. 
Table 33. CM RCS Components 
Component Identification Supplier 
Oxidizer tank ME 28 2 - 00 0 6 Bell Aerosyetems Corp. 
Bell Aerosystems Corp. 
Menasco Manufacturing Co. 
On Mark Couplings, Inc. 
Lear Siegler, Inc. 
J.C. Carter Co. 
Fuel tank ME282-0007 
Helium tank ME28 2 - 00 02 
ME273 -00 10 Helium f i l l  cotiplinl 
Test  point coupling ME 1 44- 0023 
Propellant couplings ME273-0011 
-0019 
-0021 
-0024 
Helium explosive valve ME284-00 19 Pelmec 
Pelmec 
Fairchild Strates Corp. 
Accessory Products Co. 
Calmec Mfg. Corp. 
Propellant explosive valve ME284-0130 
Helium pressure regulator ME284- 00 22 
Check valve assembly ME284- 0024 
ME284-0062 Helium pressure relief 
valve 
Burst diaphragm isolation 
valve 
ME251 -0005 Pyrodyne, Inc. 
Propellant latching 
solenoid valve 
ME 284 - 0 2 76 National Water Lift Co. 
ME271 -0019 F Iexi ble ho se Ti teflex 
Re si s tof lex 
Rocketdyne 
PV;E 2 7 3 - 0 0 46 Dynatube fitting 
Rocket engine and nozzle 
ex tension 
ME901 -0067 
ME901-0189 
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Component Potential Problem 
Pressure relief valve Vacuum cold welding 
Pressure regulator Vacuum exposure on poppet and seal 
materials 
Oxidizer tank Radiation exposure of bladder under 
oxidizing conditions 
Engine valve seat Radiation 
The following paragraphs discuss the other conditions which potentially 
r-.:i*lt in a degrading effect on CM RCS components. 
:pace Temperature Extremes 
Under certain mission conditions, i t  is possible for RCS components 
in  the CM aft equipment toroidal section to see temperature extremes of 
15 F to +200 F. 
temperature; i f  temperatures reach 200 F or  above, seals and potting 
compound in  the following may be degraded: 
No problem is expected for the components at the low 
Helium f i l l  couplings 
Test point couplings 
Helium pressure regulators 
Check valves 
Propellant disconnect couplings 
Burst  diaphragm isolation valves 
Propellant isolation valves 
System Operation and Propellant Exposure 
In normal system usage, some components of the CM RCS operate in 
such a manner that they cannot be used again without replacement or  
refurbishment. In addition, some components a re  limited life items whose 
number of life cycles may be exceeded during a combination of checkout and 
mission usage. 
Table 34. The rocket engines/nozzle extensions a re  also limited life items 
because of their ablative design. 
i n  Table 34 wil l  vary with the type and duration of the mission; where 
applicable this  replacement point includes a safety factor of 10 percent of 
the limited life of the hardware. From the operational standpoint, and from 
Table 34, the following CM RCS components wil l  be degraded from a normal 
Apollo mission: 
The CM RCS components in this category a re  as given in 
The actual replacement point for the items 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6 .  
7 .  
8. 
RCS engines /nozzle extensions 
Oxidizer and fuel propellant 
tank bladders 
Helium explosive valves 
Propellant explosive valves 
Burst diaphragm isolation 
valves 
Helium relief valves 
Oxidizer f i l l  and vent 
couplings 
Oxidizer latching solenoid 
valves 
Reentry Heating 
Re commendation 
Replacement nece ssary 
Replacement necessary 
Replace 
Replace 01 :s actuated in 
mission 
Refurbish 
Replace if  diaphragm ruptured 
Replace because of potential 
chemical attack 
Require careful retest o r  
replacement 
MaxirnurLi temperatures expected for CM RCS components due to 
reentry plus soakback heating wi l l  potentially degrade seals and/or potting 
compounds in some components. 
mately 200 F, no problems a re  expected. However, for excessive 
temperatures, the following components may be degraded: 
If temperatures do not exceed approxi- 
Helium f i l l  couplings 
Test point couplings 
Helium pressure regulators 
Check valves 
Propellant disconnect couplings 
Burst diaphragm isolation valves 
Propellant isolation valves 
Also, the ablative rocket engine /nozzle extensions wi l l  be significantly 
affected by reentry heating in some locations on the CM. 
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Structural and Dynamic Loading During Landing 
The CM RCS of S/C 009 and 011 appeared to be in excellent condition 
following the impact of water landing. On a normal mission and landing, this 
is expected to be the case. However, there is a possibility of damage to RCS 
components in the case of the most adverse landing shocks, especially to 
those components located near the impact area. 
a r e  especially susceptible to this condition: 
The following components 
Oxidizer tanks 
Fuel tanks 
Helium tanks 
Propellant solenoid valves 
Rocket engines /nozzle extensions 
Water Damage 
Salt water corrosion has  a potentially degrading effect on all CM RCS 
S/C 009 had evidence components and plumbing (especially brazed joints). 
of substantial corrosion; S/C 011 was much better than 009 but still had salt 
deposits on the bottom of tanks and lines. If procedures a re  implemented 
on subsequent spacecraft requiring washdown as  soon as possible crfter 
impact, corrosion may be negligible. The RCS engines/nozxle extcnsions, 
however, and possibly some component wiring may still be adversely 
affected by salt water and washdown water. Under this condition, all 
potentially reusable components and plumbing wilL have to be inspected, 
cleaned, and pressure-tested prior to assessment for reuse. 
Po s tr e cove r y Ope rations 
Current postrecovery tests and inspection a re  primarily designed to 
evaluate anomalies discovered in flight (where known), to ascertain any 
externally evidenced physical damage, and to discover existence of 
additional anomalies without functional checkout of the subsystems. 
case of the CM RCS, postrecovery decontamination of the system and 
possibly disassembly of components may degrade the capability of some 
components. 
in postrecovery decontamination reacted with residual Freon used in 
preassembly tank tests, and the reactants chemically attacked the aluminum 
standpipe in the tank, Also, the unfortunate experience with methanol i n  
the S/C 017 SPS tanks reveals that methanol cannot be used with titanium 
tanks. The Apollo program has taken action to forbid the use of Freon in 
the fuel side of the system and to find a substitute material (perhaps 
isopropanol/ for the methanol. With these problems resolved, the post- 
recovery operations are  not expected to degrade the capability of any 
potentially reusable CM RCS component, 
In the 
In the case of S/C 011, methanol introduced into the fuel tank 
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Summary of Anticipated Degradation 
The conditions under which potential degradation of CM RGS components 
can occur a re  summarized in Table 35. This assessment is based on 
mission conditions that may o r  may not occur; most components must, 
therefore, be inspected and tested after the recovery before an  accurate 
evaluation can be made of reuse/refurbishment possibilities. 
RCS components looked good after recovery and testing them may give a 
better indication of possible reuse capabilities for some components. 
S/C 01 1 CM 
CM RCS EFFECT ON HEAT SHIELD 
The heat shields on S/C 009 and 011 were significantly charred in the 
vicinity of the CM RCS roll engine nozzle exits. 
from normal operation of the roll jets to damp roll rates during reentry, the 
damage must t z  accepted and repaired as  pa-t of CM renovation. 
however, the damage occurred during the propellant jettison period, some 
analysis of the possibility of minimizing this damage is justified. 
If this damage occurred 
If, 
After the main parachutes a re  disreefed in a normal reentry, the 
remaining CM RCS propellant must be jettisoned to eliminate possible 
toxicity hazards on impact; this is done by burning the propellant through 
ten CM RCS engines (including the four roll engines but excluding the two 
upper pitch engines because they a re  too near the parachute lines). 
would seem possible to expel fuel only from the engines, dumping the 
oxidizer, nitrogen tetroxide, through the oxidizer dump system a s  is done 
in the pad abort mode. Nitrogen tetroxide vapor, however, can deteriorate 
the nylon parachutes and lines extremely rs.pidly, and this potential flight 
safety hazard has always been considered great enough in past analyses to 
make the burnoff mode mandatory. 
It 
It might be possible to use only two pitch and four yaw engines for this 
Heat shield damage would be reduced because the pitch and yaw 
However, propellant 
burnoff. 
jets fire at  right angles to the heat shield suriace. 
jettison and purge must be complc te before water impact, even though one- 
half of the CM-RCS is inoperable. 
pitch and two yaw) available for propllar.2 burnoff, and i t  seems quite 
possible that burnoff through only three engines would consume more time 
than would be available during parachbi 
T5ic wotLLd leave only threa engines (one 
descent on some missions. 
Further investigation may produce some alternative that would reduce 
the heat shield damage near the roll engines. 
howevc r, i t  must be assumed that such damage will occur and must be 
repaired as  part  of command module renovation. 
Pending such a result, 
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Table 35. Potential CM RGS Degradation Resulting From 
Goaditionr During a Normal Apollo Mission 
Oxidizer tank 
I Fuel tank 
I Helium tank 
Helium p res su re  regulator 
Check valve assembly 
I Dynatube fitting 
I Rocket engine and nozzle extension 
I INormal operation requires  replacement par t s  or  
2Reusable unless severe landing impact conditions 
3Normally, bladders only will be degraded. 
4In normal mission, two valves a r e  not used and 
50xidizer side only, 
(JP os si ble diaphragm rupture. 
.'Darnage to components and plumbing dependent 
on washdown procedures;  inspection and tes t  
are  necessary.  
complete replacement pr ior  to  reuse.  
in area where located was encountered. 
should be available f o r  another use. 
Conditions 
- 
Y c 
4 
It 
al a 
0 
ca 
c 
0 
(d 
9) 
.d Y
8 
E 
42 
m 
A 
VI 
&I 
- 
x3 
x3 - 
II 
- 222 - 
N O R T H  A M E R I C A N  AVIATION,  INC.  SPACE urd INmRMATION BYBTEMS DlVl8lUN 
RENOVATION REQUIREMENTS 
Subsystem Disassembly 
The four CM RCS panel assemblies (two V36-460101 helium panel 
assemblies, one V36-470101 oxidizer panel assembly, one V36-480101 fuel 
panel assembly) wil l  have to be removed from the spacecraft and largely 
disassembled to replace and/ or bench-test components. 
tanks must be removed for refurbishment and the two helium tanks for retest. 
The twelve-engine/ flexible hose/dynatube fitting subassemblies must be 
removed for engine replacement and component retest, 
are tubing runs; these wil l  probably be tested in place, but portions wi l l  be 
replaced if any degradation is apparent in postflight inspection. 
The four propellant 
All that will  remain 
Component Reuse, Refurbishment and Replacement Assessment 
The number of e ich  CM RCS component that must be replaced or 
refurbished is assessed below based on component design, capabilities, and 
degradation expected. 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
ME 282-0006 oxidizer tank (Bell Aerosystems Corp. , two each). 
The bladder expulsion tanks a re  potentially the least reliable 
components in the CM RCS. Removal and complete disassembly, 
cleaning, inspection, reassembly with new seals and new 
bladders, and a new acceptance test a r e  considered necessary. 
The vendor (Bell) is best qualified to accomplish this. 
ME 282-0007 fuel tank (Bell Aerosystems Corp., two each). 
Same a s  ME 282-0006. 
ME 282-0002 helium tank (Menasco Mfg. Go. ,  two each). The 
interior of these two titanium vessels will be protected by the 
seals in the fill/vent couplings and the regulator /check-valve 
system. 
will be required. The tanks will be removed, cleaned, and 
inspec ted. 
A new proof-pressure test to confirm tank suitability 
ME 273-001 0 helium fill disconnect coupling (On Mark Couplings, 
Inc. , Div. of Purolator Products, two each). 
These couplings, used for fill/vent of helium, contain redundant 
seals, one in the sealing cap and one in the brazed-on portion. 
It seems unlikely that sea water will per-etrate this seal. The 
sealing cap will be examined by N-4A ( a d  replaced if necessary). 
Bothseals wil l  be tested, but it seems likely that these couplings 
will be reuseable. 
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5. ME 144-0023 test point disconnect coupling (Lear Siegler, Inc. , 
26 each). NAA is to le&-test in place and reuse or replace. 
(For pricing, assume 22 will be alright and 4 will be replaced,) 
6. ME 273-0011 (two each), ME 273-0019 (four ,ach), MG 273-0021 
(4 each), ME 273-0024 (two each). Propellant disconnect 
couplings (The J. C. Carter Co., total twelve each). 
Seals and filter cannot be inspected because coupling is a welded 
system. To be conservative, 100-percent replacement of airoorne 
coupling half only is planned. 
7. ME 284-0019 helium explosive valve (Pelmec Div. of Quantic 
Indus t r ie s , ten each) . 
The valve i s  actuated in mission and. must be replaced. 
8. ME 284-0130 propellant explosive valve (Pelmec Div. of Quantic 
Industries, four ea.;h). 
Two actuated in normal mission must be replaced. 
a r e  actuated only in abort and a re  assumed retested and found 
accept able. 
Two others 
9. ME 284-0021 helium pressure regulator unit (Fairchild Stratos 
Corp., Stratos Div., Western Branch, four each). 
The CM RCS pressure regulator assemblies a re  under full 
pressure for only the short period of I ee?itry, and they a re  pro- 
tected from internal sea water contamination by check valves and 
helium fill/vellt couplings. Their use for a second cycle seems 
feasible. The effect of exterior salt water corrosion and the 
possibility of contamination entering the bellows system (which i s  
vented to space) must still  be determined. NAA will remove and 
bench-test, since welds make disassembly difficult. (For pricing 
assume three axe acceptable and one is replaced.) 
10. ME 284-0024 check valve assembly (Accessory Products Go. ,  
Division of Textron, Inc., four each). 
The check valve duty cycle is  less  than that experienced in the SM 
RCS, and reuse certainly seems feasible. Internal sea water 
contamination should not reach the check valves, especially if 
the CM RCS is  flushed soon after recovery. NAA will  remove and 
bench-test, since welds make disassembly difficult. (For pricing 
assume three a re  acceptable and one is replaced.) 
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11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
ME 284-0062 helium prerrsure relief valve ( C a h e c  Mfg. Corp., 
4 each). NAA will remove and bench-test. If diaphragm is still 
intactrunit should be reuseable. (For pricing purposes, assume 
three a re  acceptable and one is replaced.) 
ME 251-0005 burst diaphragm isolation valve (Pyrodyne, Inc., 
4 each). Diaphragm is burst in normal mission. It will be 
returned to Pyrodyne for replacement of diaphragm and seals 
and reacceptance. 
ME 284-0276 propellant latching solenoid valve (National Water 
Lift Co., a Division of Pneumo Dynamics Corp., 4 each). 
NAA will remove and bench-test, since welds make disassembly 
difficult. 
replaced. ) 
(For pricing, assume three are acceptable and one is 
ME 271-0019 flexible hose (Tite Flex, 24 each). 
NAA to remove with engine, test, and reuse or  replace. 
pricing, assume 18 are  reused and 6 a r e  replaced.) 
(For 
ME 273-0046 dynatube fitting (Resistoflex, 24 each). 
NAA to remove, inspect, and reuse or replace. 
assume 18 are  reused and 6 a r e  replaced.) 
(For pricing, 
ME 901-0067 rocket engine and ME 901-0189 nozzle extension 
(Rocketdyne, a Division of NAA, 12 of each). 
The engines have ablative thrust chambers and nozzle extensions 
which will be pyrolyzed and then soaked in sea water; their reuse 
is out of the question. The fine fluid passages in the injector 
system a re  critical and will be about the first  point where corrosion 
attacks. There remains the possibility of salvaging the oxidizer 
and fuel valves, but valve seals may be susceptible to radiation 
damage and the cost of disassembly and inspection would tend to 
eliminate any savings. Although the engines a re  expensive, no 
prudent alternative to scrapping them is seen. All 12 engines 
and nozzle extensions must, therefore, be completely replaced. 
Philosophy Behind Component TeStiAig 
~ ~~ ~ 
Many of the components above (specifically, items 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
and 13) are  recommended for either replacement without inspection, or 
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retesting without disassembly and reuse based on testing only. The following 
considerations a r e  the basis for these recommendations: 
Component development and qualification testing were designed to 
certify components for a single Apollo mission and do not provide 
test confidence for repeated mission use. 
Neither the component vendor nor NAA can be expected to certify 
the reliability with which a component will withstand a second 
mission, since there has been no test program on which to base 
such confidence. 
-Any test program capable of developing sufficient confidence to 
certify components for repeated missions would be expected to 
cost more than the new components they would be designed to 
save. 
The process of machining open regulators, valves, etc. that a re  
designed a s  welded systems, replacing all seals, reassembling, 
and retesting would be expected to cost almost as much as 
replacement with new components. 
The only alternative more economical than complete replacement 
of all such components is therefore careful component retesting 
at the component or  subassembly p a e l  level. Components passing 
this test would be declared reusable as a matter of engineering 
judgment only. Components failing such a test would ae replaced 
either with new components or with components recovered from 
a second used CM. Since NAA has no test experience that 
certifies components for repeated usage, their reuse must 
reasonably be with the concurrence of and at the risl- of NASA. 
The quantitative estimates made above of the proportion of com- 
ponents that might be recovered a re  considered the best feasible 
in the time available. 
what by analysis of the repair and scrappage records of vendors, 
but the scope of such analysis is beyond the present contract. 
The only real way to determine how many components can be 
saved is to attempt an actual refurbishment. 
These estimates might be improved some- 
POSTRECOVERY OPERATION REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS 
This analysis describes the precautions that should be taken during 
Apollo descent and post recovery periods to assure that the reaction control 
system is preserved for reuse to the maximum extent. The analysis was 
prepared with Spacecraft (212 in mind, but the conclusions reached seem 
equally applicable to Block I1 systems. 
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Spacecraft 012 has no automatic shutoff of RCS engine valves. The 
valves shut off when power is removed from the main d-c buses, but this 
may occur either before or  after impact. It is important that the engine 
valves and the propellant isolation valves be shut to seal the interior of the 
RCS from sea water. It is ,  therefore, recommended that the Spacecraft 012 
flight procedures be modified to require the following astronaut actions 
(if mission time permits), after the CM RCS purge system has been activated 
lnng enough to reduce the helium pressure (as monitored on the RCS indicator 
panel) to a low level (perhaps 100 psi), but before water impact: 
1. Turn off the CM RCS Propellant Isolation Valve - A and B control 
switches. 
2. Turn off any one of the following: 
(a) CM RCS Dump Switch 
(b) CM RCS Logic Switch 
(c) Main d-c power buses (if no longer needed). 
In a normal mission there should be sufficient time in the parachute 
descent to accomplish the above actions. If the descent time should be too 
short in an unusual mission, the actions can be deleted but equipment 
damage will probably take place. 
No procedure is now in use to preserve the exterior of the CM RCS 
from sea water degradation. 
study is to remove the lower heat shield and to hose down all accessible 
systems with fresh water. Such a technique, i f  done thoroughly, should 
provide satisfactory initial protection for the CM RCS. 
lines leading to the upper pair of CM RCS pitch engines may not be adequately 
rinsed in this operation, but they can be replaced if damaged; the engines 
a re  not considered to be reuseable in any event. 
One technique already discussed in the RCM 
The propellant 
NAA Process Specification MA0210-0162 describes the postrecovery 
decontamination procedure required for the CM RCS. 
removes propellant from the interior of the CM RCS components down to 
a 300 parts-per-million level by repeated purging with methanol (fuel side), 
Freon MF (oxidizer side), and gaseous nitrogen. 
SC 017 has shown that pure methanol is not a suitable material for use with 
titanium, and S&ID is now establishing a substitute for use in CM RCS 
decontamination. 
for a CM RCS which i s  to be preserved for reuse. 
require that the helium lines be crimped (1) close to Helium Bypass Valve A, 
This procedure 
Failure of SPS tanks on 
Otherwise, this proc,:dure seems entirely appropriate 
The procedure does 
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(2) close to Helium Bypass Valve B, and (3) close to the Helium Crossover 
Valve. All three valves a re  explosively actuated and would, therefore, have 
to be replaced before the system could be reused. The sections of helium 
lines containing the above crimps would also have to be replaced, but this 
creates no difficulty if they a re  close to the valves. 
In review, the following actions are recommended to protect CM RCS 
components on Spacecraft 012: 
(1) Shut off CM RCS engine valves and propellant isolation valves 
just before water impact. 
(2) Remove lower heat shield and hose down the outside of th2 CM 
RCS thoroughly with fresh water. 
(3) Decontaminate per specification M A  0210-0162 as  presently 
planned . 
Block II Spacecraft will have an automatic capability to shut off d-c 
power 13 seconds after CM RCS purge is initiated, but this is an optional 
feature that may not be used. Recommendation (1) is therefore still valid. 
CM RCS components will be packaged somewhat differently in Block II, but 
the changes should not affect recommendations (2) and (3) above. All three 
recommendations are ,  therefore, considered valid for both Block I and 
Block I1 systems. 
EXPLORATORY TEST REQUIREMENTS 
Exploratory tests may be defined a s  preceding and being in addition 
to component and subsystem acceptance tests; acceptance tests are those 
designed to show that the subsystem, as renovated, is ready for reuse. 
Review of the preceding sections shows that exploratory tests a r e  not 
applicable to the CM RCS for the following reasons: 
1. It i s  necessary to replace engines, nozzle extensions, and explosive 
valves in any event. 
2 .  Any expioratory test of oxidizer and fuel tanks should certainly 
include disassembly and close examination of bladders and seals. 
Refurbishment, involving disassembly and replacement of 
bladders and seals, is  believed more prudent, and should not cost 
a great deal more. 
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3.  Helium tanks will be removed and reaccepted (given new proof 
and leak tests). No other tests on these tanks a re  considered 
ne ce s s ar y . 
4. Acceptance tests of other components for reuse (valves, pressure 
regulators, etc.) will de+ermine a s  much as  can reasonably be 
learned of the functionhi of a used component without disassembly. 
As outlined in the section m Renovation Requirements, disassemble 
of these welded systemc is not considered cost-effective. The 
alternatives instead a re  acceptance based on functional tests and 
engineering judgement or replacement. 
While exploratory tests a r e  not proposed for the CM-RCS, the propul- 
sion representative on the renovation team wil l  analyze flight records and 
postflight subsystem appearance before recommending for a specific vehicle 
what components should be reused based only on acceptance tests. 
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xv. RELIABILITY 
The considerations of reuse and test described herein a r e  preliminary 
They a r e  based on the results of evalua- and intended for general guidance. 
tions conducted to date by the responsible subsystems analysts and have been 
correlated with reliability considerations of mission success and crew safety. 
REUSE CONSIDERATIONS 
Vehicle reuse entails categorization of equipment into three general 
classifications: reuse without refurbishment, refurbish to varying degrees, 
or replace with a new item. 
In assessing the impact of reuse on equipment reliability, consideration 
must be given to design criteria pertaining to time in environment, and equip- 
ment wearout, particularly of limited life items and moving or rotating com- 
ponents. These considerations affect any assumption concerning restoration 
to  original status by refurbishment. 
that (1) equipment is restored to its original status by refurbishment, and 
(2) where wearout is not a factor and no damage has been incurred, the prob- 
ability of PO failures for a successive mission of equal length is identical to 
the first mission, given that no prior failures have occurred and that design 
environments have not been exceeded. The latter assumption is based on the 
fact that electronic equipment generally possesses characteristics marked by 
the failure rate (bathtub) curve, illustrated in Figure 72. 
In the current study, it has been assumed 
For Apollo equipment not approaching wearout within the projected 
mission time, the "debugging" phase already has occurred. 
useful life region, characterized by random failures, is the area considered 
applicable, and the same number of failures may be expected to occur in the 
time period t i  to t 2  as in the equal time period t 2  to t3. 
probability of no failures for time tl to t2 and t2 is reached with no failures, 
the same R would apply for time T2 to  Tg. 
Therefore the 
Restated, i f  R is the 
Electronic equipment of a static nature (e. g. , transistors) a re  not 
typically subject to significant wearout within the mission times and equipment 
duty cycles associated with Apollo and RCM missions. Therefore, provided 
that an electronic component has not been subjected to physical damage, and 
provided that no failures have occurred during the first mission, this com- 
ponent should start the second mission with essentially the same inherent 
reliability it originally possessed. Other types of equipment a re  degraded to 
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Figure 72. Failure Rate 
varying degrees by operation and by the environments encountered during the 
mission, These a re  described in detail in the preceding subsystem sections, 
TEST REQUIREMENTS 
Testing requirements for equipment to be reused ("as is" or in a 
refurbished condition) depends to a great extent on criticality classifications, 
which a re  defined a s  follows: 
Criticality I A single failure or event which may expose the crew to 
environments beyond specified emergency limits. 
Criticality II 1. A single failure or event which may cause an aborted 
mission. 
2. Combination of any two failures and/or events which 
may cause loss of personnel. 
after f irst  unit failure following launch. ) 
(Abort is mandatory 
Criticality 111 A l l  others. 
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The criticality of an item will vary, depending on whether it is intended 
for use in the RCM spacecraft or laboratory. 
list for the RCM spacecraft will essentially be identical to the list for a basic 
Apollo spacecraft in an earth orbital mission but will be reduced extensively 
for laboratory application. 
The Criticality I and I1 item 
There appear to be few, i f  any, equipment items in the laboratory whose 
failure could cause loss of crew, with the exception of a catastrophic rupture 
of a pressure vessel. The remainder of possible failures to laboratory sub- 
systems generally a r e  related to experiment support. 
could reduce or e!iminate the capability for conducting further experiments 
but not affect the status of the CSM equipment. While mission continuation 
might be pointless under these conditions, the failures a re  not classified as 
Criticality JI, since termination of the mission for crew safety reasons alone 
is not required. Specific test requirements zcre defined in the subsystems 
section. 
Their occurrence 
Qualification Tests 
Basic Apollo equipment is being qualified for the LOR and other mis- 
The RCM spacecraft mission is 14 days, which sions of similar duration. 
results in total mission time greater than 22 days for reused equipment. 
Refurbishment has been specified for rotating and limited life equipment, and 
other items subject to degradation. 
a r e  restored to original status insofar a s  reliability is concerned. However, 
pressure vessels installed in the command module should be qualified for the 
longer cumulative mission length if they a re  to be reused. 
Under the study assumptions, these items 
Certain critical equipment which may be used on the laboratory for the 
longer missions of up to 45 days is to be qualified for these longer missions. 
This particularly applies to Criticality I items, which would include pressure 
vessels and plumbingi In addition, requalification will  be required for certain 
potential laboratory subsystems which have been relocated and will be sub- 
jected to more severe environmental operating conditions. 
other lower criticality equipment which has not been designed or qualified for 
longer missions, redesign or requalification is not considered essential. 
Failure of Criticality III equipment in the laboratory during the mission does 
not jeopardize crew safety. 
In the case of 
A s  indicated in the reliability analysis section, failures can be tolerated 
in the laboratory which, i f  occurring in the CSM, would be cause for abort, 
For example, loss of two inverters in a CSM during an earth orbit would 
require abort, since failure of the one remaining inverter would eliminate 
essential inverter output. Loss of two inverters in the laboratory could be 
tolerated, since loss of the third would affect laboratory functions only. 
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Qualification by Similarity 
In the case of certain types of equipment items (e. g. , connectors, 
static electronic devices, etc.) wherein wearout normally would not be 
expected during RCM mission times, these items may be qualified for the 
longer mission time by similarity. 
ing actual use of identical or similar equipment for comparable time periods 
without wearout, these equipments can be considered qualified, subject to the 
normal acceptance and all-systems test. 
been evaluated on an individual basis by members of the project team. 
If the supplier provides valid data regard- 
Qualification by similarity have 
Acceptance Tests 
A l l  equipment intended for reuse either with or  without refurbishment 
generally must undergo the regular acceptance test specified for each item, 
including shock and vibration. 
tests without refurbishment, the test results should be compared to those 
obtained prior to the original mission. 
of the item undergoing test is within specification limits but indicates a 
decided drift towards these limits, when compared to previous test results, 
the item normally will be subject to rejection. Possible deviations will have 
to be evaluated on an individual basis by responsible project reliability and 
engineering specialists. 
In the case of items undergoing acceptance 
If a specific performance parameter 
Exploratory T esting 
In some instances, exploratory tests a re  to be conducted. These tests 
essentially consist of performance tests followed by disassembly and exami- 
nation and are  for the purpose of correlating postflight performance with 
actual degradation. Tests normally would be planned for the first recovered 
units in an attempt to arr ive at valid conclusions affecting the degree of 
refurbishment of future units. 
testing a re  contained in the subsystem sections, particularly in the ECS/LSS 
section. The results of such tests a r e  to be viewed with caution because of 
the limited sample size and the inherent r isk of forming conclusions based on 
limited data; however, they may result on data which would provide partial 
justification for specifying refurbishment requirements. 
Specific examples of possible exploratory 
Identification 
If the RCM program is to be implemented, a system must be provided 
t The program ground rules have 
restricted the RCM spacecraft to earth orbital missions of 14 days. Items 
categorized a s  Criticality I1 or III when installed in the RCM spacecraft or 
laboratory might become Criticality I when applied to an Apollo lunar mission. 
Positive procedures will  be required to prevent inadvertent installation of a 
identify components destined for reuse. 
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refurbished or already used component into a spacecraft pyogrammed for a 
lunar mission. 
sider ed in establishing a component cost point below which refurbishment will 
not be economically feasible. 
The cost of implementing adequate procedures must be con- 
RCM AVAILABILITY ASPECTS 
Previous studies conducted at  S&ID (e. g. 8 Manned Mars  and/or Venus 
Flyby Vehicle Systems Study, SID 65-761 - 5 )  have concluded that maintenance 
is required to assure adequate probabilities of mission success and crew 
safety for long space missions, 
renovated spacecraft is only 14 days, mission of up to 45 days a re  planned for 
the RCM laboratory. The fully dependent laboratory version will have a mini- 
mum of equipment installed: largely interface with the SUI Drting command 
module electrical power, environmental control, and communications. The 
independent laboratory will be essentially a fully equipped spacecraft with the 
attendent reliability problems. 
to the independent laboratory than to the other configurations; however, most 
candidate subsystems have not been designed for maintainability and, in 
general, maintenance wil l  be severly limited without redesign. 
While the baseline mission for the Block I1 
It appears that maintenance is more applicable 
The Availability Concept 
System availability is defined a s  that percentage or fraction of the total 
desired operating time that an equipment is in commission (ready for use)l. 
Numerically this is defined as 
MTBF 
MTBF f MTTR 
Availability (A) = 
where 
MTBF = Mean Time Between Failures - (MTBF is applicable to the 
region in which random failures occur and does not apply to the 
wearout region. Where wearout is expected within the mission 
time, provisions in the form of standby redundancy or spares 
also must be incorporated. ) 
MTTR = Mean Time to Repair - (Including trouble isolation time. ) 
Availability is not a new measure of reliability. Reliability can only be iri~proved by a successful maintenance 
action. Thus the probability of an equipment being in the commission state is improved by the successful 
maintenance action. 
1 
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Availability, like reliability, i s  a prdbability; it is expressed as  the 
probability of an item of equipment being operable at any given point in time. 
Since availability is a function of MTTR, it is subject to certain 
constraints related to the ability of the crew to accomplish the required 
mdintenance actions and other constraints related to the requirements of the 
spacecraft and mission. For example, i f  a certain equipment is required to 
perform a function and the function can be delayed without jeopardizing crew 
safety or mission succer s, the reliability requirement may be relaxed pro- 
viding the equipment is repairable. 
obviously cannot be interrupted for more than extremely short time periods. 
A detailed failure mode and effects analysis must be accomplished before a 
positive determination relevant to specific functional availability requirements 
and constraints can be made. 
Some functions (e. g., life support) 
It follows that sufficient spa :eE must be provided to support maintenance 
actions planned f a x  those maintainable subsystems wherein inherent reliability 
does not meet reqkirements. 
The probability of mission availability (AM), assuming sufficient spares 
for a single unit, is: 
= e- hTe'Ut AM 
where 
1 
MTSF 
X = equipment failure rat e, 
T = mission time 
1 
MTTIZ 
u = repair rate = 
t = maintenance time constraint (MTC) 
The average number of repairs ( r )  expected may be estimated by 
Mission Time 
MTBF 
R =  
The overall system availahility is 
i 
A s =  n AMi 
i=l 
( 3 )  
(4) 
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RCM Application 
Application of the availability concept to the renovated command module 
i s  limited by the following study ground rules and mission constraints: 
1. No maintenance can be accomplished by the crew during periods of 
acc deration. 
2. Basic subsystems to be ‘%stalled in the laboratory or spacecraft 
wil l  not be subjected to  major redesign and attendent additional 
development. 
3. Maintenance will  not be accompliehed through extravehicdar 
activity. 
It is noted that the Block I Apollo design initi.*iiy incorporated mainte- 
nance provisions for the lunar mission and provided for approximately 
150 pounds of spares, largely electronics. In-flight main+enance capability 
for the electronic subsystems w a s  removed from the Block II configuration at 
the direction of NASA: therefore, improvements of the system availabil2.y Cor 
the RCM spacecraft (Block 11) generally does not appear feasible. 
may be feasible without extens-ive modification for certain RCM labcn-atorv 
subsystems whose performance would otherwise be marginal, p:irticular. y 
on the case of electronic modules, which may be removed and replaced. 
ever, this will r eqslire fault isolation capability. Since failure of components 
located within the laboratory does not have a degrading effect on crew safety, 
an extensive equipment modification program dqes not appear warranted. 
Maintenance 
How- 
Spar e s 
Active redundancy i s  frequently used in situations where the r e1iabili:y 
of a single unit i s  inadequate. 
particularly in the case of life-limited items, sirice the redundant unit also is 
accumulating operating time. 
mission times, but adds the complexity of a switching mechanism. 
may be regarded as a form of standby redundancy where man i s  the switching 
mechanism. To determine the reliability obtained by the use of spares, the 
Poisson distribution a s  listed below is applied. In this application the spare 
is assumed to have the same failure rate as the unit it is intended to replace 
and the switching mechanism (=an) i s  regarded a s  unity. 
Active redundancy has certain limitations, 
Standby redundancy i s  more effective for longer 
Spares 
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where 
a= failure rate of units 
t = system duty cycle 
n = number of spares 
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XVI. RCM LABORATORY SUBSYSTEM BUILDING BLOCKS 
A limited and incremental spectrum of subsystem functional capability 
The underlying.theme here is a combination of 
By selecting the subsystems and components for 
has been provided through the generation of a RCM Laboratory subsystem 
building block shopping list. 
economics and expediency. 
this list from those space-rated items which are presently available, develop- 
ment and qualification are minimized and in most cases eliminated, Apollo 
CM and SM equipment comprise most of the listed items with subsystems 
and components from LM, Gemini and the Agena Gemini Target Vehicle 
also present. Equipment from other space programs (such a s  Mercury, 
OGO, etc, ) was also considered. 
. 
This approach to satisfying RCM Laboratory mission objectives appears 
sound as long as overall system weight is not critical and there is a large 
degree of flexibility in the mission objectives, The system configuration 
established by resort  to the shopping list with a mission to establish criteria, 
could dictate certain changes to the mission (contracting or  expanding the 
objectives) in order to provide a higher cost effectiveness. This approach 
is necessitated by the discontinuity in the available subsystem functional 
spectrum. 
The process for integrating the shopping list subsystems into an RCM 
Laboratory system is shown in Figure 73. The overall subsystem integra- 
tion procedure requires an iterative facet which accounts for the subsystem 
interfaces with each other. Once the subsystems a r e  defined by resort  to 
the shopping list, with the mission-dependent requirements a s  criteria, 
interface requirements (such as power, temperature control, environment 
control, structural, etc. ) a re  determined and the subsystem requirements 
are adjusted accordingly. 
The subsystem selection process is repeated, and after subsystem 
This definition, the interface requirements iterative action is repeated. 
cycling continues until no change in  the defined subsystems results from a n  
interface iteration. 
laboratory and the required delta RCM Laboratory configuration results. 
At this point, subsystems a r e  integrated into the 
The following portions of this section discuss and identify the subsystem 
building blocks. Where critical, integration constraints are detailed and 
delineated. 
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CONTROL SYSTEM/ LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM (ECS/ LSS) 
The only possible ECS/LSS available, other than Apollo's, for use 
on the RCM Laboratory would bt equipment used on the Mercury and Gemini 
programs . 
Characteristics of Other Applicable ECS/ LSS Subsystems and Components 
The Environment Control System for the Mercury, Gemini, and 
Apollo spacecraft are very much alike in principle and probably have many 
similar components. All three spacecraft maintain a pure oxygen atmos- 
phere at 5.1 nsia. However, the Mercury and Gemini a re  essentially a 
separate h . . suit circuit with a cabin backup while the Apollo system is 
designed w .tri emphasis on maintaining a shirtsleeve cabin environment with 
a suit circuit backup. 
The design of the systems for the three spacecraft was a progression 
from one to the other. However, as the second and third crew members plus 
higher electrical cooling loads were added, the Mercury desigr, concepts 
had to be modified to some extent. Generally, many of the Mercury and 
Gemini ECS design concepts have been carried through to the Apollo, but 
the added heat loads, installation limitations, efforts to reduce weight, and 
the intrusion of a limited number of completely new concepts nevertheless 
made it necessary to successively modify the Mercury and Gemini hardware. 
It is felt that the design constraints of Mercury and Gemini equipment would 
not lend to renovation for use on the RCM Laboratories. 
Table 36 outlines the characteristics of the three systems. Examina- 
tion of Table 36 will show that the Mercury system would be totally inadequate 
for  RCM or  RCM Laboratory application. The one-man, short-time oxygen 
flow and heat capacity would not lend itself to a thirty-day mission. 
The use of a Gemini system as a building block or  in conjunction with an 
Apollo system is also not feasible for two main reasons: 
of coolants, and 2) incompatibility of system capacities. 
coolanol for  a coolant while the Apollo uses water-glycol. The specific heat 
and viscosity of the two fluids differ sufficiently to make equipment designed 
for one incompatible with the other for both hydraulic and heat-transfer 
reasons. 
flow circuit. 
cannot be mounted separately for an  RCM Laboratory as the Apollo radiator 
can. 
1) incompatibility 
The Gemini uses  
The Gemini has a h i g h s  coolant pump to accommodate a ser ies  
The Gemini radiator is an integral part of the structure and 
The Gemini heat-transfer surfaces and oxygen-flow ca.pacities a re  
designed for two men and not three as required. The use of two two-man 
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Table 36. Functional Characteristics of Candidate ECS/ LSS 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
Mission duration 
Size of crew 
Capsule internal pressure 
(nominal), psia 
Capsule internal tempera- 
ture (nominal), F 
Caps ule atm o s phe r e 
Capsule internal volume, f t  3 
Capsule ventilation rate 
(nominal), cfm 
Crew heat load (nominal), 
Btu/hr 
Crew oxygen consumption, 
lb/day 
Crew C02 production (nominal), 
lb / day 
Suit ventilation rate, cfm 
Suit compressor rise, in. H20 
Emergency suit pressure, psia 
Emergency oxygen flow rate, 
lb/min 
Coolant used 
Coolant inlet temperature to 
suit heat exchanger, F 
Coolant flow rate, lb/hr 
Coolant pump pressure rise, 
psi 
Electrical load (nominal), watts 
Electrical load (maximum), 
watts 
*Water moved by 02 pressure 
JA: Not available 
7 2 hours 
1 
5 
80 
Oxygen 
50 
22 
500 
2.0 
2.25 
11.4 
10 
4.0 
0.05 
W a t e r  
40 
0.5 to 5 
No Pump: 
Na A. 
N. A. 
Gemini 
14 days 
2 
5 
60 - 80 
Oxygen 
73 
88 
1000 
4.0 
4.50 
23. C 
11 
3.5 
0.1 
Coolanol 
40 
170 
200 
500 
1500 
~~ 
14 days 
3 
5 
70- 80 
Oxygen 
233 
300 
1400 
6.0 
6.75 
35 
10 
3.5 to 4.0 
0.67 
Water -Glycol 
45 
200 
36 
1300 
23 00 
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systems plus component modifications to obtain a three -man system would 
probably not be economically feasible f rom a retest  and requalification 
standpoint. 
Proposed Environment Control and Life Support Systems 
The recommended ECS/LSS for the RCM Laboratory would be basically 
renovated equipment from the Apollo program. 
(dependent) and the independent laboratory a re  outlined below. 
The systems for the basic 
ECS/ LSS For Basic or Dependent Laboratory 
The ECS for the dependent laboratory will consist of a blower and duct 
to promote sufficient exchange of atmosphere between the CM and laboratory 
to control humidity, carbon dioxide and oxygen concentration, and tempera- 
ture in the laboratory by making use of the CM/ECS/LSS. 
Data for this study were taken from Reference 12 which contains a 
lengthly section on the conditioning of the LM by use of the Apollo ECS/LSS. 
This data is directly applicable to the dependent laboratory requirements. 
Reference 12 contained parametric studies on the effect of compartment 
atmosphere interchange upon the control of carbon dioxide, humidity, oxygen 
concentration, and temperature. 
data and presents the minimum atmospheric-flow requirements for each of 
the parameters if  three men were in the laboratory: 
The following tabulation is taken from this 
Parameter Minimum Atmospheric Flow 
Humidity 
c o 2  
I Temperature 
60 
42 5 
40 I O2 
The atmospheric flow rate for humidity control is based upon a dew- 
point differential of 3 F between the two compartments. 
rate is based upon a 2-mm Hg difference in oxygen partial pressure, and the 
interchange rate for carbon dioxide is based upon a carbon dioxide partial 
pressure difference of 0.5 mm H g  and nominal generation of carbon dioxide. 
The use of simple compartment atmosphere interchange for thermal control 
of both compartments is based upon the temperature limits of 75 f 5 F. The 
laboratory can then be at  80 F while the CM can be a t  70 F. The 10 F tem- 
perature difference imposes a severe penrlty in terms of fan power to 
The oxygen flow 
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accomplish all  the thermal conditioning by means of this approach. From 
the tabulation, it is clear that an interchange flow rate of 120 cfm is required 
to maintain a 3 F dew-point differential. At this flow rate, carbon dioxide 
and oxygen partial pressure control requirements a re  amply satisfied. 
The RCM Laboratory will never contain more than two men with one 
man always required in the CM. Figure 74 was constructed to show the 
effect of two men in the RCM Laboratory. 
in the laboratory. Some heat loss in the RCM Laboratory will be beneficial 
because it will  reduce the temperature difference between the two 
compartments. 
These data assume no heat loss 
The fan selected for intercompartment circulation is the postlanding 
The characteristics of this fan are a s  ventilation fan without modification, 
follows : 
Flow 180 cfm 
Pressure r ise  0.2 in. H20 
Weight 4.5 lb 
Power 13 watts 
The use of this fan is recommended because of the relatively low power 
requirement associated with the high flow rate. Although the flow rate is 
50 percent higher than necessary to control the dew-point in the two compart- 
ments to le s than a 3 F differential, the extra circulation is recommended 
because it will reduce the atmosphere differences between compartments 
and i t  will cause the flow distribution within the laboratory to be more 
uniform. 
approximately 65 F. 
The 180-cfm flow plotted in Figure 74 shows CM temperature of 
The fan circulates the CM atmosphere into the laboratory b) use of a 
5-inch diameter duct located in the CM laboratory tunnel. The duct could 
be a rigid tube fastened to the side of the tunnel after mating pressurization 
of both modules. 
exhaust the circulated gas along the wall  of the laboratory to avoid 3hort- 
circuiting the gas flow. 
mixing and purging of the laboratory atmosphere. 
The exit of the duct located in the laboratory should 
The tangential injection also would enhance the 
Table 17 shows two additional dependent laboratory E.’!./ 3 2 ’  deltas. 
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EGS/ LSS For Independent RCM Laboratory 
Table 38 summarizes the independent RGM Laboratory ECS/LSS con- 
figuration plus deltas required to extend mission lengths frcm 15 to 30 to 
45 days. 
15-Day Mission. A fifteen-day mission would require no more than a 
standard renovated Block II ECS/LSS. 
30-Day Mission. A thirty-day mission would require a standard 
rcnovated Block I1 ECS/LSS plus an optional one-gas to two-gas atmosphere 
control and supply system plus an extra fifteen-day supply of LiOH canisters 
that can be transferred from the CM to the laboratory when needed. 
optional one-gas or two-gas atmosphere control and supply system can be 
accomplished by the addition of a nitrogen low-pressure supply system and 
a oxygen partial-pressure sensor and control system. The nitrogen and 
oxygen low-pressure supply circuits would be interconnected so the both 
could be controlled by the present Block II cabin total-pressure regulator. 
When only an axygen system is desired the nitrogen is valved off and the 
system operates a s  a standard Block II system. 
as a two-gas system, the system is valved so that the nitrogen flow is con- 
trolled by total-pressure regulator and the oxygen flow is controlled by the 
oxygen par tial-pres sure regulator . 
An 
When it is desired to operate 
Table 3 8. Independent Laboratory Configurations For 
Various Mission Lengths 
Mission Duration 
15 days 
30 days 
45 days 
Basic Unit 
Block 11 ECS/LSS 
including LiOH 
absorpiton unit 
Block I1 ECS/LSS 
including LiOH 
absorption unit 
Block I1 ECS/ LSS 
including LiOH 
absorption unit 
for suited operation 
only. 
Deltas 
None 
Extra LiOH in CM 
Optional one or  two-gas 
atmosphere control and 
supply system. 
Independent molecular - 
sieve unit 
Optional one or  two-gas 
atmosphere control and 
supply system 
- 247 - 
SID 66- 1853-3 
N O R T H  A M E R I C A N  AVIATION,  INC.  SPACE 8nd INFORMATION SYBTEMU DIVISION 
These optional atmosphere systems will permit the use of either a 
one-gas or two-gas CM. Also, the approach incorporates versatility of 
operation required by the fact i t  permits making use of the advantages of 
either a one-gas or a two-gas system as  desired. 
45-Day Mission. A forty-five day mission configuration would require 
the same standard renovated Block 11 ECS/LSS system and optional atmos- 
phere control and supply systems for the 30-day mission plus a molecular- 
sieve unit for carbon dioxide removal. In order to obviate any redesign of 
the renovated ECU, it is required that the molecular-sieve unit be a complete 
and integral unit with i ts  own blowers and ducting system. 
LiOH absorption unit will be used only during suited operation. When the 
The existing 
molecular-sieve unit i s  in operation, the LiOH is not used 
is in a suit. 
Integration Constraints 
When integrating the Apollo ECS/ LSS equipment into 
unless someone 
the RCM indepen- 
dent laboratory, it  is assumed that all equipment items originally mounted 
inside the CM will  again be mounted inside the RCM and that only items 
originally part of the SIM will  be mounted outside the RCM. 
Attention is called to the fc!lowing major operational constraints that 
must be considered when adapting the Apollo equipment for use on the 
in dependent RCM laboratory. 
Leakage and Operation 
When the CM and the independent RCM Laboratory a re  docked and 
each has its own pressure control system, considerable thought must be 
given to cmrdinated operation of the two systems. For example, if the 
allowable tolerances (*O. 2 psia) of the total-pressure regulators were such 
that one was controlling at  4.8 psia and one a i  5.2 psia, the regulator 
admitting gas at 4.8 psia would supply makeup for the leakage of both 
vehicles, thus depleting the system of one of the spacecrafts. 
In the case of a two-gas atmosphere control system, the oxygenpartial- 
pressure control system of one spacecraft might supply all of the oxygen 
makeup i f  i ts tolerance was such that its setting w a s  below that of the other 
spacecraft's system. This problem could most easily be solved by keeping 
the interconnecting hatch closed as  much as possible. This approach would 
call for no system changes or redesign. 
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Another alternative would be to provide a means to shut off one system 
This approach would before it becomes depleted and let the other take over. 
require close monitoring of expendables but only minimum design changes. 
Heat - Load Ranges 
In order to maintain a shirtsleeve environment in  the laboratory, the 
net heat load (summation of losses and gains) must be within the capability 
of the Apollo ECS. 
cabin heat exchanger which has a cooling capacity of 760 Btu/hr and a 
heating capacity of 236 Btu/hr. 
The net capability is defined by the capability of the 
A major factor regarding the heat load is the vehicle he.at transfer in 
and out of the conditioned volume. This heat load must be controlled within 
a range such that gains in this a rea  do not exceed system cooling capability 
or allow condensation to form on walls. Using Apollo as a guideline, 
environmental load should be negative and range between -200 to -1000 Btu/hr. 
Radiator Subsystem 
The Apollo ECS radiator system was designed for a specific set of 
conditions of heat load, water -boiling supplemental heating, and spacecraft 
orientation. In the Apollo system, when heat loads exceed radiator capabiliry, 
supplemental cooling is accomplished by the water -glycol +vaporator. When 
the rejection capacity of the radiators exceeds the heat load, supplemental 
heaters add energy to the coolant to prevent the coolant from freezing in the 
flowing radiator tubes. It is felt that the possibility of freezing the coolant 
in the radiator panels points out the major problem with respect to direct 
application of Apollo systems to laboratory utilization. 
assumption that, for the extended mission, the power load will be low for 
extended periods of time. If this assumption is correct, the radiator system 
as presently configured will consume a large amount of electrical powt r. 
This is based on the 
Table 39 shows the g e n e r a l  performance characteristics under various 
environmental conditions of the Block II radiator subsystem. 
seen, considering no sun on radiator as the worst-case environment, the 
minimum load the radiator can receive without supplemental heating is 
estimated a t  5600 Btu/hr. 
in the case of Apollo, a gross fuel cell power load would be on the order of 
2000 watts. 
requires a 290 watt heat load for a three fuel cell mirimum load of 1689 watts. 
Table 39 also shows that 2 panels will reject greater than 9275 Btu/hr with 
no sun on radiators, which could be translated into a gross power !3cds 
greater than 3317 watts. 
As can be 
To maintain this heat load to the radiator system 
In addition, the 4415 Btu/hr load with no sun on radiatoGs 
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Table 39. Block 11 Radiator Subsystem Performance Charzcteristics 
W a t e r  
Heat Load Bypass Boiling 
I 1 (k) (lb/hr) (Btu/hr) Environment 
9275 
560W 
4415 
6880 
6880 
5500 f 400 
5600* 
Heat Input 
Watts/Btu/hr 
No sun on radiator 
Thermal cycle 
Sun on one panel 
65 
30 
10 
~ 
*Estimated minimum load without supplemental heating. 
The Block II radiation is presently configured to be operG,:ed with one 
panel. In this situation, the nonoperating panel is ailowed to freeze with no 
provisions for activation other than spacecraft orientation. Table 39 under 
one panel shows the system performance for a single panel. Here, it can 
be seen, that the minimum load required without supplemental heating is 
reduced to 2920, with no sun on radiators. For the Apollo niission, this 
heat load can be translated into two fuel cell minimum paver of 1126 watts. 
67 50 
4415 
2920 
As mentioned above, i f  power loads a re  low for extended periods of 
time, Table 39 shows that the heater power required by the radiator system 
can be reduced by uidizing single panel operation. W i f i i  single panel 
Them.,. cycle -- 2.0 -- 
Thermal cycle -- 0.5 -- 
No sun on radiator 70 -- -- 
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radiator panel to reactivate the 
frozen panel when heat load dernmds exceed single panel capability. 
If reduction to single panel operation would still require large amounts 
of cryogenic fluid for heater operation, an additional modification to the 
existing panel could be accomplished without significant added effort. This 
modification to the panel would be to remove the series tube section and the 
selective stagnation section only. 
Figure 75 shows critical integration constraints and indicates the 
Block 11 ECS gross capabilities and limitations for the design mission for 
RCM Laboratories. The performance of the radiator siibsystem is bounded 
by water boiling for the maximum heat load and hc.akr power for minimum 
heat load. In this respect, Figure 74 shows the average rang<: of heat loads 
that can be accommodated by the radiator subsystem without pse of water 
boiling as supplemental cooling or heater power to prevent the radiator panels 
from freezing. Missions should, therefore, be planned on a preliminary 
basis within the range of heat load that would not require expendables, in 
eithzr the ECS or EPS systems. For example, in the low inclination earth 
9 A  bit, mission total heat loads to the radiator system should be maintained 
between 3500 and 4700 Btu/hr., and in no case should the total load drop 
below 1900 Btu/hr for an extended length of time. Total heat load could 
exceed 4700 Btu/hr providing there is sufficient water for supplemental 
cooling. 
mission for the ranges and heat limitations shown. 
The same could be said for the synchronous equatorial earth orbit 
It should be noted here that the combination of rejection capability and 
radiator rejection for lunar orbit causes the rejection capability bar to 
reverse. That is, the minimum capability established by dark side opera- 
tion exceeds the maximum capability on the light side. 
that, for mission planning purposes, heat loads should be high on the dark 
side and low on the light side. 
loads a re  approximately constant through lunar orbit with water boiling on 
light side not to exceed net water production. 
This indicates clearly 
In the case oi Apollo Block II, radiator heat 
In the case of extended mission duration, the power loads and heat 
loads to the radiator a re  low, which would require excessive power consump- 
tion by radiator subsystem heaters. Ir: order to avoid this situation, the 
radiator subsystem could be operated with only one of the two panels in 
operation. 
heater operation. 
limitations and was estimated a t  60 percent of minimum load of two-panel 
sys tern . 
Figure 75 also shows the estimated minimum heat load without 
The minimum heat-load capability was based on flow -rate 
r 
It also should be noted that, ii a single-panel operation is considered, 
an additional s:artup heater on the deactivated panel wil l  be required to thaw 
panel prior to high heat-load periods. With a heater incorporated in  the 
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panel design, an addition panel could be installed and activated in the event 
of meter oid puncture . 
Several additional comments should be made with respect to ulilization 
of the Block II ECS radiator subsystem for the independent laboratory. 
First ,  the primary loop of the radiator subsystem can be utilized with either 
a Block I or Block II command module ECS hardware. Second, if the 
radiator panel requirements for meteoroid puncture are greater than 
Apollo lunar mission requirements, additional analytical efforts are required. 
These ‘efforts would be directed toward utilization of both primary and 
secondary loops in the Apollo Block II system in the same fashion as Apollo 
after one radiator panel has been punctured. The analysis would involve the 
rejection capability of the system versus the functions or  experiments that 
could be accomplished at a limited rejection capability, 
It should be noted here that. if dual loop operation is considered, all  
Block I ECS systems will have to be modified to incorporate secondary 
loop components and Block II coldplates. If, on the other hand, dual loop 
operation will not satisfy requirements, additional analytical and test efforts 
will be required to define and verify redesign, 
. _  
Figure 75 also shows the cabin heat exchanger limitations. The cabin 
heat exchanger ties together the environmental loads and the total system 
power loads. Without exceeding the exchanger capability limits, the system 
power loads may swing from,400 to 2800 watts if the environmental load is a 
loss a t  1000 Btu/hr. If the environmental load were zero (laboratory ther- 
mally isolated) system load range would be only 0 to 500 watts. 
Physical Characteristics 
Power Requirements 
Power requirements for the ECS/LSS are tabulated in  Table 40. 
power requirements for the PLV fans and valves occur only after touchdown. 
The 45.0 watts for potable water occur during heating wqter for food prepara- 
tion. 
because not all items will be operating a t  the same instant: A more detailed 
definition of the variaus mission profiles is needed to reach a n  average or 
transiect total. 
The 
No attempt has been made to add up the various column to reach a total 
. I  
Weight 
ECS/LSS equipment in  the SM weighs 160 pounds wet and’-144 pounds dry. 
Volume and Installation Requirements 
LSS a re  covered by the NAA Apollo installationdrawings Tistid in Table 41. 
M?s; of the equipment is located in the lower left-hand equipment bay on the Apollo. 
The ECS/LSS in the CM weighs 536 pounds wet and .$lZ.pounds dry. The 
The volume and installation details for Ihe various segtions of the ECS/ 
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Table 41. Installation Drawings 
Item 
ECU 
Cabin recirculation unit 
Coldplate network 
Water systems 
Oxygen system 
Suit hose connection 
assembly 
Waste management 
system 
Radiators 
V16-613001 
V 16-610003 
V16-610004 
V16-610005 
V 16-6 13001 
V16-6 10022 
V16-610006 
V 3 6 -6 13 500 
V36 -6 13 800 
3V36-610001 
V36-610201 
V36-610500 
V36-6 11500 
V36-613800 
V3 6- 6 12 50 1 
V3 7 -3 220 1 
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ELECTRIC POWER 
A specific power system for the independent RCM Laboratory cannot be 
designed because of the lack of definite mission requirements. However, the 
objective of utilizing a s  much Apollo equipment a s  possible does allow out- 
lining the capability of the power system in terms of potential missions. 
capability has been looked at  from two viewpoints. The first centers around 
the physical problems of mounting a complete Apollo Block II service module 
power system on the cruciform structure, The second is to define the physi- 
cal  and functional properties of the EPS components and provide a guide for 
building up a complete system when a definite mission has been established. 
This 
The baseline design configuration for the purposes of structural con- 
sideration is based on the existing CSM power system. 
module equipment is used because the original equipmegt is .not recoverable 
and new components must be used. 
ment in the RCM Laboratory and Block II equipment on the cruciform can 
occur. 
components a r e  mechanically different, they have similar electrical 
interfaces. 
Block II service 
The configuration using Block I equip- 
This will not create any serious problems because, even though the 
Three fuel cells and two sets of cryogenic tanks have been selected to 
demonstrate the feasibility of locating this system on the RCM Laboratory. 
This type of system is arbitrarily chosen because it utilizes Apollo equipment 
to the fullest e#ent, and it is probably the most complicated and difficult to 
install of the several potential systems. The system actually used must be 
selected on the basis of detail mission requirements; to keep costs down, as  
much existing hardware a s  possible must be used. 
h order to utilize the maximum amount of the Apollo system as  possible, 
each component's capability within the system must bz defined. The basic 
power system used in the CSM is shown in the block diagram of Figure 76. 
The relationship of the various power sources to one another is shown and 
the most likely points a t  which a substitution or change may be made can be 
ascertained. For instance, substitution of larger capacity batteries for 
batteries A and C, removal of all  other power sources, and disabling all 
unused control circuits would create a worka'ble primary bh-Yery system. 
Dependent Pow e r Source 
Selection of the main power source is one of the most serious problems. 
Three possible types have been studied for the RCM Laboratory. The first 
is the simplest and consists of obtaining power from the CSM. A study (Ref- 
erence 13) has been made for the A A P  program on the power available for an 
external laboratory. 
delivering as  much a s  1200 watts from an A A P  Apollo CSM. 
The results show that it is feasible to consider 
Also, there is 
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at present in Block I1 Apollo a LEM power feed-through in the docking tunnel 
designed to deliver power a t  200 watts. The primary constraint for this sys- 
tem is the cryogenic storage capability of the CSM. 
five pairs of cryogenic tanks. 
would probably be the maximum power level that could be maintained for two 
weeks. 
The A A P  CSM utilizes 
If a Block II CSM is used, a 200-watt level 
Battery Power Source 
Several batteries have been designed and qualified in the Gemini and 
LEM programs in addition to the Apollo batteries. 
zinc type and thereford have a very limited charge/discharge cycle life. 
These batteries a r e  listed in Table 42 along with their pertinent character- 
istics. 
requirement for the Apollo battery charger because of its small capacity. 
This limit8 the use of the large batteries to a primary battery system. 
most likely use for &he smaller batteries would be for supplying power for 
cyclic peaklload conditions. 
charger would be in order. 
They a r e  all of the silver- 
Exclusive use of the large batteries (300 amp-hr) would eliminate any 
The 
Under these circumstances, use of the battery . 
Fuel Cell Power Source 
Fuel cells are the primary source of power on the Apollo CSM and a s  
The EPS such a r e  strong candidates for a RCM Laboratory power source. 
components available for reuse have been designed to protect and control fuel 
cells, thus eliminaeing many problems that would occur i f  another type of 
source had been used. 
a very complex system to support it. 
support requirements and must be investigated to insure successful'opera- 
tion. A cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen storage system with sufficient 
capacity to supply the cecessary reactants must be installed. 
system is also needed to dis,sipate the waste heat generated by the fuel cell. 
These two subsystems themselves generate 3 host of problems that must be 
investigated and solved; such a s  limiting the cryogenic system heat leak to 
prevent venting the reactants overboard and to prevent freezing of the water- 
glycol in the radiators. A solution to these problems cannot be established 
yntil. a definite mission has been defined and the effects of time, orbit, and 
The pertinent fuel cell and supporting subsystem per- 
formance characteristics needed to evaluate their applicability and to provide 
i preliminary design estimate a r e  presented a s  an  alternate to a detailed fuel 
cell s,ystern design. ' 
However, a fuel cell is an active device which requires,  
Many subsystems are  effected in these 
A radiator 
f objectives evaluated. 
Batteries, fuel cells, and combinations of both a r e  characterized bnd 
limited by power, energy, transient' capability, w.eight of reactants required, 
volume of power system including reactant tank system, temperature, radi- 
ator heat rejection ,capability, r&fiability, cost, and availability. Although 
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most of these performance characteristics and their upper and lower limits 
have been established as a result of prior tests and studies, the absolute lower 
limit of power system parasitic power demand has not been estatlished. It 
has only recently been proven feasible that an Apollo Block II fuel cell can be 
operated, for at least several days without interruption, in a low-power mode 
with the positive terminal disconnected from the spacecraft d-c bus system. 
The aforementioned power system parasitic power demand includes fuel cell 
pumps, heaters, instrumentation, radiator heaters, CGSS (cryogenic gas  
supply system) heaters and bloNers, solenoid valves in fluid transport lines. 
To place a fuel cell in the powered-down or hot-standby condition, a s  it 
is sometimes called, the flight crew simply disconnects the fuel cell by 
momentarily placing the appropriate toggle switches in the O F F  position. For- 
instance, suppose that in an RCM laboratory equipped with three Apollo 
Block 11 fuel cells, the flight crew desires to place two fuel cells on hot 
standby. A crew mernber momentarily places the four associated Fuel Cell 
Main Bus ON:/OFF toggle switches on the displays and controls panel in the 
O F F  position. This will disconnect the positive output terminal of both fuel 
cells from the spacecraft main buses A and B. Afte r  this has occurred, the 
two fuel cells a r e  on hot standby. 
Apollo Block 11 Fuel Cell Performance Characteristics 
. Apollo Block 11 fuel cell projected performance estimates and Block I 
test data were analyzed to establish baseline Block I1 fuel cell performance 
characteristics. 
istics under normal operating conditions a re  the same as those reported in 
(Reference 14) unless otherwise stated. The estimated performance of the 
Block 11 fuel ceii systems as reported in Reference 14 is summarized and 
reproduced in this bection wherever advantageous. 
Except for minor updating changes, performance character- 
Voltage- Power - Temperature Characteris tics 
Figure 77 is a composite graphical illustratian of figures previously 
presented to NASA-MSC. 
700 watts down to 563 watts gross power to cbir:r requirepents of the fuel 
cell wocurement specification (Reference 15). 
inc:*eased from 1420 wat t s  to 1500 wattd, b; sed on the Pratt-Whitney esti- 
mation L -ted by Figure 15 of Reference 16. Constant-tefnperature 
voltage-pLvCrer lines a re  identical to those of Figure 32 of Reference 16, with 
updated constant-temperature operating lines a s  reported’in Reference 17. 
‘Characteristics of Figure 77 a re  utilized exclusively in this report to repre- 
sent the Apollo s lack I1 fuel cell. 
range for space or  vacuum operation is estimated to be the same a s  those of 
The steady- state operbting line was ext,ended from 
Maximum gross power was 
Fbel cell electrode-electrolyte- temperature 
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Figure 77. Temperatures measured on the mid-cell in the stack, Ce!l No. 17, 
are estimated as approximately 20 F higher in space or vacuum operation 
than a t  sea level. 
Load Sharing 
The steady-state operating line of Figure 77 can be projected to a sys- 
tem steady-state operation of two and three fuel cell power plants (FCP) con- 
nected in parallel with the assumption that each FCP has identical performance 
characteristics. However this is not realistic since the performance char- 
acteristics of each FCP is expected to vary because of inherent design and 
manufacturing tolerances and because of variable operational conditions, 
especially temperature differences, 
between FCP units of a system supplying a common spacecraft power 
requirement. 
variati )n resulting from inherent design and manufacturing tolerances. This 
data is based on test measurements made by P&W in 1964 as part of the FCP 
development program and is shown superimposed on the constant-temperature 
operating lines. 
cells selected at random is seen from the figure to be no greater than 100-150 
watts, dependent to some extent upon voltage. 
utilized in estimating maximum power variation for two and three FCP sys- 
tems. Table 43 shows the calculations at three power levels for a two FCP 
system when one FCP is at maximum performance and the other at minimum 
expected performance. 
FCP system when the performances are one FCP at maximum, one FCP at 
minimum, and one FCP at average. 
The final result is unequal load sharing 
Figure 77 indicates the normal range of FCP performance 
The difference in load sharing capability between tvpo fuel 
Data from Figure 77 were 
Table 44 presents similar calculations for a thee  
The results of the load sharing analysis are graphically presented in 
Figure 78. 
greatest at minimum power level, decreasing continuously as the power level 
of the combined fuel cell system is increased. 
Variation in percent of load shared is seen by Figure 78 to be 
A t  minimum power level of 563 watts/FCP, maximum power variation 
A t  maximum power level of 1500 watts/FCP, maxi- is seen to be 150 watts. 
mum variation is 130 watts. 
maximum variation is intermediate between 150 and 130 watts. 
A t  intermediate levels between power limits, 
Transient Capabilities 
The steady-state operating line shown in Figure 77 represents the focus 
of thermal equilibrium voltage versus power points for the FCP. 
changes in the mission power requirements will result in an operation along 
a constant temperature line from the initial power level to the new power 
level. 
steady- state operational line as the FCP operating temperature approaches 
Step 
A t  the new power level, the voltage wil l  gradually approach the 
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f ie1 Cell No. 
1 
2 
Parallel combination 
of 1, 2 
1 
2 
1, 2 
1 
2 
1, 2 
W 
Tabla 43. Maximum Power Variation Between Two Acceptable Fuel Cells 
Power (kw) Percent Total Power 
0.6 57.2 
0.45 42.8 
1.05 100.0 
1. 16 53.7 
I. 00 46.3 
2. 16 100,0 
2.13 51.6 
2.00 48.4 
4. 13 100.0 
Fuel Cell No. Power (kw) Percent Total Power 
1 0.6 38.2 
2 0.45 28.7 
3 0.52 33.1 
of 1, 2, 3 1.57 100.0 
1 1. 16 35.8 
2 1.00 30.9 
3 1.08 33.3 
1, 2, 3 3.24 100.0 
i 1. 51 35. 1 
2 1.35 31. 5 
3 1.43 33.4 
1, 2, 3 4.29 100.0 
1 2.13 34.4 
2 2.00 32.3 
3 2.06 33.3 
1, 2, 3 6. 19 100.0 
Parallel combination 
+ 
Table 44. Maximurn Power Variation Among Three Acceptable Fuel Cells 
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is a function of the step power 
increment and the spacecraft thermal environment. 
typical thermal lag of the FCP as the result of a step increase, followed by a 
step decrease in power. 
reach thermal equilibrium. 
operating on the steady-state operating line. 
mally be within the area enclosed by dashed lines shown in Figures 80 and 81. 
To maintain the system voltage within the voltage limitation of 27.0 to 
31.0 volts, operation must be restricted from the shaded portions of the 
dashed line operational area. 
range of step power increments and/or (2) using voltage limitation for step 
power decreases and peaking batteries for step power increases. 
defines the allowable transient power increment for a unit Block 11 FCP and 
this data can be projected to include two or three FCP operations. 
percent contingency factor was included in the calculations for defining 
transient capability. 
Figure 79 shows a 
As indicated, up to three hours may be required to 
This implies that seldom wil l  the FCP be 
Instead, operation wil l  nor- 
This can be accomplished by (1) restricting the 
Figure 82 
A ten- 
Figures 80 and 81 were  again based on the unrealistic assumption of 
identical average performance characteristics for the unit FCP's comprising 
the total system. 
between F C P  units defined and shown in Figures 77 and 78. 
These cimves can be projected to include the variation 
Superimposed upon Figure 80, which graphically depicts transient and 
steady-state operation of a nominal or average performance of FCP systems, 
are individual variation data of Table 43 and Figures 77 and 78. This super- 
position results in the construction of Figure 83. 
represent estimated maximum variations in voltage-power performance. 
Variations arise from two sources: (1) temperature induced transients a s  
previously described; and (2) inherent variations among acceptable fuel cells. 
Suppose, for example, that the combination of two fuel cells is delivering 
3.00 kilowatts of gross power. 
provides nominal, that is, average, identical performance characteristics. 
Voltage of the combination (Figure 83) is therefore 27.4 for this condition of 
steady-state operation. If the gross load shifts to 1. 125 kilowatts (minimum 
self-sustaining limit), the voltage shifts along the dashed line of Figure 83 to 
31.7 volts which is within the over-voltage region. If the load is then main- 
tained constant at 1. 125 kilowatts, the voltage gradually moves downward in 
the vertical direction a t  an exponential time rate a s  steady-state equilibrium 
is approached. The voltage finally stabilizes a s  31.0 volts. This is a t  the 
opposite end or terminus of the nominal steady-state operating line of Fig- 
ure 53. Vertical tie-lines a r e  equally spaced in the figure. If the load is now 
increased back to the original load of 3.0 kilowatts, the voltage swings down- 
ward along the dashed line in the direction of the arrow to a point in the 
peaking battery region, below the minimum voltage of 27.0 volts a s  shown in 
the figure. 
principle previously mentioned. 
Outer bounds of Figure 82 
Further suppose that the fuel cell combination 
The voltage then begins to r ise  according to the same exponential 
Voltage r ise  a t  first is fa i r ly  rapid, then 
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Figure 82, Estimated Transient Power Capability/ FCP 
- 269 ,. 
SID 66-1853-3 
N O R T H  A M E R I C A N  AVIATION,  I N C .  HI'AACE and INkX~RMATION SYOTRMS DIVISION 
i w 
0 
7 
i3 Z 0 
0 
0 
c 
- 270 - 
SID 66- 1853-3 
N O R T H  A M E R I C A N  A V I A T I O N ,  INC. BI'ACE and 1NEY)RMATION S Y S T E M 8  DIVISION 
decreasini, in rate a s  it approaches steady state. 
interval the voltage moves upward along the vertical tie-line, terminating 
finally a t  27.4 volts, the point of origin. 
During this transient 
The same principle a s  that described for the nominal performance 
system applies to the F C P  of highest performance (dotted line with arrow in 
upward directionj, or the FCP of lowest performance (dotted line with arrow 
in downward direction). Under no circumstances of load variation between 
minimum and maximum bounds of 1.045 and 3.075 kilowatts can voltage be 
outside the dotted boundary of Figure 83. 
Figure 84 was constructed from data of Figures 77, 78, and 81 for a 
XP system, power :,rid voltage a r e  at all  
3-FCP system in a manner completely analogous to that used for Figure 83. 
Just a s  was the case for the tv-o 
times constrained within the dotted line boundary. 
transient thermal l a g  interval moves along a vertical tie-line. 
lines in Figure 84 a r e  depicted for the nominal system only. 
dotted line boundary, they may be extended a s  required. 
Also, voltage during a 
Vertical tie- 
To include the 
Reactant Consumption 
The reactant consumF .ion characteristics for the baseline PC3A-2 
Block II FCP were determined by utilizing the equations defined in 
Reference 16. 
0829 lb/kw-hr 
V SPC (H2) = 
and 
0*6632 lb/kw-hr V SPC (02) = 8 
where 
V = volts/cell 
Table 45 and Figure 85 give the results of the reactant consumption 
calculations on a unit F C P  gross power basis, 
Tables 46 and 47 and Figure 86 present the calculations for two and 
three FCP systems on a net power basis. The parasitic power load is esti- 
mated at  125 watts per FCP referenced to the 28 vdc SM bus. This estimate 
assumes that the new high-speed hydrogen pump-separator assembly will  be 
utilized on the Block I1 FCP. 
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Table 45. FCP Reactant Consumption Calculation 
Power 
(watts) 
563 
800 
1000 
1200 
1400 
1500 
FCP 
(volts) 
31.00 
29.95 
29.15 
28.42 
27.75 
27.40 
Volts / 
Cell 
1.00 
0.966 
0.941 
0.918 
0.895 
0.884 
0.0829 
0.0857 
0.0881 
0.0904 
0.0925 
0.0938 
0.0466 
0.0686 
0.0881 
0.1084 
0.1295 
0. 1405 
SPC (H2 t 0 2 )  
(lb /hr) 
0.373 
0.548 
0.705 
0.869 
1.035 
1.125 
0.420 
0.617 
0.793 
0.977 
1.165 
1.266 
Figure 86 indicates that, from a reactant consumption basis, two fuel 
cell  operation is preferred for average net power levels below 2300 wattE. 
while three fuel cell operation is preferable above 2300 average net watts. 
The difference between two and three FCP operation is not great when cal- 
culated on the basis of average power and operation on the steady-state 
operational line. The differences would become greater when transient 
operation is considered for any specific mission power-time profile, 
especially if the step power increments require operation in the volrage 
limiter o r  peaking battery regions as shown in Figures 83 and 84. 
Accurate determination of reactant consumption involves trade-off differ- 
ences which would require computer simulation of the actual mission power 
profile. This program w a s  developed during the P D P  study under contract 
NAS 9-5017. 
W a t e r  Production 
The water production is assumed to be equal to the reactant consumption 
as shown in Figures 85 and 86. 
Heat Rejection 
The waste heat to be rejected by radiation to space through the EPS 
radiator subsystem was  calculated as the difference between the higher heat 
value of the hydrogen gas  consumed and the net power output of the F C P  sys- 
tem. 
28 vdc bus; however, not all of this must be rejected a s  waste heat by the EPS 
radiator. 
inefficiency, which is rejected through the ECS radiator system. 
The electrical parasitic load per FCP is 125 watts referenced to the 
Approximately 30 watts (102 Btu/hr) represents the dc-ac inverter 
The 
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Table 46. Two-FCP System Reactant Consumption Calculations 
Net 
Power 
(watts) 
876 
1170 
1470 
1970 
2470 
2750 
Gross 
Power 
(watts) 
1126 
1420 
1720 
2220 
2720 
3000 
0.0932 
0.122 
0.148 
0.196 
0.250 
0.281 
0.147 
0.976 
1.184 
1.568 
2.000 
2.248 
0.840 
1.098 
1.332 
1.764 
2.250 
2.529 
Table 47. Three-FCP System Reactant Consumption Calculations 
Net 
Power 
(watts) 
1315 
1455 
1955 
2455 
2955 
3455 
3955 
4125 
Gross 
Power  
(watts) 
1690 
1830 
2330 
2830 
3330 
3830 
4330 
4500 
0.140 
0.152 
0.198 
0.248 
0.297 
0.348 
0.402 
0.421 
1.120 
1.216 
1.584 
1.984 
2.376 
2.784 
3.216 
3.370 
1.260 
1.368 
1.782 
2.232 
2.673 
3.132 
3.618 
3.791 
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(325 Btu/hr) was assumed to be rejected by the EPS 
system. 
heat rejection requirements. 
the ratio of net power to the heat equivalent of the consumed hydrogen gas, 
expressed in percent. 
calculations on a unit FCP basis, while Table 49 and Figure 89 give the data 
for a two- and three-FCP system. 
Figure 87 shows, on a bar graph, the basis used in calculating the 
The F C P  system efficiency was calcblated as 
Table 48 and Figure 88 present the heat rejection 
Voltage Drop and Power Loss in Transmission Lines 
During transmission to inverter and spacecraft loads in the RCM Lab- 
oratory, distributed resistance in the transmission lines results in lowered 
voltage and loss of power. Using the same analytical techniques reported in 
Reference 14, Figure 90 was  prepared depicting voltage drop as continuous 
functions of power in one, two, and three fuel cell systems. 
This figure was used to estimate voltage at the inverter input terminals, 
for conditions of high voltage, i. e., low power demand. 
Hot Standby Mode of Operation 
By disconnecting a fuel cell positive terminal from the two positive 
buses of the Apollo Block II power distribution system, the fuel cell is 
placed in the hot standby mode. 
in-line heater temperature control sensor reaches 388 F, whereupon the 
in-line heater is automatically connected and the fuel cell begins to generate 
electric power. 
heater, resulting in an increase of cell stack temperature. 
sensed by the in-line heater sensor also increases until, a t  395 F, the in-line 
heater is disconnected. 
During the ensuing cool-down period, the 
A l l  electric power so generated is dissipated in the in-line 
The temperature 
According to results of the analytical heat-transfer study reported in 
Reference 18, the in-line heater may be expected to remain on 3.0 minutes, 
and s tay  off 1.0 minute to form a cycle period of 4.0 minutes. The study of 
Reference 18 was based upon many simplifying assumptions, including a 
local environment temperature of 80 F. Aforesaid numerical values of time 
periods a r e  repeated here to provide data that a r e  believed to represent 
operating conditions with reasonable accuracy. For example, the estimated 
4.0-minute period might be determined by laboratory test to be a s  low as  
2.0 or a s  high a s  8.0 minutes; but test results cannot be reasonably expected 
to be outside of these limits. 
Although tests of limited duration have been conducted at  NASA/MSC 
and a t  Pratt- Whitney's Hartford, Connecticut facilities, never exceeding 
approximately two days of continual operation, test results have not been 
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-P- ot- 
where: 
A = Hydrogen consumption heat equivalent 
= H2 (Ib/hr) x 61,000 Btu 
B = Gross electrical power output 
C = Net electrical power to CSM loads 
D = FCP parasitic power, 125 watts dc/FCP 
E = DC-ac inverter inefficiency, heat rejected by ECS 
radiator subsystem 
F = Heat rejected by EPS subsystem 
A - (E + C). This i s  plotted in Figures XVI-C-13 and 14 
G = Heat rejected to SM structure and environment 
H = Heat rejected by EPS radiators 
Efficiency = x lo0 
A 
F i g u r e  87. Heat-Re jec t i on  Calcu lat ibn De f in i t i on  
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1275 
1375 
Table 48. Heat Rejection and Efficiency P e r  FCP 
43 50 
4690 
Ne t  Power 
(watts) 
438 
675 
875 
1075 
1494 
2300 
2984 
3670 
Gross 
Power 
(watts) 
563 
800 
1000 
1200 
1400 
1500 
0.0466 
0.0686 
0.0881 
0.1084 
0.1295 
0.1405 
H2 Heat 
Equivalent 
(Btu /hr) 
2840 
4185 
5375 
6620 
'7900 
8570 
Heat 
Rejection 
(Btu /hr  ) 
1244 
1783 
2289 
2848 
3448 
3788 
Efficiency 
(Percent) 
54.7 
published. 
reported in the near future to support the A A P  program. 
It may be reasonably expected that such tests wil l  be repeated and 
Determination of Performance Characteristics , Limits and Constraints 
Relating to Bus-Disconnected Hot Standby Mode 
Since each fuel cell while generating electric power requires a-c power 
for (1) water- separator pump, (2) radiator coolant (glycol-water) pump, 
(3) instrumentation, and requires d-c bus power for d-c instrumentation, at  
least one fuel cell o r  alternate d-c source must be connected to the space- 
craft d-c bus system. Parasitic power system parameters which must be 
known are: 
1. Power 
2. Voltage 
3. Inverter input voltage 
4. Reactant consumption rate for fuel cells 
5. Heat generation rate 
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~ - 
Gross 
Power SPC (H2) 
(watts) (lb/hr) 
W 
Table 49. FCP System Heat Rejection and Efficiency 
~ ~- ~~ ~ 
H2 Heat Heat 
Equivalent Rejection Efficiency 
(Btu/hr) (Btu/hr) (Percent) 
1126 0.0932 
1420 0.122 
1720 0.148 
2220 0.196 
2720 0.250 
3000 0.281 
5680 2488 52.7 
7440 3244 53.7 
9030 3808 55. 6 
11950 5023 56. 2 
15150 6518 55. 6 
17120 7538 i 54.7 
1315 4482 
1455 4967 
1955 6672 
2455 8377 
2955 10067 
3455 11777 
3955 13477 
~ 4125 14057 
ILOCK II FCP IN PARALLEL 
1690 
1830 
2330 
2830 
3330 
3830 
4330 
4500 
0.140 
0.152 
0.198 
0.248 
0.297 
0.348 
0.402 
0.421 
8 540 
9270 
12080 
15120 
18110 
2 1220 
24550 
25650 
- 
3752 
3997 
5102 
6437 
7737 
9137 
10767 
11287 
::i 55.4 . 5
55.4 
A l l  of the foregoing parameters have been established for conditions 
btfore launch, during ascent, and during space flight, for fuel cell systems 
comprising one, two, and three fuel cell systems, using the same o r  similar 
analytical techniques which have proven to be successful in prior studies 
relating to extended Apollo applications. 
Results of the analytical calculations a re  summarized in Table 50 
through 57. 
transmission power loss, voltage, power, reactant consumption and heat 
generation for conditions of maximum, minimum, and average power 
generation. 
These tables show a systematic determination of load demand, 
During startup, excess heat generated by the fuel cells is passed on by 
the radiator to the inner region of the SLA, where it can be removed by the 
GSE forced-zir cooling system which is available. 
removed during the prelaunch time interval is listed in Table 55, for one, 
two, and three fuel cell systems. 
Heat which must be 
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Table 54. Power and Heat Generating Parameters of Bus-Connected Fuel 
Cell During Prelaunch Period on Pad 
II, 
Fuel cells per system 
Fuel cells connected to d-c bus 
D-c bus power (ave. watts)  
Bus voltage (ave. volts) 
Bus voitage per cell (volts) 
Specific hydrogen consumption (lb/kw- hr) 
Hydrogen consumption rate (ave. lb/hr) 
Heat generation rate (ave. Btu/hr) 
One 
One 
275.5 
32. 5 
1.050 
0.0789 
0.0217 
1,320. 
Two 
One 
376. 5 
31. 6 
1.020 
0.0811 
0.0306 
1,865. 
Three 
One 
470.0 
30. 7 
0.990 
0.0836 
0.0393 
2,400. 
Table 55. Power and Heat Generating Parameters of Bus-Disconnected 
Fuel Cells During Prelaunch Period on Pad o r  Af te r  Launch 
Fuel cells per system 
Fuel cells disconnected from d-c bus 
Connected (watts) 
Duty cycle (70) 
Average (watts)  
Fuel cell voltage while generating power (volts) 
Voltage /cell while generating power (volts) 
Specific hydrogen consumption (lb /kw -hr) 
H consumption rate (ave. lb/hr) 
Rate of heat generation (Btu/hr) 
2 
Two 
One 
220.0 
75.0 
165.0 
33.1 
1.068 
0.0776 
0.0128 
780.0 
Three 
Two 
440.0 
75. 0 
330.0 
33. 1 
1.068 
0.0776 
0.0256 
1, 560. 0 
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W 
Table 56. Heat Generation and Reactant Consumption by Fuel Cell  
System During Prelaunch Time Period on Pad 
Fuel cells per system 
Fuel cells connected to bus 
Fuel cells disconnected from bus 
Average ratc. of heat generation by bus- 
connected fuel cells (Btu/hr) 
Average rate of heat generation by bus- 
disconnected fuel cells (Btu/hr) 
Average rate of heat generation by fuel 
cell system (Btu/hr) 
Rate of hydrogen consumption (ave. lb/hr) 
Rate of oxygen consumption (ave. lb/hr) 
One 
One 
1,320 
1,320 
0.217 
0.1736 
Two 
One 
One 
1,865 
780 
2,645 
0.0434 
0.3472 
Three 
One 
Two 
2,400 
1,560 
3,960 
0.0649 
0.5192 
If it is desired to extend flight time by reducing reactant consumption, 
It pro- hence electric power generation, the hot standby mode can be used. 
vides maximum extension of time since it requires less reactant consumption 
than any other operating mode. 
While the fuel cell system is in hot standby mode, the bus-connected 
fuel cell can provide voltage a t  inverter input terminals which exceeds the 
specified allowable voltage of 30.0 if no other load is on the bus. Inverter 
input voltage wits determined for maximum, minimum, and average power 
conditions of one, two, and three fuel cell systems operating in hot standby 
before launch and during space flight, for (1) a two-pair Block 11 cryogenic gas 
storage system (CGSS), and (2) a four-pair Block I1 CGSS. Highest voltage 
possible for any configuration and set of conditions is  estimated to be 34.3. 
This is obtained from Table 57 as follows. 
a single fuel cell system during the prelaunch period, the dc bus voltage is 
34. 5. Allowing a 0.2-volt loss in transmission, the inverter input voltage 
i s  then estimated a s  34.3 volts. For  the same set  of operating conditions, a 
single fuel cell system provides average voltage of 32.3 a s  estimated from 
average bus voltage of 32. 5 (Table 54). These upper limits of inverter input 
voltage do not appear likely to damage the inverter. This can definitely be 
determined either from the manufacturer, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 
o r  by test qualification of the entire hot standby operating procedure, 
including inverter operation. 
If no useful power is drawn from 
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Possible freezing of water-glycol coolant in the radiator under extreme 
conditions of space flight has been examined. 
have been computed, with results as listed in Table 57. 
addition of 5.0-watt electric heaters to each radiator coolant loop, coolant 
freezing is not expected to occur under any set of operating conditions which 
have been considered. 
Minimum heat rejection rates 
With the recent 
Water accumulation is expected to proceed without difficulty. 
to date have demonstrated the practical feasibility of the water collection 
system. 
that hot standby would adversely affect the accumulation of water. 
A l l  tests 
Upon examination, no reasons were  found to support any hypothesis 
Apollo Block 11 Cryogenic Gas Storage System (CGSS) Components 
Apollo Block II CGSS tanks are available in single units, as pairs com- 
prising one oxygen tank and one hydrogen tank per pair, and as multiples of 
pairs. In any combination, the RCM Laboratory CGSS will comprise one o r  
more hydrogen tanks, one o r  more oxygen tanks, hydrogen and oxygen valve 
modules, servicing disconnects, density and temperature s ignal  conditioners, 
electrical connectors, fuel cell valve module for each fuel cell, and related 
plumbing. Convenient modules can be formed.from multiples of tank pairs , 
as for example, a two-pair system comprising two hydrogen tanks' and two 
oxygen tanks. 
Block 11 Cryogenic Gas Storage System 
The Block I1 cryogenic gas storage system includes two equally sized 
spherical oxygen tanks and two equally sized spherical hydrogen tanks. The 
storage tanks and associated controls a r e  located in Sector IV  of the service 
module. 
to the environmental control subsystem (ECS) from each oxygen tank. 
and hydrogen can be supplied to any of the three fuel cells f rom each tank a s  
shown schematically in Figure 91. The oxygen tanks and the hydrogen tanks 
and their controls a r e  packaged into two complete and separate modules to 
permit f i n a l  assembly and checkout of each system prior to final installation 
of the system in the spacecraft. 
system module can be installed o r  removed independently. 
system is arranged and located to provide access to the service propulsion 
engine. 
The tanks and plumbing a r e  arranged so that oxygen can be supplied 
Oxygen 
The oxygen system module and the hydrogen 
The hydrogen 
Figure 91 also shows the accumulator (surge tank), heat exchangers, 
and flow restrictors in the CM oxygen supply system. 
part  of the ECS but serve important functions for the cryogenic storage sub- 
system. 
vent the loss of system pressure in the cryogenic oxygen storage system 
These components a r e  
The heat exchanger, in conjunction with the flow restrictors,  pre- 
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during emergency flow conditions in the event of a cabin puncture. 
bined flow from the accumulator and the cryogenic storage system is required 
to provide the emergency flow for five minutes. 
The com- 
Flow from the reactant tanks to the fuel cells is  controlled by solenoid 
valves, which in turn a r e  controlled by pressure regulators in the fuel cell. 
Flow from the oxygen tanks to the ECS is controlled by flow restrictors and 
pressure regulators in the ECS. 
The duration and power requirements of the extended Apollo missions 
affect the implementation of Apollo CGSS components in three major areas: 
1. Service life 
2. Fluid storage 
3. ECS expulsion requirements 
Present Apollo CGSS components have a minimum service life require- 
ment of 400 hours. 
for 30-day mission and 2300 hours for ninety-day mission. 
must be qualified to these criteria. Those components (i. e., solenoid valves, 
pressure switches, check valves) which undergo numerous cycling operations 
during their service life wi l l  present the biggest problems associated with 
qualification and acceptance testing. 
relief valve, pressure transducer, temperature sensor) which &> not experi- 
ence excessive cycling operations may not prove difficult to qualify. 
Service lives of approximately 900 hours a r e  required 
A l l  components 
Other components (i. e. , pressure 
Fluid Storage Heating Requirements 
The amount of fluid necessary for the mission is dependent on the 
energy demands on the EPS a . d  the storage requirements of the ECS. 
EPS demand is composed primarily of the amount required for experimenta- 
tion (as defined by the customer), the parasitic power of the EPS itself, and 
the CGSS power requirements. 
The 
The CGSS energy requirements a r e  composed primarily of the amounts 
necessary to operate the tank heaters and fan motors; nomina'. amounts a r e  
required for the pressure switch, solenoid valves, pressure transducer: and 
temperature sensors, 
For constant pressure operations, the required heating rate is  
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where 
= specific heat input, Btu/lb of fluid withdrawn 
qS 
4- = flow rate, lb/hr 
= allowable heat leak Qa 
The specific heat input is a function of the fluid thermodynamic proper- 
ties. Flow rate is 
w = R x E x P  
where 
R = ratio, lb of fluid/lb of water  (1/9 for hydrogen; 8 /9  for oxygen) 
E = powerplant efficiency factor, 16 of water/kw-hr 
P = power plant demand, kw-hr 
'Powerplant efficiency factors for the Apollo fuel cell vary from approxi- 
mately 0.67 to 0.88 lb H~O/kw-hr;  0.77 is used in the following calculations 
as a reasonable value for preliminary purposes. 
To prevent system boil-off losses, the allowable heat leak is 
For a power of 2.0 kw, the minimum flow rate is 
= 0.77 x 2.0 x 1.0/9.0 
= 0.171 lb/hr (for hydrogen) 
= 0.77 x 2.0 x 8.0/9 
= 1. 37 lb/hr (for oxygen) 
The allowable heat leak is: 
= 0. 171 x 100 = 17.1 Btu/hr (hydrogen) 
= 1.37 x 32 = 43.9 Btu/hr (oxygen) 
SI1) 66-1853 
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No. of 
Pz.irs 
of Tanks 
1 
2 
3 
4 
A reasonable estimate can be made for the heating requirements of the 
hydrogen system if  it is assumed that the average required heating rate is 
30 percent of the maximum heating rate. 
Tank Fan 
Heaters Motors Instruments Subtotal 
(watts) (watts) (watts) (watts) 
45 19 5 69 
45 38 10 93 
45 57 15 117 
45 76 20 161 
= 262 Btu/lb 
qs (max) 
Losses 
(15'$) 
(kw- 
111) 
7.5 
10.2 
12.8 
15.4 
w = 0.77 x 4.2 x 1.0/9.0 = 0.36 lb/hr 
(max) 
Totals 
(ki\?- hr) 
57.2 
78.0 
98.1 
1J.8.2 
= 262.0 x 0.36 - 17. 1 = 77.8 Btu/hr = 22.6 watts 
Qr (max) 
Energy 
Required 
( kw- hr) 
50.0 
67.5 
85.0 
102.5 
= 6.8 wat t s  = ci Qr (max) av 
Solenoids 
Valves Subtotal 
(kw- hr) ( kw- hr) 
0.3 50.3 
0.3 67.8 
0.3 85.3 
0.3 102.8 
However, a reasonable estimate of the heating requirements of the 
oxygen tanks is difficult because of the expulsion requirements of the ECS. 
Heating requirements vary directly with the amount of fluid remaining in the 
tank. If ECS oxygen is stored cryogenically, it is necessary to know when 
the oxygen expulsion takes place in order to determine the heating rate. 
The average heating rate for the EPS oxygen is 37.6 watts (assuming 
qr  (av) - 0.3 qr(max). A summary of the estimated power requirements for 
the CGSS is shown below as  a function of the number of pairs (02 and H2) of 
reactant tanks. The heating requirements for the ECS must be added to the 
values shown below if the oxygen is stored cryogenically. 
power and energy requirements a r e  shown in Table 58. 
The CGSS electric 
In addition to the heat required for the oxygen tanks (which include ECS 
provisions) some heat may be required to increase the temperature of the 
oxygen delivered to the ECS. The principal reason ior this requirement is 
the relatively high flow rates encountered during the various repressuriza- 
tions. An investigation of this requirement is beyond the scope of this re?ort 
Table 58. CGSS Electric Power and Energy Requirements 
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since it requires a knowledge of the ECS design, repressurization occurre ce 
times, and initial temperature. 
to determine if the required heat may be more economically provided by a heat 
exchanger system a s  opposed to electrically provided energy. 
Also, a trade-off study should be conduc.ad 
Because of the relatively low flow rates associated with fuel cell opera- 
tion, it is pr9bable that no heat need be provided to the reactant gases prior 
to their entrance at the fuel cell pressure regulators. It is anticipated that 
the heat provided from the surrounding structure should be sufficient to 
satisfy the minimum temperature requirement at the fuel cell entrance. A s  
before, a thorough heat-transfer analysis is necessary to verify this 
a s  sumption. 
Heat is required at the reactant tanks prior to launch in order to build 
up pressures to operating pressures. It is anticipated that this energy wil l  be 
supplied by ground equipment. For the constant volume process, this amount 
of heat is 
VAP Q-WAh--  J 
It can be shown that this relationship becomes 
Q = 7.49 W (Btu, 'axygen system) 
= 13.20 W (Btu, hydrogen system) 
It should be noted that a s  the remaining weight in the reactant tanks 
approaches 10 percent of the initial weight, the specific heat input becomes 
asymptotic and qr increases correspondingly, depending upon the withdrawal 
rate (w). However, the temperature of the fluids becomes a controlling fac- 
tor in the evaluation of the heating requirements towards the end of the 
mission. It is probable that the heaters must be turned off and the tank pres- 
s u i  - allowed to decay in order to prevent the fluid temperatures from 
exceeding 70 F, the minimum allowable fluid temperature at the fuel cell. In 
order to verify this assumption, however, it would be necessary to conduct a 
transient heat-transfer analysis which would zonsider a l l  the factors affecting 
the temperature of the stored gas. 
Apollo Block U Cryogenic Gas Storage Tank Heat-Leak Analysis 
The heat-leak characteristics of the Apollo Block 11 cryogenic gas stor- 
age vessels have been analyzed so that the electrical energy requirements 
for extended missions can be accurately determined. 
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The objective of the calculations was  to determine the heat leak into the 
Heretofore the only values avail- 
Apollo cryogenic tanks during varying flow-rate conditions where the flow is 
higher than the minimum normal flow rate. 
able concerning the heat leak of the Apollo Block II cryogenic storage tanks 
have been for conditions of minimum flow throughout the complete density 
spectrum. When the flow rate from the vessel is increased above the mini- 
mum level, the heat leak through the insulation to the inner vessel is 
decreased because of the increased cooling of the shield and insulation. 
The results of the analysis are summarized in Figures 92 through 95 
and present the heat input requirements as a function of flow rate for oxygen 
and hydrogen. 
respectively, and Figures 94 and 95 are for high and low density hydrogen, 
respectively. 
Figures 92 and 93 are for  high and low density oxygen, 
The horizontal parameters of the figures relate to the heat leak into 
the fluid as a function of density and flow rate. b'ertical parameters relate 
to the total heat input requirements as a function of density and flow rate. 
The difference between the two curves on Figures 92 through 95 is the elec- 
trical power required to maintain operating pressure level. 
These curves show that the heat leak into the inner fluid decreases as 
The heat the flow rate increases due to the decreasing shield temperature. 
leak also varies with density in that it increases with decreasing density 
until the min dc/dm density is reached, and then the heat leak decreases due 
to increasing fluid temperature. 
The analysis is based on the standby heat leak of the tanks a t  zero flow, 
and on the vapor cooled shield performance during flow. 
across  the insulation system was obtained based on the heat absorption capa- 
bilities of the exiting fluid. A s  the flow rate increased, then the heat abrop- 
tion of the shield increased, which caused the shield temperature t c  decrease, 
even though the heat leak from the outer shell to the vapor cooled shield 
increased. 
A heat balance 
Constraints on Reactaat Consumption Rates Due to Thermal Build-up of 
Pressure in CGSS Tanks 
Tests a t  SID on Block II CGSS tanks have established flow rates of 
hydrogen and oxygen a t  the respective minimum dQ/dM or  worst-case condi- 
tion, Heat leak into the cryogenic fluid at the minimum dQ/dM is the lowest 
rate of heat leak possible during a mission which is required to expel a unit 
mass velocity of fluid, The test 
results a r e  given in Table 59. 
Units of dQ/dM are ,  typically, Btu/pound. 
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Figure 93. Oxygen Heater Input Requirements, Low-Density Region 
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Table 59. CGSS Test Data of Minimum Fluid Flow Rates for Minimum 
dQ/dM Condition - Ambient Temperature 140 F 
Hydrogen Tank No. 
Present design 
goal 
Flow Rate (lb/hr) 
~~~ 
0.0660 
0.0730 
0.0713 
0.0709 
0.0720 
0.054 
Oxygen Tank No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Average 
Flow Rate (lb/hr) 
0.667 
0.690 
0.678 
0.713 
0.707 
0.712 
0.667 
0. 693 
0.691 f 0.015 
From parameters of Table 59 (namely, the design goal worst-case 
hydrogen flow rate and average test value of worst-case oxygen flow rate, 
which pertain to 140 F local ambient), flow-rate parameters were computed 
for a 30 F local ambient environment which is believed to represent an  
effective heat- sink temperature for the RCM-installed EPS gas supply. 
parameters relate to both a worst-case condition and an average condition 
which is based upon the simplifying assumption that, for an  entire mission, a 
thermally required average flow rate  is approximately 0.8 times the worst- 
case flow rate. These parameters a r e  combined with flow rates required by 
fuel-cell operation to form Table 60. 
These 
Control of CGSS Tank Temperature 
The Block II cryogenic tanks must be maintained at the proper tempera- 
ture to minimize venting the reactants overboard. 
studies have recommended adding an insulation shield around the tanks. 
type shield recommended for the A A P  is as follows. 
To accomplish this, A A P  
The 
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Table 60. Two-Pair Tank CGSS-EPS. Fluid Flow Parameters Under 
Normal and Limiting Conditions 
Average flow rate for 
30-Day mission, lb/hr 
tank 
Range of specific 
reactant consumption, 
lb/kw hr”- 
Most probable average 
specific reactant 
consumption 
Flow rate for minimum 
dQ/dM condition, lb/hr 
tank 
Estimated average mini- 
mum flow rate require- 
ment based on average 
dQ /dM condition 
Hot standby minimum 
flow rate ,+ average 
lb/hr tank maximum 
Normal operating mini- 
flow rate, lb/hr mum 
tank aver- 
age 
maxi- 
mum 
~~ ~~ 
Hydrogen 
0.0389 
0.0744 - 0.0977 
0.0855 
(ambient 140 F) 0.054 
(ambient 30 F) 0.049 
(ambient 140 F) 0.043 
(ambient 30 F) 0.039 
0.008 
0.028 
0.117 
0.024 
0.0389 
0.061 
0.311 
0.595 - 0.784 
0.684 
(140 F)(EPStECS) 0.691 
( 30 F)(EPStECS) 0.545 
(140 F)(EPS) 0.485 
( 30 F)(EPS) 3.382 
(140 F)(EPStECS) 0. 560 
-( 30 F)(EPStECS) 0.436 
(140 F)(EPS) 0.388 
( 30 F)(EPS) 0; 306 
0.064 
0.204 
0.936 
0.192 
0.311 
0.488 
0.563 kw, minimum power level - normal operating mode 
1.428 kw, minimum power level - normal operating mode 
:$Assumes one fuel cell is operating normally, one is on hot standby. 
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Superinsulation comprising 40 layers of crinkled aluminum-coated 
Mylar sheet material, forming a gross thickness of approximately 0. 5 inch, 
will  be placed midway between two aluminum sheet metal bumper shields 
which,are set  approximately 1.0 inch apart. 
0.020 inch thick, depending upon configuration size. Space between the two 
bumper shields is space-vacuum, with the superinsulation occupying the mid- 
region. Walls formed in this manner a r e  then 'arranged and attached together 
to form a continuous enclosure around a group of hydrogen tanks, and a group 
of oxygen tanks. 
Each bumper shield is 0.016 o r  
If, for a pkrticular mission, a two-pair gas supply system is to be 
installed, the two hydrogen tanks wi l l  be installed together and totally enclosed, 
(except for the base support structure) by the bumper- shield- superinsulation 
structure. The two oxygen tanks wil l  be similarly enclosed. 
To interrupt o r  reduce heat leak into each cryogenic tank, support 
structure attachments wil l  be fabricated from low thermal conductivity cer- 
amic material. A design based upon this technique can be expected to mini- 
mize heat leak into the supercritical fluid. 
temperature around the tanks of 30 F has been set as a preliminary design 
goal. 
environment temperature is no greater than 140 F. Again, a specific design 
recommendation must be withheld until definition of a mission and establish- 
ment of the actual environmental conditions to which the CGSS will  be exposed. 
An internal effective ambient 
This applies to both hydrogen and oxygen tanks when the external 
CGSS - EPS Configuration 
From the fluid-flow parameters listed in Table 60, it is seen that a 
single pair of tanks with either one o r  two fuel cells is feasible. 
two pairs of tanks with either one o r  two fuel cells a r e  a feasible configura- 
tion for a 30-day mission. In either case, a peaking battery normally would 
supply peak power. 
Likewise, 
Analysis and Description of Present Block I1 Radiator 
The present Apollo Block II radiator a rea  of 40 square feet wi l l  be used 
as  the primary heat-rejection mechanism for the AES fuel-cell waste heat. 
The present configuration can be changed to accommodate the addition of a 
fourth fuel cell. 
5 square feet each (i. e. , 20- 1/4  by 36 inches), with three tubes on a panel 
corresponding to one fuel cell each (one parallel passage per fuel cell). 
There a r e  presently eight individual panels of approximately 
The heat transfer behavior of a number of radiator configurations was 
analyzed. 
be 5499 Btu/hour (See Table 61). 
The Block I1 radiator capability under worst conditions is taken to 
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areject  Btu (Net) 
H r  
Table 61. Apollo Block II Capability (40 Square Feet, 
Lunar Orbit (80 Miles) Worst Orientation) 
Specifications: I 
Per Module 
Section of Eight-Sectioned 
Circumference 
5 
Btu 
Hr- Ft 2 
Q. in 
159 
87.2 
73.7 
72.4 
89. 5 
165.6 
304 
3 18 
242 
357 
3 62 
313 
320 
204 
13 
-5 
T = 695R 
T = 668 R 
in 
out 
W = 83 lb/hr 
Qreject = 1833 
Btu / hr 
(per module) 
Qreject 
(3 modules) 
5499 Btu/hr 
Net heat rejection varies along the circumference of the vehicle as  a 
result of different incident heat loads. 
6, 7 and 8 results from high incident energy from lunar planetary thermal 
emission. The most critical condition for the radiator is when it sees the 
lunar surface, since selective coatings a r e  not effective for the longer wave- 
lengths of the thermal planetary emissions. 
worst side) is therefore selected as the required radiator location for any 
additional area. 
net heat rejection of 208 Btu/hour per f t2  of effective area. 
requirements can thus be determined. 
rate of 8500 Btu/hr, corresponding to 4000 watts of power output, the required 
area increase is: (1) 43 square feet results in 5500 Btu/hour net heat rejec- 
tion, (2) excess waste heat = 8500 - 5500 = 3000 Btu/hour, and (3) area to be 
added = 3000/208 14.4 square feet. 
The lower net rejection for sides 1, 
Side 4 (opposite side 8, the 
Under this restraint, the radiator is expected to result in  a 
Additional area 
For example, for a heat-rejection 
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If the radiator operating temperab:res and conditions are lowered 
(Tin = 643 R, Tout = 608 R, and W = 78, 5 pounds per hour), the net heat 
rejection wil l  reduce to 145 Btu/hour-ftz and the required additional area 
becomes 20.7 square feet, 
To increase fuel cell output to the maximum capability of 4000 watts 
For minimum load conditions, the maximum active 
(i. e., two F C P  operating a t  2000 w a t t s  each), the radiator area must be 
increased accordingly. 
radiator area is limited to 48 square feet; i. e., a minimum heat rejection 
of 2550 Btu/hour results in an equilibrium temperature of -30 F (taken to 
be the lower limit for water glycol) with an active a rea  of 48 square 
feet. 
During space coast of the mission, with the vehicle facing the sun 
and spinning, the net heat-rejection capability of the full 40-square foot 
area is taken to be 6810 Btu/hour (see Table 62), which is adequate for the 
estimated requirements of the fuel cells. This value represents steady- 
state operation, with a radiator inlet temperature of 643 R and an outlet 
temperature of 608 R at a flow rate of 78.5 pounds per hour. 
Apollo Block II Radiator Capability 
The following Block I1 radiator capability is based upon the analysis 
For earth orbit, a minimum heat rejection performed during this study. 
of 1746 Btu/hour is required to maintain 40 square feet of radiator surface 
(see Table 63) above -35 F as a radiator outlet temperature. This is taken 
to be the lower limit for the water-glycol mixture that is used a s  the cool- 
ant. With a 200 F condenser temperature as maximum flowable, the radi- 
ator heat-rejection capability is 7270 Btu/hour. Figure 96 shows the 
effect of varying this condenser exit temperature (i. e. ,  varying radiator 
surface temperature). 
Q/C = 0. 18/0.92 a s  the initial value and @/c = 0.27/0.85 as a final value. 
Degradation of surface coating has not been fully defined for all space 
environment (i. e. , low-energy proton fluxes); however, Q / E  = 0.27/0.85 is 
taken as  the maximum degradation of coating. 
Two ratios of thermal coatings a re  considered with 
Figures 97 and 98 show maximum and minimum heat-rejection values 
as  a function of gross power for Block II. Figure 99 gives the glycol pump 
characteristics, with curve No. 1 representing maximum values and curve 
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Table 62. Block I1 Capability - Space Coast (Facing Sun and Spinning) 
Side 
(BW 
2 Hr- Ft in 
Q 
0 
0 
0 
0 
53 
73 
73 
20 
32 2 
355 
343 
293 
2 52 
218 
18 6 
280 
One Module 
Tin = 643 R 
T = 608 R out 
W = 78.5 lb/hr 
= 2270 Btu/hr (per module) 
reject Q 
Total Qreject LL70 (3) = 6810 Btu/ 
hr 
No. 2 minimum values. 
by using curve No. 2 for values shown in Figure 96 (e. g. ,  approximately 
30 Btu/hour a t  maximum condenser temperature of 200 F). 
Block 11 capability for lunar-transit phase. 
minimum incident energy (that is, Qin = 0) is shown to be 2457 Utu/hour. 
Below this, heat-rejection rate radiator fluid freezing becomes a serious 
problem for the condition of deep-space o r  zero incident heat, 
A slight increase in net hezt rejection is obtained 
Table 63 shows 
Minimum heat rejection a t  
Utilization of Apollo Block I1 Radiator Panels 
Eight Apollo Block I1 radiator panels comprising an area of 40 square feet 
a r e  designed to reject heat from the Block I1 three-fuel cell system. 
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3 
- Q 0.18 
E 0.92 
- CONDlTl O M  
- Q 0.27 
0.85 
- 
3 FUEL CELLS OPERATING PER 
BLOCK I I  LUNAR ORBIT, 60 NMI 
X-AXIS HORIZONTAL 
40 SQUARE FOOT RADIATOR AREA 
GLYCOL PUMP CHARACTERISTIC CURVE 2 
100 200 300 
MAXIMUM CONDENSER EXIT TEMPERATURE (DEGREES) 
Figure 96. Apollo Block II Radiator Capability, Lunar Orbit 
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FUEL CELL GROSS POWER OUTPUT (WATTS/MODULE) 
Figure 97. Minimum Fuel-Cell Heat-Production Rate 
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Figure 98.  Minimum Fuel-Cell Heat-Production Rate 
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0 ~ 0 3 0 1 ~ 1 0 s o o m ~  
INTERFACE PRESSURE DROP (PSI) 
Figure 99. Glycol Pump Cl-aracteristics 
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If, for a particular mission as yet undefined, a one-fuel cell system 
is required, then a proportionate number of Apollo radiator panels would 
be installed (i. e. , three panels). 
thirds of a full set (i. e. , five o r  s ix  panels depending on the mission). 
Likewise, two fuel cells require two- 
A s  previously described, each Block 11 radiator panel includes three 
fluid coolant tubes arranged in geometric parallel. 
Apollo system, each coolant tube relates to a particular fuel cell. 
In the three-fuel cell 
If a three-fuel cell system is to be installed for the RCM laboratory, 
the Apollo Block 11 system installation is to be followed. Plumbing inter- 
connections from panel to panel fol'.ow a regular sequential order. 
of fuel cell No. 1, which is tube No. 1 (counting from top) on panel No. 4, 
takes the position of tube No. 2 (second from top) on panel No. 5, and so 
on. 
The tube 
This arrangement reduces side effects in t e a t  radiation to space. 
If a one-fuel-cell system is to be installed for the laboratory, several 
methods of using the available tubes are possible. 
in mechanical parallel, mechanical series, or  some comomation of parallel 
and series. 
o r  counter-flow direction. 
forward- flow arrangement, how ever , they are heat- transfer counter cur rent, 
since there is a difference in fluid temperature in adjacent tubes at points 
of entrance. 
radiator panel, effectively, as a type of auxiliary heat exchanger. During 
periods of maximum heat rejection, the radiator is somewhat less effective 
than a parallel-flow type. 
rejection with thc panel pointed towards deep space, coolant is less likely 
to freeze since some heat is picked up from an adjacent tube. 
arrangement has two important advantages: 
possible, and (2) less fluid friction in the coolant loop requires less work 
by the pump, resulting in longer service life and less  electric power input. 
Therefore, the parallel arrangement, with the necessary plumbing line 
changes and manifolding (only two in each loop), i s  recommended for the 
RCM laboratory EPS-radiator design. 
ance heater, to bypass lines of each radiator cooling loop and possibly to 
direct lines a s  well, might very wel l  provide positive control of thL physical 
condition of coolant fluid by eliminating, in a practical sense, the possibility 
of freezing. 
They CAT? be connected 
If in series, the tubes can be arranged in  either the forward- 
Even i f  the tubes a r e  series-connected in 
The main advantage of se r ies  arrangement is to use each 
However, during periods of minimum heat 
Parallel  
(1) greater heat rejection is 
Addition of a 5-watt electric resist- 
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Eubsystem Buildup 
required for the mission. 
relatively low-level operation unless the CSM has been modified to increase 
its cyrogenic storage capacity. Figure 100 shows a comparison of the energy 
capability of batteries and fuel cells on a weight basis. 
based upon the batteries listed in Table 42, and the fuel cell curve i s  based 
upon current operational data and does not include the low-level operation 
previously described. 
definite at  the ends of the curve. But the gross nature of the calculations 
limits its usefulness at  the crossover point. 
the 30-kw-hour range, further study is required before any selection should 
be made. 
Selection of a power source is  based largely upon the energy storage 
The dependent system could only be used for . 
The battery data a re  
The superiority of one source over the other is  
If the energy levels fall in 
After the power source is selected, the rest  of the EPS can be built up 
from the existing Apollo components. 
characteristics of the Block I and Block II components previously listed in 
Table 19. 
guide to the application of these components i s  given in Table 67, EPS 
Subsys tem Buildup. 
Tables 64 and 65, list the physical 
Each component's function and capacity is  listed in Table 66. A 
An example of the use of these tables is given herein: 
1. Power requirement Less than 200 watts with short peaks 
of 1000 watts 
Selected source Dependent d-c power plus peaking 
battery 
2. Support requirements IIa and IIc call f o r  la, IVb which call 
fo r  IIIa (note 1) which yields IVa. 
3. EPS components a. LEM docking umbilical 
b. C14A16 
c. C14A2 
d. C14A7 
e. C15A5 
f.  C14A3 
Note 1: An independent a-c source was selected to m i n i m i z e  the impact 
to  the CSM wiring, 
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Table 64. Block I Component Physical Characteristics 
Component 
C14A1 
C 14A2 
C14A3 
C 14A7 
C 14A8 
C14A1.2 
C14A13 
C14A14 
C 14A15 
C14A16 
C14BT 1.2.3 
C14BT 5.6 
Cl4BTC 1 
C14PS 1 , 2 , 3  
BVT 
C15A 1 
C 1 SA2 
C15A5 
S14A1 
S 14A2 
S14PS 1 , 2 , 3  
S48A4,5 
S48A6 
S48A7 
S48A10, 11 
S48AR 107, 108. 109, 
110,111,112 
S48LV1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
S48TK 1 ,2  
S48TK 2, 3 
- 
X 
47 
62 
55 
- 
6. 8 
65  
4 
152 
94 
6 
6. 9 
3 
3 
69 
85 
44 
- 
Dimension 
(in.) 
Y 
72 
91 
8. 6 
41 
4 
118 
20.2 
10. 8 
10. 6 
5.75 
2.75 
6. 3 
146 
Tubing 
only 
4 
z 
17.4 
103 
2-9 
16.2 
35 
71 
20-8.4 
5 
6-12.2 
11.75 
6.75 
5. 7 
149 
9 5  
22. 5 diameter  
cylinder 
Volume 
(in. ) 3 
590 
580 
2 60 
4 52 
91 
335 
4360 
508 
580 
4. 66 
56 
108 
1490 
Negligible 
323 
17 500 
10. 6 
7. 6 
80 
5. 2 
4 
4 
7 
20 
70 
3. 4 
28 
5. 6 
3. 8 
39. 5 
1. 5 
3. 0 
3.0 
70 
35. 3 
5. 5 
262 
2 
25  
25 
7. 1 
1 
4 
70 
8 5  
~ ~~ 
' emperature  (F) - 
Low 
- 55 
-
55 
50 
50 
50 
55 
65 
65  
55 
65  
- 
High 
2 00 
- 
200 
200 
2 00 
2 00 
2 00 
140 
140 
I40 
1 40 
~~ - 
Coldplate 
No 
No 
Ye5 
Yes 
Yes 
Y C S  
NO 
No 
No 
No 
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4 
10 
10 
51 
Table 65. Block I1 Component Physical Characteristics 
4 
6 
b 
51  
Component 
C14A1 
C i4.X 
C 14.43 
C 14A7 
C 14A8 
C14A12 
C14A13 
C14A14 
C14A15 
C14A16 
C14BT 1 , 2 , 3  
Cl4BT 5 , 6  
C14BTC 1 
Cl4PS  1 .2 .3  
EVT 
C15A 1 
C15A 2 
Cl5A 5 
S14A 1 
S14.4 2 
S14PS1,2 ,3  
S48A4,5 
S48A6 
S48A7 
S48A10, 11 
S48AR 107, 108, 109, 
110.111.112 
S48LV 1, 2, 3. 4, 5. 6 
S48TK 1.2 
j48TK 3 , 4  
- 
X 
4. 5 
5. 4 
- 
47 
6.2 
42 
6. 5 
4. 25 
- 
- 
13. 5 
6. 9 
3 
3 
6. 8 
14 
10 
8. 4 
7.6 
4. 9 
44 
25  
5 
5 
54 
3 
2. 3 
Dimension 
(in. ) 
Y 
8 
9 .25  
122 
4 
108 
4 
12.2 
- 
- 
5. 2 
5.75 
275 
6. 3 
14. S 
Tubing 
mly  
10 
3 
50 
2 0 . 8  
7.7 
2 
14. 5 
12 
75  
16 
76 
3. 5 
12.2- 
6.2 
- 
- 
2 . 8  
11.75 
6. 75 
5. 7 
1;. 8 
3 
10 
9. 1 
184 
108 
22.  5 diameter  
cylinder 
3 d iameter  
cylinder 
5. 5 I 4. 5 
33 d iameter  sphere  
21. 5 I 28. 2 d iameter  
cylinder 
Volume 
(in. ) 3 
52 2 
600 
430 
398 
378 
91 
472 
- 
197 
466 
56 
107 
1490 
Negligible 
420 
300 
306 
29 10 
41 1 
17, 500 
40 
300 
300 
14 1 
21 
57 
18,800 
13, 300 
10. 6 
7. 6 
80 
5. 2 
4 
4 
100 
- 
3. 4 
28 
5. 6 
3. 8 
39. 5 
1. 5 
6 
4 
70 
35. 3 
5. 5 
265 
2 
12 
12 
7. i 
1 
4 
70 
82 
Tempera ture  (F) - 
Low 
- 55 
- 55 
- 55 
-55 
- 55 
- 55 
- 55 
-55 
- 55 
- 55 
50 
50 
50 
- 55 
-65 
-65 
-65 
-65  
- 
High 
2 00 
2 00 
2 00 
2 00 
2 00 
2 00 
200 
2 00 
2 00 
2 00 
2 00 
200 
200 
2 00 
140 
200 
140 
140 
Coldplate 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
N o  
No 
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Table 66. EPS Component Functions 
Cociponent 
C 14-41 
C 14-42 
C 14.43 
C14A7 
C14A8 
C14AlZ 
C14A13 
C14A14 
C14A15 
C14Al6 
C14BT1, 2, 3 
C14BT5, 6 
C 14BTC 1 
C14PS1, 2, 3 
C l5Al  
C 15.42 
C 1 SA5 
S14A1 
Sl4AZ 
S14PS1.2, 3 
S48A4, 5 
S48Ab 
S48A7 
S48A10, 11 
S48ARl07,108,109, 
110,111,112 
S48LV1,2, 3 ,4 ,  5, t 
S48TK1,2 
S48TK3,4 
Function 
;elects a-c  sou rce  and connects to  bus plus 
i -c  sense unit 
Battery bus t ie 
inverter d-c control 
Bus t i e  acd  inve r t e r  c i rcui t  b reake r s  plus 
isolation diodes 
Fuel-cell pump motor phase correct ion 
Circuit  protection 
Control uprighting sys t em compresso r  
Control auxiliary battery supply on BL I 
Circuit b reake r  fo r  auxiliary power supply 
Battery and pyro circui t  b reake r s  
Postlanding and r een t ry  bat ter ies  
Pyrotechnic bat ter ies  
Battery cha rge r  
D-c t o  3+ a -c  converter  
Vent battery gas ses  overboard 
Bulkhead feedthrough and p j r o  disconnect 
Bulkhead feedthrough and pyro disconnect 
Voltagt s enso r  
Controls fuel-cell  output 
Controls fuel-cell  operation 
Converts H2 and 02 to d-c power 
Conditions tank t empera tu re  and leve! 
s e n s o r s  
Cryogenic 112 relief and check valve fo r  
tank 
Cryogenic 02 relief and c..eck valve for 
tank 
Controls cryoger.ic tank motors  ar.4 hea te r s  
Monitors F C  gas flew ra t e s  
F C  gas shutoff valves 
Cryogenic H2 s toraqe 
Cryogenic 02 s to rage  
Support mounting sk i r t  fo r  H2 tank 
Capability 
Sfalects 1 of 3 sou rces  
2 bat ter ies  
3 i nve r t e r s  
13 circui t  b reake r s  -I 8 diodes 
3 fuel cel ls  
30 fuses  
3 motor  switches and 2 circui t  b reake r s  
Control 3 bat ter ies  
7 circui t  b reake r s  
9 c i rcui t  b reake r s  
40 AH at 27 volts 
1 5  A min a t  23 volts 
1 battery a t  a t ime 
1250 V 4  
3 bat ter ies  
9 movable, 3 flxed connectors 
5 movable, 1 fixed connector 
2 busses  
3 fuel cel ls  to  2 busses  
3 fuel cel ls  
900 wattb 
1 tank 
2 tanks 
2 tanks 
2 tanks 
1 pe r  reactant line 
1 gas for 3 fuel cel ls  
28 lb H2 
320 lb 02 
1 pe r  tank 
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Table 67. E' 5 Subsystem Buildup 
I. DISTRIBUTION 
A. D-C .n 
1. Support requiremenLs (power source (II) 
2. Components 
a. C14A2 d-c power control 
b. C14A7 main CB panel 
c. C15A5 circuit utilization box 
d. C152A05 panel, five controls 
e. C22-2A203 displays 
B. A-C System 
1. Support requirements (power source (III) 
2. Components 
a. Ci4A1 a-c power cbntrol 
b. C15-4A403 circuit breakers 
C. C22-2~1203 controls and displays 
II. D-C POWER SOURLLJ 
A. Dependent source 
1. Support requirements (d-c distribution system (LA) 
2. Componenis (LEM docking umbilical cables) 
B. Primary battery 
1.  Support requirements 
a. D-c distribution system (TA) 
b. Coldplate (for C14BT 5, 6 )  
2. Components (C14A16 battery CB panel) 
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Table 67. EPS Subsystem Buildup (Cont) 
C. Secondary Battery 
1. Support requirements 
a. D-c distribution system (1A) 
b. Battery charger (IVb) 
c. Coldplate (for C14BT 1, 2, 3) 
2. Component (C14A16 battery 1 CB panel) 
D. Fuel Cell 
1. Support requirements 
a. D-c distribution system (1A) 
b. 
c. Gas supply (V) 
d. 
3 4 a-c power source (III) 
Water glycol radiator and manifold (VI) 
2. Components 
a. S11A1 power distribution box 
b. 
c. S48A4197-112 flowmeter 
d. S18LV1-6 F/C shutoff valves 
e. F / C  filter (ME286-0036) 
f .  C15-2A205 controls 
g. C22-2A203 controls and displays 
S11A2 F / C  remote control assembly 
I.U. A-C POWER SOURCES 
A. Dependent Sovrce 
1. Support requirements 
a. A-c distribution system (IB) 
2. Component (LEM docking urrdxsical) 
B. Independent Source (Suppor 1. Requirement ) 
1. Conversion equipment (IVA) 
2. A-c dist:ibution syatem 
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Table 67. EPS Subsystem Buildup (Cont) 
IV. CONVERSION EQUIPMENT 
A. Inverter 
1. Support requiremerts 
a. D-c power source (II) 
b. Coldplate (for C14E 1. 2, 3) 
2. Components 
a. C14A3 motor switch control 
b. C22-2AZO3 control panel 
B. Battery Charger 
1. Support requirements 
a. D-c power source (II) 
b. 
c. 
d. 40 AHr secolr.:. v silver-zinc battery 
3 + a-c power source (III) 
Coldplate (fcr C 14BTC 1) 
2. Components 
a. 
b. C15A205 a-c power control 
C22-2AZ03 panel 3 selector switch 
V. GAS STORAGE SYSTEM 
A. H2 Cryogenic Storage (S48TK 1,  2) 
1. Support requirements 
a. D-c power (II) 
b. A-c power (In) 
2. Component 
a. S48AC valve module assembly 
b. S48A10 cryogenic control system 
c. Tank support skirt  (ME127-0039) 
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Table 67. EPS Subsystem Buildup (Cont) 
B. 02 Cryogenic Storage (S48TK 3, 4) 
1. Support requirement 
a. D-c power source (II) 
b. A-c power source (IU) 
2. Components 
a. S48A7 valve module assembly 
b. S48A11 cryogenic control system 
c. S48A4, 5 signal conditioner 
d. C22-2A202 control and display panel 
VI. EPS RADIATOR 
A. Support Requirements 
1. Fuel cell (II-D) 
2. Manifold assembly 
I 
B. Components I 
1. Space radiator ME901-0328-0002 
2. Valve assembly ME284-0319-0001 
The flexibility of the EPS control components can be attributed to their 
basically simple design. 
mounting platform for the desired device, such as a circuit breaker, motor 
switch, or diode. 
a terminal s t r ip  or connector on the assembly. 
completed by the external wiring harness. 
In many cases, the component assembly is just a 
The electrical terminals of these devices are brought to 
The circuits are then 
This design concept makes it feasible to consider the possibility of 
utilizing these components is designs other than the one for which they were 
intended. For instance, the C14A2 d-c power control box consists only of 
two motor switches and four diodes. If a heavy-duty r e l a y  is required fo r  
Some purpose, this unit probably would be able to perform the functior. 
'l-his type of philosophy, of course, depends upon the availdbility of the 
component for use. 
another unit must be obtained and a new support structure provided. 
may possibly exceed the cost  of designing a new unit. 
of these components outside the original system must be judiciously 
considered in each case. 
If the device is being used in its original circuit, 
This 
Thus, the utilization 
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Solar Cell Power Svstems. 
Solar cells offer z.n attractive alternate power source for the missions 
Currently, a study is being made on the Apollo Applica- 
Solar 
of longer duration. 
tion Program regarding the app1i;ation of solar panels to the Apollo. 
a r rays  have proven their capability on numerous spacecraft from the 
Vanguard to the Mariner programs and a r r ays  as large as 400 watts have 
been flight tested on the OGO program. 
The utilization of solar arrays incurs many mission constraints, 
however, as well as control problems that do not occur with the power 
systems previously discussed. The temperature of the panels must be held 
low, for example, to maintain the conversion efficiency of the cells. 
N / P  cells presently being used are relatively sensitive to nuclear radiation 
and protective devices, such as glass cover plates, and the avoidance of 
radiation belts need employment in order  to increase the cells' useful 
lifetime. 
also must be considered and methods of heliotroping the arrays must be 
employed. 
The 
The angle of incidence of solar radiation and the earth's albedo 
Some methods which have been used for this purpose are: 
1. Panel orientation 
2. Spacec raft Orientation 
3. Mounting cells over 360 degrees of surface 
4. A combination of two or more of the above methods. 
Furthermore, power must be maintained during eclipse periods and 
peak loads, hence a secondary battery system must be provided. 
The advantages of the solar panels lie in their inherent simplicity, 
exclusive of the orientation problem, long life, and reliability. 
of the panels can be estimated to be eight watts per square foot for earth- 
orbit missions. 
output of the 'system w i l l  have to be increased by as must as a factor of two 
t o  allow for  battery charging. 
panels have been approximately $5000 per square foot. 
that an a r r a y  approximately the output of a fuel cell (1200 watts) cost 
approximately four times as must as the fuel cell. 
The output 
If the panels are eclipsed for any appreciable time, the 
Current estimates of the price of the solar 
Thus, i t  can be seen 
No attempt has been made to design a sclar cell system for the reason 
that, primarily, it is believed that one is beyond the scope of this report, 
and additionally, the lack of a specific mission would iiiake any attempt in 
this direction relatively meaningless. 
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COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA 
The Comm /Data building blocks are intended to provide various levels 
This is, opera- of capability for a partially dependent laboratory operation. 
tion is possible only with the aid and use of a supporting GSM and its 
subsystems for certain required functions. 
levels of capabilities provided by each configuratior, iomplement . 
Data Building Block No. 1 consists of a two-wire (exclusive of power 
requirements) hardllne ar,d an Apollo CM audio center. It i.s indicated 
part  of the RCM Laboratory Comm/Data System in Figure 100. 
extends from the audio center (intercom bus) of a supporting CSM through the 
docking tunnel and into the audio center located in the Laboratory module. 
This configuration permits laboratory personnel to converse with each other 
or  with the supporting CSM crew. 
from laboratory crewmen for later dump via the CSM unified S-band equip- 
ment. S-band voice from the ground will be available to the laboratory, 
but the laboratory crew cannot transmit voice directly. 
This section presents thi-ee 
Comm/ 
The hard line 
The CSM can record voice s n  the DSE 
The audio center equipment is manufactured by Collins Radio Company 
and requires little o r  no refurbishment irom previous ilights. 
characteristics of t h e  audio center are: Weigh1 10 pounds; 5. 8H s 10. 3W s 
7. OD (inches); power consumption is 20 watts. 
cold- plate cooling. 
Phys ica l  
The audio center will requiie 
Comm/Data Building Block No. 2 (Figure 101) consists of equip- 
ment which perm s VHF RF voice communications with a supporting CSM. 
The VHF link cac also be used to communicate by voice with the ground i n  
low-altitude, earth-orbit missions, the supporting CSM, and EVA crew 
activities. Equipment required to perform these functions includes: audio 
center, VHF/AI\'_ transceiver, VHF multiplexer, and V H F  omniantennas oi 
Block I o r  11. 
interchangeable. 
I h e  Block I and II equipment varies slightly and is not 
Physical characteristics of the equipment involved are  as iollows: 
Audio Center; 10 pounds, 5. 8H s 10. 3W s 7.  OD (inches) 
Power Consumption; 20 watts dc 
VHF/AM Transceiver; 12 ?ounds, 6 .  OH s 4. 7W s 12.  UD (inches) 
Power Consumption; 40 watts dc 
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VHF mul t ip lexer ;  2 pounds, 3 . 4 H  x 4.6W x 5 .  OD ( inches)  
No power  r equ i r ed  
Antennas (each)  12. 5 pounds,  12. OH x 7. OW x 2. 5 d i a m e t e r  ( inches)  
N o  power r equ i r ed  
Instal la t ion cons t r a in t s  include the u s e  of cooling plates f o r  the audio 
c e n t e r  and the VHF/AM t r a n s c e i v e r .  B1- 11 l a b o r a t o r y  modules  wi l l  
r e q u i r e  provis ions  for mounting the  s c i m . t a r  an tennas ,  s ince  t h e s e  an tennas  
are mounted on the s e r v i c e  module in  typical  Block 11 appl icat ions.  
Al l  equipment  listed, except  the  an tennas ,  is ava i lab le  f r o m  previous  
fl ights.  
scimitar antennas are  not recoverable. 
The scimitar notch antennas are burnt beyond further u s e  and  the  
C o m m / D a t a  Building Block No. 3 (F igu re  101) provides  S-band voice,  
coherent  ranging, and up-data commands  between the  l a b o r a t o r y  and ea r th .  
In  addition, the hardline voice capabi l i ty  of Building Block No. 1 as wel l  
as t iming s igna ls  to o the r  l a b o r a t o r y  s u b s y s t e m s ,  are provided. 
channel  capac i ty  in  e x c e s s  of the  above r e q u i r e m e n t s  is also ava i lab le  f o r  
wide band and s u b c a r r i e r  implementat ion.  
f r o m  previous  Apollo f l ights  with m i n o r  r e fu rb i shmen t s ,  except  f o r  SCIN 
antennas  (Block I configurat ion)  which are not re furb ishable .  
Data- 
The  above  equipment  is ava i lab le  
Phys ica l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of the C o m m / D a t a  Building Block No. 3 
configurat ion is as follows: 
*Unified S-band equipment  (USBE); 38 pounds,  6. OH x 9.5W x 21. OD 
( inches ) 
P o w e r  consurrlption; 34 wat t s  a c ,  4 wat t s  dc  
S-band power a m p l i f i e r  ; 30 pounds,  6. OH x 5 .  75W x 22. 5D ( inches)  
P o w e r  consumption;  90 wat t s  a c ,  5 wa t t s  d c  
P re -Mod  p r o c e s s o r ;  14. 5 pounds,  6. OH x 4 . 7 W  x 10 .6D ( inches)  
Audio c e n t e r ;  7. 0 pounds,  6. O M  x 4. 7W x 8 . 7  d i a m e t e r  ( inches )  
P o w e r  consumption;  20 wat t s  d c  
Up-data l ink ;  1 9  puurids, 5. 6H x 8. 9W x 17. 7 5  d i a m e t e r  ( inches)  
SID 6 6 -  1 8 5 3 - 3  
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Power consumption: 12  watts dc 
Central timing equipment; 10 pounds, 6. OH x 4.7W x 8. OD (inches) 
Power consumption; 20 watts dc 
Ant e nna s : 
Block I SCIN (each, 2 required); weight-12.5 pounds, 
12. OH x 7. OW x 2. 5 diameter (inches) 
Block II S-band omniantenna (each, 2 required); weight-2.0 pounds, 
2. 5" diameter x 4" long 
No power required for antennas 
Components of the Comrr/Data Building Block No. 3 configuration 
will require cold-plate cooling for  all items except the antennas. 
the S-band omniantennas, which are normally mounted in the aft heat shield, 
will require new mounting provisions i f  the heat shield is not used on 
laboratory structures. 
In addition, 
Table 65 provicl.es a summary of the equipment complement in 
each building block, the manufacturer , and the means of acquisition for 
utilization on the dependent laboratory modules. 
DISPLAYS AND CONTZOLS 
Since displays and controls are a necessary function for operation of 
subsystems included in a laboratory vehicle, their number and type may be 
estimated easily f rom command module controls and displays. 
and placement of specific controls and displays is, however, a function 
of laboratory configurations , astronaut tasks , and human-factors 
consideration. 
tion study: 
The location 
Three approaches may be considered in the RChf laboratory configura- 
1. U s e  of existing panels in existing locations 
2, U s e  of existing panels in n.ew locations 
3. U s e  of new panels in  new locations 
Approach number one is wasteful of space and ignores human factors 
but Is a, least-cost approach. 
those systems installed requiring operative controls a. 3 displays. 
All panels may remain in place wi th  only 
All 
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renovat ion da ta  f o r  RCM D&C wi l l  apply with the except ion that  only r equ i r ed  
i t e m s  need be re furb ished .  
Approach number  two wi l l  r e q u i r e  re rout ing  of sh ips  wir ing  and  will  
add p r o b l e m s  in  layout but wi l l  provide added volume while  maintaining 
min imum panel  cos t .  
Tab le s  69 and 7 0  indicate  those items and the re fu rb i shmen t  r e q u i r e d  
f o r  a fully independent l abora to ry  on Blocks I and II. 
tion has  f u r t h e r  eliminated four  pane ls  whic!i r e t a in  e i t h e r  only one o r  a 
small number  of switch functions which may be eas i ly  moved to another  
pane l  with blank spaces .  
The Block I configura-  
Additional wi r ing  is r equ i r ed  at the new locat ion.  
Pane l  one of the Block II l a b o r a t o r y  configurat ion may a l s o  be e l imin -  
a t ed  by the foregoing technique. 
Approach number  t h r e e  will ,  m o s t  l ikely,  be the eventual  solution to 
the D&C layout s ince  the space  and volume requ i r emen t s ,  plus  the human 
f a c t o r s  r equ i r emen t s ,  wi l l  indicate  that  a new layout wi l l  be r equ i r ed  for 
eff ic ient  opera t ion  in  addi t ion to  new con t ro l s  r equ i r ed  by modif ied 
s u b s y s t e m s .  
INSTRUMENTATION 
Ful ly  independent bas i c  l abora to ry  ins t rumenta t ion  wi l l  be ident ical  
with that  of the  RCM (see  Sect ion IX. ). 
Additional ins t rumenta t ion  m a y  be suppl ied f r o m  a l a r g e  l i s t  of 
qualified components  which includes (but is not l imi ted  to  ): 
P r e s s u r e  
Tempe  r a t  u r e  
Vibrat ion 
Accelera t ion  
Displacement  
S t r a i n  
F requency  
Radia t icjn 
Velocity 
Vr l tage  
C 1, r r e nt 
I'h - Arid i ty  
Signal  . Jndi t ioners  
P o w e r  Supplies 
C a m e r a s  ( F i l m )  
( T V )  
Specific requi re tnents  fo r  ins t rumenta t ion  will  d e t e r m i n e  spec i f ic  
device  to d isp lay ,  r e c o r d ,  o r  t e l e m e t e r  information.  
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MDC Pan 18 
V !6-77 14 1 U 
Replace 25 togale switches 
Replace 2 conne'lors 
Rcplacc w i r e  harnesr 
Replare 13 cvcnl kldlCUOr8 
Replace MA switch 
R e p l a ~ r  L togile switrhss  
' lb-771419 Replace L ronnectors 
Replace 1 eveni  indkalor 
Replace w i r e  harnesm 
R e p k c e  26 toyale switChts 
Replace 2 ConwLLors 
Replace w i r e  harncss  
MDC R n  LI R e p h e  7 toggle s w t t i h e s  
VIb-77l221 Replace 2 Connucturs 
Replace w i r e  harness 
MDC Pan LL 
Vlb-7714LL Replace L ronnertutr 
Replace wtre harness  
R a p h i e  5 ckt breaker8 
M X  Pan 1 Y  
Mix; R a  20 
V Ib- 7714110 - .- 
Replace IO toyylr swsL<l,t~s 
MDC Pds, L3  X F u n ~ t i o n  to R n e l  I I  
V 1 b - 7 7 1 ~ 3  
MD(; Pan L4 Replace 1 &pglt: switch 
V lb-771424 Replace 2 connectors 
Replace W L I C  harness  
MDC R n  25 R a p l a ~ e  I  to^& swttLh 
Vl6-77 1425 Replace 2 connectors 
R e p k r e  uire tmr-..ss 
MDC Pan I 6  
Vlb-771426 
MDC R n  I00 X 
\ Ib-771JYL1 
MDC Pan ZOO 
V lb -77 lJ97  
X Functcon to R n e l  (1 
Replace 2 tog&le e-itches 
ReplAre L  conneL1ers 
Replare Y l r e  harnnsm 
Table 69. Renovation Requirements for Block I (CM 012 and 014) 
RChl Laboratory Displays and Controls 
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~~~ ~ 
R e p h c t  3 toggle e t c h e s  
Replace 5 caPPactors 
Replace wire harness 
Table 70. Renovation Requirements for Block II RCM Laboratory 
Die plays and Controls 
7 ~~ ~ 
V36-761011 
M D C p u r L  
L 
MDC Pan 11 
V36-762065 
U D C p m 3  
Y36-?61513 
A m C p u r I  
V36- 7610 14 
uM;Paa7  
V36-761011 
UDC-5 
V36-761015 
UDC-8 
V36-761010 
UDC-6 
V36- 7610 16 
X 
V36-7610 19 
V36- 76 1020 
MDC Pan 98 
V36-764099 
v36-764090 
Uot Required  
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Refurbish 
Replace 70 toggle switches 
Replace 19 event iDdiutors 
Replace 2 ClW indicator 
mtrices 
Replace 9 connectors 
Replace wire harness 
Replace 62 toggle switches 
Replace 21 eveat idicators 
Replace 1 N-4 switch 
Replace 10 connectors 
Replace wire harness 
R e p k c t  3 toggle switches 
Replace 4 coanutors 
Replace wire h m s s  
Remarks  
Fbctiop. to 
Rae1 z 
Requires redesign 
(engineering) for 
added fuactionn 
Etnctionr to 
Panel 8 
Replace 10 toggle switches 
Replace wire harness 
Requires minor 
redesim 
R e p k c e  5 coneectors 
- 
Replace 5 toggle switches 
Replace 2 connectors 
Replace wire  harness 
Replace 8 toggle switches 
Replace 1 connector 
Replace wire  harness I 
I NOTE: EL panel lighting m a y  be removed entirely for Lobra tory  configuration. 
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STABILIZATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM (SCS) 
The following is a summary of the systems considered feasible for 
RCM Laboratory use. 
contains reaction wheels, GE's MAGS, which use gravity-gradient torques, 
and GE control-moment gyros were reviewed but not included a s  they could 
control only small spacecraft or  were still under development. Of the 
following systems summarized below, only the Block I1 Apollo SCS and 
advanced inertial reference system a r e  considered satisfactory for control of 
an RCM Laboratory. 
components for local vertical hold, offers the easiest installation. The 
Advanced Inertial Reference System, however, offers the longest mean-time 
between failure operation and lowest power draw. 
Many other systems such as TRW's OGO, which 
The Block II Apollo SCS, while requiring additional 
Automatic Stabilization and Control System (ASCS). 
Manufacturer 
The system was manufactured by Minneapolis Honeywell, Aeronautical 
Controls Division and was used on the Mercury project. 
Description of Functional Highlights 
The -4sCS provides automatic stabilization and orientation of the 
vehicle from the time of separation until the parachute is deployed. 
sists of seven subassemblies: three rate gyros, two attitude gyros. an 
amplitude calibrator, and an acczleration switch. 
It con- 
The Mercury ASCS is considered unsatisfactory for RCM laboratory 
use because of the wide attitudc deadband and the lack of manual control. 
Functional Characteristics 
The attitude deadband is *l. 0 degrees and the rate deadband is 
*O. 5 degrees. There is no provision for manual control. 
Physical Characteristics 
No information is available as to the physical characteristics. 
In te gra tion Cons train t s 
The assemblies require cold plate cooling and thc svtisur assembly 
must be mounted so that the gyro axes a re  parallel to their rcspcctive ases. 
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Attitude Control and Maneuvering Electronics System -
The system was manufactured by Minneapolis Honeywell, Aeronautical 
Division z ~ d  was used on the Gemini project. 
Description of Functional Highlights 
The attitude control and maneuvering electronic system provides for 
The system converts rate and stabilization and control of the spacecraft. 
attitude signals from various sources to reaction control system signals. 
The system consists of five devices: (1) attitude control electronics; 
(2) power inverter; (3) two gyro packages; and, (4) orbital attitude maneu- 
vering electronics. 
Attitude e r r o r  inputs are obtained from three sources: (1) horizon 
Local vertical scanner; (2) radar; and, (3) inertial platfsrn and computer. 
capability is, therefore, incorporated. 
Functional Characteristics 
The attitude deidband of the system is f4 .0  degrees. The system 
requires 92 watts at t28 VDG. 
Physical Characteristics 
The volume is 1000 cubic inches and is contained in five packages. 
Integration Constraints 
Cooling by cold-plate is required and the gyro assembly must be 
positioned so that the gyro axes a re  positioned parallel to their respective axes. 
Lunar Module Stabilization and Control Subsystem (LM SCS) 
The system was manufactured by Minneapolis Honeywe1.1, Aeronautical 
Division as is used on the Apollo Lunar Module (Block I). 
Description of Functional Highlights 
The LM SCS provides the backup guidance to the pr imary  guidance and 
navigation system (PGNS) and also provides the control electronics interface 
between the PGNS and the reaction control system and the propulsion 
subsystem. 
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The LM SCS consists of eight assemblies and a control panek 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7 .  
8. 
Guidance coupler assembly 
Rate gyro assembly 
Attitude and translation control assembly 
Descent engine control 
Attitude controller 
Translation Controller 
Attitude controller 
Backup guidance section 
In utilizing the LM SCS Block I, consideration should be given to 
eliminating the descent engine control assembly and the translation controller. 
Functional Characteristics 
The system is designed with a goal of *O. 1-degree attitude minimum 
dead band and 70  watts of power. 
Physical Characteristics 
There is no information presently available concerning physical char- 
characteris tics 
Integration Constraints 
No information available. 
Abort Guidance Section (AGS) 
The AGS was manufactured by TRW Systems and is used on the Apollo 
lunar module (LM). 
Description of Functional Highlights 
The AGS is  a backup guidance system used on the LM and is a strapdown 
guidance system which has the capability of maintaining attitude reference, 
computing attitude errors ,  driving attitude displays, solving guidance equa- 
tions (digitally) and provicliiiy engine comnlands. 
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It consists of three assemblies: 1) abort electronics assembly (generak 
purpose digital computer), 2) abort sensor assembly (three strapdown gyros 
and three accelerometers), and 3) data entry and display assembly (display 
keyboard). 
Utilization of the AGS in the RCM laboratory would require a reaction 
jet  driver assembly. 
Functional Characteristic s 
The three scrapdown gyros provide output pulses proportional to incre- 
The sensor scale factor mental rotations of the vehicle about the body axis. 
is three a rc  seconds per pulse. 
Physic a1 Character is tic s 
The weight of the system is 61.6 pounds. It displaces a volume of 
1797 cubic inches and is contained in three assemblies with a system 
operating power of 174 watts. 
Integration Constraints 
The sensor assembly must be mounted so that the gyro axes a r e  posi- 
tioned parallel to their respective axes. 
Stabilization' and Control System (SCS) Block I 
The SCS is manufactured by Minneapolis Honeywell Aeronautical 
Ccintrols Division and is used on the Apollo Block I Command Module. 
Description of FunLtional Highlights 
It provides stabilization and control of the Apollo Block I spacecraft 
and controls the RCS and SPS, based on rate and attitude inputs from the SCS 
sensors, manual inputs, or the G&N subsystem 
The SCS consists of the following assemblies: 
1. 
2. Rate gyro package (RGP) 
3. Roll channel ECA 
4. Pitch channel ECA 
Attitude gyro and accelerometer package ( B U G  and accelerometer) 
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5. 
b. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Yaw channel ECA 
Attitude gyro coupler assembly (AGCU) 
Display AGAP ECA (DECA) 
Flight director attitude indicator (FDAI) 
Attitude set/gimbal position display (AS/GPD) 
Delta-V display panel 
SCS control panel 
?)-axis rotation control (2 each) 
Translation control (2 each) 
TVC capability is not a requirement of th RCM la bo r at o r y , the r e f o r e, 
the delta-V display ;>anel and the two translation controls and one rotation 
control can be deleted from the subsystem. 
The SCS will be capable of performing attitude hold, rate dampiit: 
and manual maneuvering, utilizing the attitude reference subsystem. h c a l  
vertical capability is provided by an orbit rate generator (4. 1 deg:ee/ 
minute). 
equipment bay and the main display panel should be reconfigured to provide 
maximum utilization of the available space. 
The orbit rate is based on a 100-mile circular orbit. The lower 
The utilization of the SCS Block I in the RCS laboratory is not recom- 
mendeti because of obsolescence, sparing capability and the fact that the units 
are not sealed and pressurized. 
Functional Characteristics 
The system has a maximum attitude deadband and a minimum attitude 
The maximum deadband is *5.0 degrees and the mini- 
The power requirements of the system a re  147 watts a t  400 Hz and 
deadband capability. 
mum deadband is *O. 2 degrees. 
second. 
1 ,O watts at t 2 8  VDC (not including valve driver power). 
The rate deadband is io. 2 degrees per 
Physical Characteristics 
The SCS weight is 212 pounds, the LEB assemblies weigh 164 pounds, 
and the controls and displays weigh 48 pounds, 
display panel, two translatioil controls, and one rotation control will rcduce 
Deletion of the delta-V 
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the SCS controls and displays weight to 33 pounds. 
would then be 197 pounds. 
The total system weight 
The volume of the total system is 4970 cubic inches. The controis and 
displa; 'r volume will be reduced by 352 cubic inches with the deletion of the 
delta-V display panel, two translation controls, and one rotation control. 
Integration Constraints 
The following assemblies require cold-plate cooling: 
1. Attitude gyro accelerometer package (ASAP) 
2. Roll channel ECA 
3. Pitch channel ECA 
4. Yaw channel ECA 
5. DisplaylAGAP ECA 
6. Attitude gyro coupler assembly (RGCU) 
7. Flight director attitude indicator (FDAI) 
The attitude gyro accelerometer package and the rate gyro package 
must be mounted so that the gyro axes are positioned parallel to their 
respective axes 
Stabilization and Control System (SCS, Block 11) 
The SCS is manufactured by Minneapolis Honeywell, Aeronautical 
Division and is used on the Bloc!: II Apollo command module. 
Description of Functional Highlights 
The SCS Block I1 provides stabilization and control of the Apollo 
Block I1 spacecraft and controls the RCS and SPS, based on the rate and 
attitude inputs from the SCS sensors, manual inputs, or the G&N subeystems. 
The SCS consists of the following assemblies: 
1. Solenoid driver assembly 
2. Control electronics assembly 
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3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Display assembly 
Gyro display coupler assembly 
TVC servo amplifier assembly 
Two gyro assemblies 
Two flight director attitude indicators 
Gimbal position and fuel pressure indicator 
Attitude set  control panel 
Two rotational hand controllers 
Translation hand controller 
G&N and TVC capability is not a requirement of the RCM laboratory, 
therf -ore, the thrust vector position servo amplifier, gimbal position/fuel 
prea sure  indicator, translation control, one rotation control, and one FDA1 
can be deleted from the equipment list. 
circuit breakers associated with SCS control should be relocated to provide 
maximum utilization of space and operational capability. A number of the 
power and mode switches and circuit breakers must be provided with remote 
control in order to apply power and, subsequently, control moding for  atti- 
tude hold and rate damping prior t - docking to the unmanned laboratory. 
The main display panel switches and 
If the vehicle is required to maintain local vertical, a means of local 
vertical attitude hold must be incorporated into the SCS. This can be 
accomplished with an o r b i t  rate generator o r  a horizon sensor. 
sensor approach affords the best accuracy and flexibility. 
The horizon 
Functional Characteristics 
The system has a maximum attitude deadband and a minimum attitude 
The 
capability. 
band is *O. 2 degrees. 
power requirements of the system are 240 watts a t  400 Hz and 250 watts at  
t 2 8  VDC. Gyros have a 2500-hour mean-time between failure. 
The maximum deadband is k 5 . 0  degrees and the minimum dl%ad- 
The rate deadband is kO.2 degrees per second. 
Physical Characteristics 
The SCS weight is 161 pounds, the LEB assemblies weigh 116 pounds, 
and the controls and displays weigh 45 pound$. Deletion of the thruct vector 
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position servo amplifier assembly from the equipment list will reduce the 
SCS LEB equipment weight to 102 pounds. 
fuel position indicator, translation control, one rotation control, and one 
FDAl will reduce the weight of the controls and displays to 33 pounds. 
total system weight would then be 135 pounds. 
Deletion of the gimbal position/ 
The 
The volume of the total system 
is: LEB 3496 cubic inches and controls and displays 1526 cubic inches. 
Deletion of the items discussed above will rqduce the LEB volume to 
948 cubic inches. 
Integration Constraints 
The iollowing assemblies require cold-plate cooling: 
1. 
2. Solenoid driver assembly (SDA) 
3. Control electronics assembly (CEA) 
4. Display electronics assembly (DEA) 
5. Gyro display coupler (GDC) 
6. 
7. Gyro assembly No. 1 
8. Gyro assembly No. 2 
Th 
Flight director attitude indicator (FDAI) 
/ 
Thrust vector position servo amplifier assembly (SAA) 
gyro assemblies must be mcunted so that the gyro axes are PO 
tioned parallel to their respective axes. 
Advanced Inertial Reference System 
The system is inanufactured by the Autonetics Division of North 
i- 
American Aviation, Inc. 
date. 
It has not been utilized on any specific program to 
Des c ripti on of Functional Highlights 
The system consists of an inertial reference assembly (IRA) utilizing 
an  air-bearing gyro assembly (Autonetics GlOB gyros) and a control electron- 
ics assembly. 
attitude hola. 
.'* ,mal control capability can be incorporated. 
ot 
driver assembly must be added to the existing configuration. 
A horizon sensor can be incorporated for local vertical 
The mean time between fai lure  of the gyro is 140,000 hours. 
As in other systems, a means 
A reaction jet  emote control of power and mode control will be  required. 
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The inertial reference assembly is capable of maintaining a maximum 
drift of less than one a r c  degree per hour. 
presently mechanized for a high thrust of *O. 5 degrees per second and a low 
thrust of io. 3 degrees per second. 
The control electronics a r e  
The power requirements for  the inertial reference assembly and the 
control electronics assembly are: Inertial Reference Assembly, 30 watts 
at 300 RPS gyro speed; 1 watt a t  20 RPS gyro speed; control electronics 
assembly, 9. 5 watts maximum; 5. 0 watts average. 
Physical Characteristics 
The inertial reference assembly weighs 14 pounds and the controls 
electronics assembly weighs 3 pomds. 
inches and the volume of the latter is 128 cubic inches. 
The volume of the former is 539 cubic 
Integration Constraints 
With this system, the temperature must be maintained within a range 
of between 30 ana 110 begrees fahrenheit. 
The IRA must be mounted so that the gyro axes a re  positioned parallel 
to their respective ases. 
REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM 
The fully dependent RCM Laboratory, by definition, contains no rezction 
control system (RCS). 
with which it is docked. 
It depends for attitude control and rotation on the CSM 
A fully independent lzboratory, on the other hand, must have an RCS 
compatible with both the configuration and mission of the RCM. 
of these parameters is adequately known, no final system concept can be 
chosen. However, parametric data can be developed which car  be used to 
optimize RCS design as the vehicle and its potential mission became better 
known. The following procedure has been used to develop th i s  data: 
Since neither 
1. A configuration has  bee? assumed for a maximum weight RCM 
fully independent laborhtory in order to calculatc inertias for 
comparing the performanct of candidate RCS concepts. 
2. Basic equations to determine the propellant required to provide 
attitude hold and rotational capability to such a vclricle were 
developed. 
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missions were assumed. 
4. A series of Candidate RCS concepts was developed and the para- 
metric capabilities de scribed. 
The system weights necessary for candidate systems to perform 
assumed missions were calculated. 
Implications of the calculations are discussed. 
5. 
6. 
Assumed Configuration 
(1) a forward end consisting of a truncated cone with diameters of 36 and 
230 inches, an a!%ude of 120 inches, and a uniformly distributed mass of 
8000 lb; (2) a cylindrical center section (RCM systems) 230 inches in diameter 
and 36 inches high with a uniformly distribcted mass of 5000 lb; and (3) a 
cylindrical aft section (experiments) 230 inches in diameter and 60 inches 
high with a uniformly distributed mass of 12,000 lb. 
The fully independent RCM Laboratory is assumed to have (Figure 102): 
The momeats of inertia for such a laboratory a r e  given in Table 71. 
Also given a re  moments for a total system consisting of this laboratory 
docked with a 23,134-pound (Spacecraft 103 type) CSM containing 3000 pounds 
of resiiual service propulsion system (SPF’ propellant. 
Bzsic Equations 
Attitude Hold 
When a vehicle is being maintained within a certain attitude deadband, 
an angular impulse (Lt) is applied whenever the deadband is approached to 
change attitude by @a): 
ACI = (Lt) in. -1bf-sec (32. 17) ft-lbm/sec2-lbf (180/a) deg/radian (1) 
where 
Lt = 
I =  
A U =  
2 ( I )  lbm-ft (12 inch/ft. ) (1/3600) %our/sec. 
552.960 Lt/I deg/hour 
qRFt ,  the number of thrusters firing ( g )  times their effective 
moment a rm (R, inches) times their individual thrust  (F, lbf) 
times the action Lime (t, sec) 
2 
moment of inertia (lbm-ft ) 
change in  angular velocity (deg/hour). 
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Figure 102. Inertial hlass Characteristics of the Fully Independent 
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0.3004 
0.1185 
0. 1512 
0.912 
1.2095 
0.052 1 
9. 363 
Table 71. Fully Independent Laboratory Moments of Inertia 
0.3004 
0.1185 
0..1512 
0.912 
1.1863 
0.0593 
'.. 348 
Mass 
Code Subsystem (1b) 
A Experiments 12,000 
B Systems 5,000 
C Lab CM 8,000 
D Lab total 25,000 
E CSM 23,131 
F SPS 3.000 
propellant 
G System total 51, 134 
Sample Calculations: 
Center of Gravity 
(in. 1 
- 
X 
1296 
1248 
1195 
1254 
97 8 
90 5 
- 
1110 - 
Y 
0 
-2.6 
7.7 
-1. 1 
2 
0 
7 . 5  
5.7 
+3.7 
Inertia 
(Lbm Ft2 x 
0.561 
0.2295 
0.2175 
1.008 
0.4227 
0.0488 
1.488 
-6 - -  lZooo (9.503)' x = 0.516 x 10 LBM FTZ 
I X A  - 2  
2 
%A = 'ZA = 12000 ( - t - $ ) =  12000 (22.95 t 2.08) = 
- 
= 11296 (12000) t 1248 (5000) t 1195 (8000)~125000 = 1254 xD 
IyD = IzD = 0.3004 t 0.1185 t 0. 1602 t 6 112000 (1296 - 1254)' 
144 x 10 
t 5000 (1248 - 1254)' t 8000 (1195 - 1254)' I 
- 0.5701 t 49.201144 = 0.912 
- 
= 11254 (25000) t 978 (23134) t 905 (300o)l /51134 = 1109 xG 
*YG = 0.912 t 1.2095 t 0.0521 t 125000 (1254 - 1109) 2 144 x IO6 
t 23134 (1109 - 980)2 t 3000 (I109 - 9 0 5 ) ~ J  
= 2.173 t 1035.41 144 = 9. 363 
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The average rotational velocity will only be half this amount, or 276.480 
Lt/I  degrees per hour. 
degrees, the thrusters will be actuated every 2 8  degrees of rotation, and the 
firing frequency (ff) will be: 
If attitude is t5 be controlled to plus or  minus 
265,231 Lt/I 
2 8  ff = 
= 138,240 Lt/I bursts per hour. 
Since the impulse per burst is (qf t  lbf-sec), at a specific impulse 
(lbf-sec/lbm) the propellant consumption (Ca) is: 
(nft) (138,240 nRft/IB) 
S Ca = 
= 138,240 112RktZ/Ie S lbm/hour. 
Since the propellant requirement is proportional to the square of the 
n&nimum impulse bit (nFt) applied by a system, propellant expenditure can 
be excessive if this minimum impulse bit is too great for the system inertia 
(I). 
hold be accomplished with single thrusters (q = 1). Since a configuration has 
been assumed (Table 7 l), propellant requirements for the independent lab- 
oratory (ca i) and the laboratory/CSM system (Cas), to maintain attitude 
about all three axes can be calculated: 
To increase freedom in thruster selection it will be required that attitude 
2 = 0.4403 (ft) (R)/8S lbm/hcw 
' I  1 +-+ -  1.488 9. 363 9. 348 - (0. 13824)( lo6) ( 1)2 (ft)' ( r)  ( 1 0 5  Cas = 
2 = 0. 12245 (ft) (R)/OS lbml'hour 
From the above it should be clear that a system designed to maintain 
attitude for the laboratory/CSM may  be unsuitable to maintain attitude of the 
laboratory alone. 
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Rotation 
The propellant required to initiate and conclude pitch, yaw, and roll 
rotation depends on the rotation rate desired, which i n  turn depends on the 
time one is willing to wait  to complete a rotation. It shall be assumed that 
a rate of 0.3 degree per second (1080 degrees per hour) is satisfactory. 
This would permit 90 degrees of rotation in five minutes, assuming that 
thruster on-time is negligible compared to coast time. 
required to initiate such a maneuver can be obtained by setting the (Au) in 
Equation 1 equal to 1080 degrees per hour: 
The thruster on-time 
= 0.0019531 I/(nRF) (1080) (I) 
(552,960) (nRF) 
t =  
Since a complete rotation requires an equal impulse (nFt) to stop as 
well  as start rotation, the propellant requirement (Cr) for a system of specific 
impulse (S) is: 
Cr = 2n Ft/S = 0.0039062 I/RS lbm. (7) 
Since inertias have been assumed, it is easy to calculate the propellant 
required per set (one pitch, one yaw, one roll) of rotations for the independent 
laboratory (Cri) and the laboratory/ CSM system (Crs): 
(8 )  
6 Cri = (0.0039062) (2.832 x 10 )/Rs = l1,062/RS lbm/set 
( 9) 
6 Crs = (0.0039062) (20.199 x 10 )/RS = 73,9Ol/RS lbm/set 
It should be noted that the rotational propellant requirement is inversely 
proportional to moment radius, and ;he attitude hold requirement (Equation 3) 
directly proportional. 
Minimum Thrust and Impulse Criteria 
A minimum acceptable rotation rate has been assumed to be one that 
permits a 90-degree rotation in 5 minutes (ignoring acceleration/deceleration 
transients). Assume i t  is desired to spend not more than about 1/4 this time 
in acceleration and 1/4 in deceleration, with a t  least 1/2 the time used for the 
coast period between. If two thrusters a r e  firing a s  a couple, the force from 
each thruster must be (from Equation 6): 
6 
( 10) 0.0019531 I - (0.001953 1) (9.363 x 10 ) ~ 1. o6 Ibf - RT 2 (115 inches} (75  seconds) F =  
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Apparently a 1.0 lbf thruster is the minimum that can be used effectively 
with the laboratory CSM combination, even at a full 115-inch moment radius. 
If it is assumed that a 10-millisecond valve-open time is about the smallest 
desirable, 0.010 lbf-sec becomes the smallest minimum impulse bit for 
calculation. 
Mission As sumption 
Mission A: Laboratory Alone 
The initial guideline in this study was that the RCS would only be used 
when the independent laboratory was separated from the CSM and unmanned, 
but that it might be required to support experiments during that period. 
Accordingly, it was assumed that the RCS would supply the following over a 
30-day mission period: 
1. Attitude hold in all three axes at *0.2 degrees deadband (the limit 
of the Apollo SCS). 
2. Two rotations about each axis daily. 
The propellant requiremcnt (CA) for Mission A can then be obtained 
from Equations 4 and 8 as: 
2 
0.4403 (ft) (R) lbm ) t(",","" (60 sets) (11) ' A = (  S 
2 
= ( l /S )  (1585.1 (ft) R t 663,72O/R) lbm 
Where 
S = specific impulse (ft-lbf/lbm) 
(ft) = minimum impulse bit (lbf-sec) "7 
R = moment radius (inches) 
Mission B: Laboratory and Laboratory-CSM 
Midway in this study it was stated that the unmanned laboratory would 
not need attitude control to support experiments when i t  was separated from 
the CSM (although some rough control to prevent tumbling seemed desirable). 
The independent laboratory RCS, however, would be required to provide 
attitude control to the overall laboratory-CSM system for experimental 
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purposes while they were docked together. To simulate these conditions, the 
following mission (Mission B) is assumed: 
1. Attitude hold of the laboratory alone in three axes at *5. 0 degrees 
deadband for  30 days. 
2. Two rotations of the laboratory about each axis daily for 30 days. 
3. Attitude hold of the laboratory-CSM system i n  three axes at  
*O. 2 degrees deadband for 30 days. 
4. Two rotations of the total system about each axis daily for 30 days. 
The propellant requirement (CB) for Mission B can then be obtained 
from Equations 4, 5, 8 and 9 as: 
0*4403 12245 (ft)2 (R/S) (720) t (1 1,062 + 78,901) (l/RS) (60) 
'B=[  5.0  + 0.2 1 
( 12) 
2 
= ( l / s )  (504.2 ( f t )  R + 5,39?,800/R) lbm. 
Candidate Reaction Control Svstems 
Compressed ("Co?d") Gas 
The simplest reaction control system consists of a tank of compressed 
gas, pressure regulator, control valve(s), and simple supersonic nozzle(s). 
While low in specific impulse, such systems have proved reliable on space 
vehicle s . 
The specific impulse of a compressed gas acting through a converging- 
diverging nozzle' may be estimated: 
where 
(ACD), which corrects for nozzle half angle and discharge coefficient, 
is taken a s  0.95 
the thrust coefficient, is available in tables as a function of 'lt" 
and expansion ratio c (the latter assumed to be 50).  cF' 
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T, the "chamber temperature" is assumed 70 F 
R = 1545 ft-lbf/mol deg R 
g = 32. 17 ft-lbm/sec2-lbf 
M is molecular weight in lbm/mol 
k = C  / C  
P V  
While this expression assumes a perfect gas and a constant value for 
%, I '  it is useful for comparative purposes. 
the specific impulse available from 30 simple gases. A more important 
figure, however, is the impulse available from each pound of total gas-plus- 
container. 
It was used (Table 72) to calculate 
This may be obtained from: 
Where C is an expression for tank mass (lbm per mol of gas) required to 
provide a 50 percent margin over ultimate strength (1. 5 safety factor) at an 
assumed maximum temperature of 170 F. C equals 41.32 for oxygen and 
hydrogen (steel tank of 180,000 psi ultimate strength and 0.283 density) and 
26.445 for all other gases (titanium tank of 160,000 psi ultimate strength 
and 0. 161 density). 
Application of this equation to the gases of Table 72 produces the fol- 
lowing approximate system specific impulses: 
1. About 43.0 for methyl ether, propane, and silane. All are 
flammable and somewhat toxic, and the first two liquify a t  
temperatures (-13 and -48 F) to be expected iL the expansion 
process . 
2. About 37.2 and 36.3 for carbon dioxide and nitrogen, respectively, 
both nontoxic znd nonflammable gases. 
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While silane (SiH4) and carbon dioxide both deserve further analysis, 
nitrogen is chosen for further calculation because its use is well established 
in space systems. 
of nine feet (108 inches) and a minimum impulse bit of 0.01 lb-sec, the 
nitrogen-plus-tank mass would be (from Equations I f  and 12): 
If it can be dischar; d using an effective moment radius 
Mission A: 170 lb 
Mission B: 1377 lb 
Easentially all of this mass is used for rotation, with attitude hold 
consuming less  than a pound in each mission. 
increased by some factor (for example, by extendable reaction arms), the 
gas-plus-tank mass required would be reduced by the same factor. 
If the moment radius can be 
"Tridyne" Catalyzed Gas Mixture 
In the "Tridyne" concept being developed by Rocketdyne Division of NAA 
(References 19 and ZO), propulsion is provided by a gas mixture of the 
following type: 
Component I Mol Fraction 1 Mass Fraction 
Nitrogen 
Oxygen 
Hydrogen 
Total 
0.85 
0.10 
0. 05 
1.00 
0.9297 
0.0625 
0.0078 
The gas mixture has been shown to be non-explosive in these propor- 
tions. When the mixture is passed ovez MFSA catalyst (Engelhard 
Industries, Inc. ), the hydrogen is oxidized and the mixture increases to about 
1500 F, providing a specific impulse of about 150 lbf-sec/lbm when passed 
through a supersonic nozzle. Compositions providing temperatures and 
specific impulses much higher than this present problems not only because 
explosive limits are approached, but also because catalyst life begins to 
deteriorate rapidly a t  about 1700 F. 
For short firing times (less than 0. 2 second for a cold system) much of 
the relezsed heat energy must be used to heat the catalyst. For attitude hold, 
then, the specific impulse should be calculated from the constituent m a s s  
fractions and the cold gas specific impulse values of Table 72. 
- 350 - 
SID 66- 1853-3 
-- I NORTH A M E R I C A N  AVIP  
Table ?; 
I Gas 
Hydrogen (HZ) 
He1 ium (He 
Methane (CH4) 
Ammonia (NH ) 3 
Neon (Ne)  
Acetylene (C2H2) 
Nitrogen (N ) 
Ethylene (C2H4) 
Ethane (CzH6) 
Methylamine (CH3NH2) 
2 
Oxygen (02) 
Si lane (SiH4) 
Argon (Ar )  
Propane (C3H8) 
Carbon Dioxide (GO2) 
Nitrous Oxide (N20) 
Methyl Ether  (C2H60) 
Methyl Chloride (CH3Cl) 
Cyanogen (C2N2) 
hobutane (C4Hlo) 
Ethyl Chloride (C2H5C1) 
Freon 23 ( CHF3 ) 
Krypton (Kr )  
Freon 22 (CHC1F2) 
Freon 14 (CF4) 
Molecular Weight 
(Lbm/Lbmol) 
2.016 
4.003 
16.042 
17.032 
20,183 
26.036 
28.016 
28. C52 
30.068 
31.058 
32.000 
32.092 
39.944 
44.094 
44.01 
44.016 
46.068 
50.491 
52.036 
58.12 
64.517 
70.018 
83.7 
86.475 
88.01 
104.47 
120.93 
131.3 
148.93 
154.48 
- 
k=CP/CV 
@ 70°F 
1.408 
1.66 
1.316 
1.317 
1.642 
1.233 
1.40 
1.180 
1.220 
1.185 
1.40 
1.146 
1.67 
1.130 
1. 304 
1. 311 
1.110 
1.200 
1.256 
1.110 
1.190 
1.191 
1.689 
1.184 
1.159 
1.145 
1.137 
1 666 
1.135 
1.091 
- 
cF 
Q E=50 
1.69 
1.55 
1.74 
1.74 
1.55 
1.79 
1.69 
1.83 
1.81 
1.83 
1.69 
1.87 
1.55 
1.89 
1.74 
1.74 
1.93 
1.82 
1.76 
1.91 
1.83 
1.83 
1.54 
1.84 
1.86 
1.87 
1.89 
1.55 
1.89 
1.92 
ISP  
(Lbf-Sec/Lbm) 
Freon 13 (CC1F3) 
Freon 12 (CCl2F2) 
Xenon (Xe) 
Freon 13B1 (CBrF3) 
Freon 115 (C2C1F5) 
263.5 
157.2 
98.5 
95.4 
71.9 
81. 0 
70.6 
81.2 
76.5 
77.0 
66. 1 
78. 5 
51.0 
67.9 
59.5 
59.5 
68.4 
59.9 
56.0 
60.4 
53.4 
51. 3 
34.9 
46.5 
47.0 
43.4 
41.0 
28.2 
36.9 
37.3 
Isp ( s y s )  
(Lbf-Sec/Lb 
~ 
12.23 
20.7 
37.2 , 
37.3 
31. 2 
40. 3 
36.3 
41.2 
40. 5 
41.6 
28.8 
43.0 
30. 7 
42.4 
37.2 
37.2 
43.4 
39.2 
37.2 
41.5 
37.8 
37.2 
26.6 
35.6 
36.1 
34.6 
33.6 
23. 4 
31.4 
31. 8 
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Table ?2.. RCS Concepts arid Their  Character is t ics  
ISP 
( L b f - S e c / L b m )  
~~ 
263.5 
157.2 
98.5 
95.4 
71.9 
81.0 
70.6 
81.2 
76. 5 
77.0 
66.1 
78.5 
51.0 
67.9 
59.5 
59.5 
68.4 
59.9 
56.0 
60.4 
53.4 
51.3 
34.9 
46.5 
47.0 
43.4 
41.0 
28.2 
36.9 
37.3 
e, melts at -70 
ISP (SYS) 
( L b f - S e c / L b m )  
~~ 
12.23 
20.7 
37.2 
37. 3 
31. 2 
40. 3 
36. 3 
41.2 
40. 5 
41.6 
28. 8 
43.0 
30. 7 
42.4 
37.2 
37.2 
43.4 
39. 2 
37.2 
41.5 
37.8 
37.2 
26.6 
35.6 
36.1 
34.6 
33.6 
23. 4 
31.4 
31.8 
Isp ( s y s )  
Rank 
30 
29 
14 
1 1  
24 
8 
17 
6 
7 
4 
26 
2 
25 
3 
14 
14 
1 
9 
14 
5 
10 
14 
27 
19 
18 
20 
21 
28 
23 
22 
at 5.2 atmospheres 
F r e e z i n g  
P o i n t  'F 
-434 
-458 
- 296 
-128 
-416 
-114 
- 346 
-272 
- 278 
-135 
-361 
-301 - 309 
-305 
x 
-152 
-2L6 
-154 
- 18.3 
-230 
-218 
- 247 
-251 
- 256 
-299 
-295 
-252 
- 169 
-270 
-159 
B o i l i n g  
P o i n t  OF 
-423 
-452 
-259 
- 2& 
-41 0 
-119 
-320 
-155 
-127 
t 19.8 
- 297 
-170 
-302 
- 48 
x 
-129 
- 12.8 
- 1 1  
- 6.1 
t 14.5 
-t 53.9 
-1 16 
- 241 
- 41 
-198 
-115 
- 21.6 
-164 
- 73 
- 37.? 
- 
Toxic 
? 
N o  
No 
Y e s  
Y e s  
N o  
Y e s  
N o  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
N o  
Y e s  
N o  
Y e s  
N o  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e a  
Y e s  
- 
- 
Fire H a z a r d  
? 
Y e s  
N o  
Y e s  
Y e s  
No 
Y e s  
No  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
N o  
Y e s  
No 
Y e s  
N o  
N o  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  
N o  
Y e s  
Yes 
Yes 
Y e 3  
No 
Y e s  
Y e s  
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I = (0.9297)(70. 6) t (0.0625)(77. 0) t (0. 0078)(263. 5) = 72. 5 (15) 
SP 
The gas must be stored in a steel tank, which would weigh about 
1. 613 lb per lb of gas, 
therefore is about 57.41 as a hot gas  and 27. 74 as a cold gas. 
mass" required for the reference missions can be computed from Equations 11 
and 12 as 
The "system specific impulse" of the tank-plus-gas 
The llsystem 
Mission A: 
2 
'A - 27.74 (108)( 57. 41) 
- (1555. 1)(0. 01) (108) + h63' 720 = 108 lbin 
Mission B: 
2 
(17)  
- (504. 2)( 0. 0 1) (108) 5* 397, 8oo = 871 lbm 
'B - 27.74 (108)( 57. 41) 
Even when a modest adjustment for the mass of catalyst and its con- 
tainer (about 1. 1 lb) is made, the Tridyne concept looks much better than 
nitrogen cold gas,  and adds very little in complexity. However, it is not 
space- rated and requires considerable development efiort. 
Catalyzed Hydrazine 
A recent S&ID report (Reference 21)  states that anhydrons hydrazine, 
expanded through a 50: 1 nozzle, h a s  theoretical vacuum specific impulses 
varying between 2 13 and 248, depending on the dent of dissociation 
(between 100 and 40 percent, respectively, ) of the product ammonia. 
hydrazine freezes at t34. 5 F, its thermal control would pr 
design difficulties to the RCM laboratory. A mixture of 31 percent water 
and 69 percent N2H4 by weight, however, freezes at -63 F; it is reported 
possible to debiign a catalyst system for use with such a mixturc which would 
have only 20 percent IVH3 dissociation and would have a thec;i > ika l  Isp of 
about 190. 
be used arbitrarily as the I 
Since 
ent serious 
This efficiency would not be realized in an actual system; 175 will 
for firings of several seconds o r  more. SP 
Greater ammonia dissociation would be expected for very short pulses. 
Assuming it would be 50 percent, then: 
3 N2H4 - 4 NH3 t N2 t 144, 300 Btu 
2 NH;- N, t 3 H, - 39,600 Btu 
3 N2H4 2 NH3 t 2 N2 'r 3 H2 t 104,700 Btt1 
(96 LBM) (34 LBM) (5b LBM) ( 6  LBM) 
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35.4 lb  
i. 2 lb 
Such a mixture at 70 F expanding as a cold gas should have an Isp (using the 
cold gas specific impulses of Table 72) oi: 
285.7 lb  
56 6 34 (95.4) t ~ ( 7 0 . 6 )  I - (263.5) = 91.4 lbf sec/lbm 96 96 
(3) LEM fuel tanks (104 lb capacity each) 
Gemini RCS helium tank 
Since the mixture is only 69 percent N2H4 in the worst case assumption, the 
H20 does not contribute to specific impulse. 
30. 5 lb  
2 . 2  lb 
I (mixture) = (0.69) (91.4) = 63.0 
SP 
The propellant mass required for the assumed mission can then be 
calculated using expressions similar to Equations 21 and 22. This only 
represents propellant, and the total mass which logically should be compared 
with the gas-plus-tank mass of a coi; gas or Tridyne system is found as 
follows: 
I MissionA I Mission B 
(1) CM KCS fuel tank (45 lb capacity) 
(3) -4pollo RCS helium tanks 
Hel:*irn 
Fue l  solenoid valve( I) 
Catalyst and containers 
Total mass 
0. 2 
1. 0 
1. 1 
47. 1 
16.5 l b  
1. 5 
2 . 0  
1. 1 
337.3 
Hydrazine systems of this type have been extensively developed, 
although not man-rated. 
1. 0 Ibf engine (RRC-TA1 5-001) that might be used in the system, but further 
qualification and perhaps flight testing would be required. 
Rocket Research Corporation has developed a 
SSD 66- 1853-3 
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90 Percent Hydrogen Peroxide 
Reaction control was provided to the Mercury capsule by decomposition 
of 90 percent hydrogen peroxide. 
Mercury is reported to achieve a steady state specific impulse of 157 at 
1.0 lb thrust, and to have a n  ISp of about 80 a t  its standard pulse width of 
0. 15 second when the catalyst was cold (i. e. , cold minimum impulse bit 
about 0. 0764). 
Equations 6 and 7: 
The Bell Model 8050 engine used in 
Propellant requirements can then be calculated from 
Mission A: 
-J 
- (1585. 1) (0 .  0764)& (108) 663720 
'A - 80 ( 157) (108) 
= 12. 5 t 39. 1 = 51.6 lbm 
Mission B: 
- (504.2) (0.0764)' (108) + 5 397 800 
'B - 80 (157) (108) 
= 4. 0 t 318. 3 = 322. 3 lbm. 
System mass for comparison purposes would then be: 
Hydrogen peroxide 
Mercury "Manual" toroidal tanks 
(2) at 30 l b  capacity each 
(1 1) a t  30 lb capacity each 
Apollo RCS helium tanks at  5.5 lb each 
Helium 
Valves 
Cat a1 y s t and cont aine r s 
Total Mass 
Mission A 
51. 6 l b  
19. 8 lb 
5. 5 lb 
0. 5 
2.0 
1. 1 
80. 5 
Mission B 
322.3 l b  
37. 7 l b  
16. 5 l b  
1. 5 
4.0 
1. 1 
443. 1 
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Bipropellant Systems 
Storable bipropellant systems such as those used for reaction control 
on the Apollo command and service modules, LEM, and Gemini, provide a 
natural design alternative for the fully independent RCM Laboratory. 
prime criterion for the suitability of such systems is the steady state and 
pulsed performance available from existing qualified engines. 
itemizes the more important reaction engines of suitable site (5 to about 
200 lb thrust) that have been used with storeable bipropellants in significant 
man-rated o r  space-rated systems: 
A 
Table 73 
Table 73. Available Bipropellant Engines 
Application 
Apollo CM RCS 
Apollo S M  RCS 
and LEM RCS 
Gemini RCS 
Gemini OAMS 
Agena and Agena-GTV 
Secondary Propulsion 
Systems 
Surveyor 
Advent 
Titan 111 Tr-nstage 
Attitude Control 
Type Engine 
Ablative 
Radiation cooled 
Ablative 
Ablative 
Radiation cooled 
Re generatively 
cooled 
Radiation cooled 
Ablative 
Thrust Level 
(vacuum) 
88. 3 lb  min. 
100 lb 
23.0 lb 
23. 0 lb, 79.0 lb 
94. 5 lb  
16 lb, 200 lb 
Throttleable 
(30-104 lb) 
25 l b  
25 lb 
45 lb  
Manufacture r 
Roc ke tdyne 
Marquar dt 
Rocketdyne 
Roc ke tdy ne 
Bell 
Thiokol RMD 
Marquar dt 
Rocket dyne 
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Ablative engines a r e  desirable for reentry conditions where radiation 
cooling is not feasible, ar,d aAe  best suited to shorter total firing times that 
do not exceed the cooling capability of the ablative material. 
of the ablative engines to the RCM Laboratory application can only be 
assessed when more is known of potential mission requirements. 
cooled engines are lighter and should be suitable for the environmental 
requirements of the most probable RCM Laboratory missions. 
The suitability 
Radiation 
The Marquardt 100-lb thrust engine used on the Apollo service module 
ar!d LM RCS has I steady state specific impulse of about 270, and a specific 
impulse of about 135 at a minimum impulse bit of about 0.5 lbf-sec when 
operated by the Apollo stabilization and control system (SCS). Equations 11 
and 12 can be used bo obtain the propellant requirement: 
Mission A: 
- 1585.1 (0. 5)2R 663720 
‘A - 135 270R 
= 2.935R t 2458lR 
= 317.0 t 22.8 = 339.8 lbm. at R = 108 in. 
Mission B: 
!;504.2) (0. 5)‘R + 5397800 - 
‘B - 135 270R 
= 0.9337R t 19992IR 
= 100.8 t 183.1 = 285.9 lbm a t  R = 108 in. 
Clearly the high thrust level and minimum impulse bit of the S M  RCS 
engine results in undesirably high propellant consumption for attitude hold 
(and the rotational velocities in attitude hold are greater than may be desired 
for some experiments). 
reduce the effective moment arm. (This slows the rotation rate and there- 
fore reduces the frequency at which the engines must fire. ) If Equation 20 
is differentiated with respect to R and set  equal to zero, 
One way to reduce propellant requirements is to 
2 -- - 0 = 2.935 - 2458/R dCA 
dR 
\ 
R = (2458/2.935)ll2 = 28.94 
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When the moment a r m  is decreased from 108 inches to 28.94 inches, 
4 propellant requirement for Mission A is reduced from 339.8 to 169.9 lb, 
equally divided in use between attitude hold and rotation. This reduction may 
be achieved either by placing the engines closer to the center of gravity or by 
turning them so that only a small sine function of thrust is effective. 
same change would increase the propellant required for Mission B from 
285. 9 to 717.8 lb. 
The 
A better solution seems to be the use of an engine of smaller thrust. 
Two radiation-cooled engines a r e  available: the 16-lb engine used in the 
Agena-GTV secondary propulsion system, and the 25-lb engine used in the 
Advent program. If the minimum impulse bit can be assumed proportional 
to engine thrust, the propellant requirement using the Agena engine should 
be: 
Mission A: 
3 
Mission B: 
"System masses" for comparison with cold gas  and monopropellant 
systems are  a s  follows: 
I Component Mass, LB 
Engine I SM RCS 
Mission 
Moment a rm 
Oxidizer 
Oxidizer tankage 
Fuel 
Fuel tankage 
Helium tankage 
Helium 
Propellant valves 
A 
108" 
194.4 
11. 5 
145.4 
18. 3 
11.0 
1.0 
3.0 
A 
28. 94" 
104.5 
9 . 2  
65.3 
8.3 
5. 5 
0.5 
2.0 
I 384*6 I 195*3 System mass 
B 
108" 
180.4 
11.5 
105.5 
11.5 
11.0 
1.0 
2.0 
322.9 
A 
A 
108" 
20.3 
3.5 
11.4 
' 3.5 
2.2 
0.2 
2.0 
43.1 
!na 
B 
108" 
129.6 
9 . 2  
65.2 
8.3 
5. 5 
0 . 5  
2.0 
220.3 
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Bipropellant Components 
Although certain assumptions on propellant tank sizes have been made 
to arrive at the foregoing mass comparisons, component selection and sys- 
tem design cannot really begin until the mission requirements are better 
understood. 
able from the Apollo, LM, Gemini, and Agena programs. 
of similar design (titanium shell and teflon bladder) qualified for bipropellants 
a r e  available in a wide range of sizes (440 to 3900 cubic inch capacity). For 
missions longer than 30 days, however, the adequacy of this tank design has 
not been demonstrated. Some alternative tank design such as the bellows 
concept used on the Agena-GTV secondary propulsion system may be neces- 
sary for longer missions. 
However, a range of qualified, man- rated components is avail- 
Propellant tanks 
Steel and titanium spherical pressure vessels for compressed gases 
a r e  available in a wide range of sizes. 
lators, and similar components would be made, where possible, from exist- 
ing space- rated systems. Such selection, however, requires a knowledge of 
the mission and the expected thermal environment and a careful analysis of 
the extent of qualification of available components which is beyond the scope 
of the present effort. 
Selection of valves, pressure regu- 
Summary of Analysis 
System Mass Comparisons 
The "system mass" required to perform the two assumed missions 
with the several RCS concepts discussed above are summarized in Table 74. 
Table 74. System Mass Comparisons 
I System Mass Required 
RCS Concept t3zGzz 
C o mpr e s s e d nitrogen 
Tridyne (catalyzed N2-02-H2 mixture) 
Catalyzed hydrazine (69/31 mixture with water) 
Hydrogen peroxide (902) 
Bipropellant, using 100-lb SM RCS engine 
Bipropellant, using 16-lb Agena engine 
170 
109 
47 
80 
38 5*< 
43 
Mission B 
1377 
872 
337 
433 
323 
220 
~~ ~~~ ~~ 
$195 lbm when moment radius is reduced to 29 inches. 
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The "system mass" totaled includes the propellant, pressurizing gas, 
catalyst, and containers for them, plus control valves for the liquid propel- 
lants. The totals do hot include gas regulation components (pressure regu- 
lator, check valves, relief valves, etc. ), fill/vent provisions, and fluid 
tubing, all  of which should be somewhat comparable for all  systems. 
totals also do not include thxuster mass, which will vary from the 3- to 5-lbm 
per liquid engine down to a much more modest mass for the simpler 1.0-lbf 
gas or monopropellant thrusters. 
The 
Discussion 
Compressed gas systems a r e  attractive because oc thtrr extreme 
simplicity and because they avoid the problem of prope-dit  freezing. 
only attitude control of a fairly stable system (even a large one) is required, 
they represent a good solution. However, when many rotational maneuvers 
of a system with substantial inertia is required, the low specific impulse of 
compressed gases soon causes mass requirements to become excessive. . 
The Tridyne concept offers the same advantages at about 2/3 the mass 
requirement, but the concept is still in the developmental stage. 
Where 
The catalyzed hydrazine system is attractive from a mass require- 
ment standpoint, and the concept has been extensively developed. 
additional testing would be required, especially if use of a hydrazine-water 
mixture was chosen to minimize the freezing problem. 
peroxide system was man-rated on Project Mercury, but the components a r e  
out of production and some replacement probably would be necessary for the 
toroidal propellant tanks, which would be hard to locate and insulate. These 
factors, together with the lower performance of the peroxide system, make 
it seem a less desirable choice than catalyzed hydrazine. 
Some 
The hydrogen 
A storeable bipropellant system offers the best specific impulse of the 
choices considered, and therefore potentially the lowest system mass. 
ever, a system employing the large (100-lbf) engines used on the Apollo SM 
and LM RCS appears too powerful for efficient long-term narrow-deadband 
attitude control. 
however, mass requirements a r e  reduced dramatically. 
HOW- 
When the smaller 16-lbf Agena engine is substituted, 
Conclusion 
It appears from this analysis that a bipropellant system employing an 
engine of modest thrust (such a s  the 16-lb engine used in the Agena GTV) is 
the most efficieni, lightest concept for the missions assumed. While use of 
the Apollo SM RCS feed system with this engine has been assumed for pre- 
liminary pricing purposes, use instead of the Agena components and system 
should be considered in  a further phase. 
bellows- type propellant tanks may be desirable a s mission durations exceed 
30 days. 
In particular, use of the Agena 
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No final recommendation can be made, however, until mission 
requirements are better understood. 
bipropellant system should be reassessed and compared with alternatives 
such as the catalyzed hydrazine-water monopropellant concept. 
At  that time the desirability of the 
RCS Building Blocks 
Service Module RCS 
Descriptive Title. Apollo Service Module Reaction Control Subsystem, 
Block I. 
Manufacturers and Availability Status: The SM RCS subsystem is 
assembled, installed, and checked out by NAA/S&ID. 
obtained from the suppliers indicated i n  Table 75. The qualified components 
used on the f ina l  Block I subsystem a re  essentially the same as those used on 
the Block I1 subsystem, and should be available at the time the RCM laboratory 
is implemented. 
still be available at S&ID, even though the Block I subsystem no longer wil l  be 
in actual production. It is further assumed that components can be pro’curid 
on a non-interference basis with Apollo requirements, but no investigation of 
schedule impact has been made. 
Components are 
Tooling and capability to assemble the subsystem should 
Space Programs. The configuration discussed herein is that used on 
the f i n d  Block I vehicles of the Apollo program. 
Description of Functional Highlights. The function of the SM RCS is to 
provide the thrust required for three-axis stabilization and  control of the 
independent RCM Laboratory throughout its mission. 
stabilization and control function, the S M  RCS i s  capable of providing trans- 
lational velocity increments, minor velocity corrections, and emergency 
retrograde from earth orbit. 
In addition to the 
The SM RCS is pulse-modulated, pressure-fed by helium gas, and 
utilizes storeable hypergolic liquid propellants (N2O4 and MMH). Normally 
the S M  RCS is controlled automatically by the guidance and control system, 
but override controls a re  provided for manual operation. 
Functional Characteristics. The SM RCS engines wi l l  provide reaction 
thrust to the Apollo CSM using 16 engines. 
pulse-modulated, pressure-fed, bipropellant thrust generator designed to 
produce a vacuum thrust of 100 pounds (Figure 103). Each engine consists 
of two propellant cqntrol valves, an injector, and a thrust chamber. The 
valves a r e  solenoid-operated and control the flow of the respective propel- 
lants to the enpine. The combustion chamber is made of unalloyed 
molybdenum and is coated inside and otrt with molybdenum disilicice to 
prevent oxidization. A thrust chamber nozzle is attached to the combustion 
chamber at a nozzle expansion ratio of 7:l; the expansion ratio of the nozzle 
exit is 40:l. Performance values are ehown in Figures 104and 105, Other 
RCS components are listed in Table 76 . 
Each engine is a radiation-cooled, 
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Table 75 . Components of Apollo SM RCS 
Component 
SM RCS engine 
SM quad heater 
Propellant solenoid valve 
Relief valve 
Check valves 
Helium pressure regulator 
Helium solenoid valve 
Fuel tanks 
Oxidizer tanks 
Helium pressure vessel 
Dynatube fittings 
Propellant f i l l  and drain fitting 
Helium coupling 
Test Point coupling 
Propellant filter 
~~ 
Supplier 
Marquardt Corporation 
Thermal System 
National Water Lift 
Calmec Manufacturing Company 
APCO 
Fair  child -Hiller Corporation 
National Water Lift 
Bell Aerosystems 
Bell Aerosystems 
Menasco Company 
Res is t of lex Corporation 
J. C. Carter Company 
Purolator Products 
Lear Seigler 
Cemarc Corporation 
Physical Characteristics. The S M  hCS consiacs PC four independent 
modular quad assemblies located at 90 degroe i y  -rer4-.ents around the peri- 
phery of the SM. Each modular assembly cocfaks a helium storage and 
distribution system, an oxidizer storage and distribution system, a fuel 
storage and distribution system, and an engine c ~ s e m b l y  cluster with four 
engines. A schematic of an individual quad is shown in Figure 106 and a 
perspective drawing in Figure 107 
36 x 67 inch door a s  shown in Figure 107. 
Each quadrant is currently mounted on a 
Integration Constraints. Present Apollo requirements require that 
temperatures be controlled to the values shown in Table 77. 
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f 
HEUUM TANK PRESSURE 
HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE HEUUM ISOUTION VALVE 
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY 1 REGULATOR ASSEMBLY 2 
U A I U I L C K  
TP 13 TP 11 
I i  
I /  I 
L1 
T P 7 T  I i TP 9 
TP 8 TP 6 TP IO 
/FUEL EUEF VALVE 
OXIDIZER PRORUNT 
FUEL FILL 
COUMING OXIDIZER VENT 
COUPLING *FUEL V E M  
COUPLING *OXIDIZER 
FI LL 
COUP11 NG 
*NOTE: FILL AND VENT COUPLING 
FUNCTIONS ARE INTERCHANGED 
WHEN MODULE I S  INVERTED. 
Figure 106. Schematic of Typical SM RCS Block I Quad 
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Figure 107. Perspective of Typical SM RCS Block I Quad 
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Table 77. Critical GSM RCS Temperature .Limits 
Components 
SM RCS 
Engine fuel valt-e 
Engine oxidizer valve 
Injector head 
Fuel tank 
Oxidizer tank 
Helium check valve 
Fuel isolation valve 
Helium in storage tank 
CM RCS 
Engine fuel valve 
Engine oxidizer valve 
Fuel tank 
Oxidizer tank 
F u e l  isolation valve 
Oxidizer isolation valve 
Temperatur 
Maximum 
175 0 
175 0 
350 0 
85 0 
85 0 
150 @ 
105 @ 
150 @ 
200 0 
200 0 
105 @ @  
105 @ @  
105 @ 
105 @ 
Limits, '1 
Minimum 
~ __ 
35 0 
35 0 
32 @ 
40 @ 
40 @ 
30 0 
40 @ 
30 0 
40 0 
40 0 
40 @ 
40 @ 
40 @ 
40 @ 
Remarks 
1-second firing 
?ermitted at 20 F 
1-second firing 
2errnitted at 20 F 
To preclude two-phase propellant flow and/or seat damage. 
To preclude freezing of propellant and/or assure valve operation on 
direct coil. 
Lir-lit for shrink fit of insert into injector body. 
To preclude freezing of propellant. 
To preclude overpressurizing system. 
To preclude overpressurizing helium system 
To preclude low feed pressure 
Material exposure limit. 
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100-lb engines of the SM RCS 
1 -  
appear to be too powerful for efficient attitude control of the RCM laboratory. 
Substitution of smaller engines such as the 16-lb Agena GTV engines reduces 
propellant requiremects substantially. Also, the capacity of the four SM KCS 
quads may be more than needed for any expected mission. Substitution of 
CM RCS for SM RCS propellant tanks reduces this by about 1/3, which may be 
more in keeping with requirements. 
The SM RCS quads a re  designed to fit i n t o  the SM RCS structure, and 
If the quads a re  to be mounted on the ends 
the large heat sink provided by the large service propulsion system tanks 
helps maintain thermal control. 
of the RCM laboratory support structure, careful analysis of thermal control 
requirements wi l l  be necessary. 
pact geometry may be cecessary to minimize heat loss. 
Repackaging the system into a more com- 
Command Module RCS 
Descriptive Title. Apollo Command Module Reaction Control Subsystem, 
Block 11, 
Manufacturers and Availability Status. 
assembled, installed, and checked out by NAAB&ID. Components a re  
obtained from the suppliers indicated in Table 75. 
qualified components and subsystems similar to those used on Block I1 wi l l  
be available at the time the RCM laboratory is implemented. Tooling and 
capability of the suppliers to produce such components w i l l  still exist even 
though the components no longer may be in actual production. It is further 
assumed that the components can be procured on a non-interference basis 
with Apollo requirements, but no investigation of schedule impact has been 
made. 
The CM RCS subsystem i s  
It is assumed that the 
Space Program. The configuration discussed herein is that used on 
the Block I1 vehicles of the Apollo program. 
Description of Functional Highlights. The function of the CM PCS is to 
provide the thrust and impulse required for three-axis rate damping of the 
RCM Laboratory during entry. The system is activated only for the earth 
entry phase. 
and utilizes storeable hypergolic liquid propellants (NZO4 and MMH). 
Normally, the CM RCS is  controlled automatically by the guidance and control 
system but override controls are  provided for manual operation. 
The CM RCS is pulse-modulated, pressure fed by helium gas, 
Functional Characteristics. Two identical systems, designated A and B, 
are  provided, which normally operate simultaneously; however, i f  one system 
fails, the remaining system is capable of adequate control for entry. 
assembly consists of a pressurization subsystem, a propellant subsystem, a 
Each 
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engines with nozzle extensions. 
The CM RCS engines w i l l  provide reaction thrust for attitude control of the 
RCM Laboratory during entry. 
modulated, pressure-fed, bipropellant thrust generator designed for a 
minimum vacuum thrust of 88.3 pounds at an expansion rate of 9:l (without 
nozzle extension). 
gases through the heat shield. The two basic components of the engine are  
the propellant control valve assembly and the thrust chamber assembly, 
which includes the injector, combustion chamber, nozzle, and mount. 
Performance values are  shown in Figures 108 and 109. Other CM RCS 
components are listed in Table 78. 
Each engine is an  ablative-cooled, pulse- 
The nozzle extension provides a passage for the exhaust 
Physical Characteristics. The complete CM RCS, shown schematically 
in Figure 110 and perspectively in Figure 111, consists of two equally 
capable and identical subsystems (designated A and B) located outside the CM 
pressure hull in  the aft compartment. 
displays and controls inside the CM pressure hull. 
These assemblies are supported by 
Integration Constraints. Pres e n t  Apollo requirements require that 
temperetures be controlled to the values shown in Table 77. 
Application to RCM Laboratory. In an RCM laboratory application 
the dump and purge provisions of the CM RCS would be unnecessary and 
should be deleted. 
the RCM laboratory application and would best be replaced by smaller 
radiation-cooled engines. 
independent assemblies, one assembly could be packaged as a "quad" at each 
end of the RCM support cruciform. This would provide 2/3 as much propel- 
lant as'four SM RCS quads, which is probably more than adequate. Alterna- 
tively, the CM RCS could be used at its present capacity (1/6 the SM RCS 
capacity i n  each of two assemblies), with each independent assembly feeding 
two clusters of three or four engines each at the ends of the cruciform 
structure. 
The ablative CM RCS engines do not seem appropriate to 
Since the CM RCS consists of two identical and 
The CM RCS is now distributed throughout the aft equipment bay of the 
Apollo command module i n  order to f i t  within the geometric limitations of the 
heat shield, and is protected from temperature, radiation, and m i c r e  
meteorites by the thick heat shield. If the protection of this heat shield were 
removed (as i n  the RCM Laboratory), the subsystem would have to be 
repackaged. 
of long, small diameter propellant lines. 
Particular attention would have to be paid to the thermal control 
Agena GTV SeS 
Descriptive Title. Model 8250 Secondary Propulsion System for the 
Agena Gemini Test Vehicle. 
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Component Function 
Fuel tank MMH storage 
Oxidizer tank N2O4 storage 
Propellant isolation valve Isolate propellant until each entry, 
burst at 241 i 14 B I D  I 
Type 
Positive expulslon witn teflon bladder 
Positive expulsion 
Burst diaphragm 
Flexible metal hose 
Heliiim isolation valve I Flex with dynatube fittings I Explosive actuated Enzine connect Retain He iu pressure vessel 
Propellant interconnect Isolate system A from B and dump 
~ 
Manufacturers and Availability Status. The Model 5250 system was 
manufactured by Bell Aerosystems Company for Lockhey2 Missiles and 
Space Division. 
unknown. 
The system is now out of production and its availability is 
Explosive actuated 
Space Programs. The Model 8250 system provided secondary propul- 
sion to the Agena-Gemini Docking Target Vehicle. 
Description of Functional Highlights. The 34odel 8250 system ?rovided 
a vernier thrust capability in the forward axial direction so that the Agena GTV 
could assist in the rendezvous and docking maneuver with the manned Gemini 
capsule. 
Functional and Physical Characteristics. Each -4gena RTV was pro- 
vided with two identical and independent Model 8250 systems. 
included (see Figure 111) one 200-lb thrust chamber assembly, oqe 16-lb 
thrust chamber assembly, one bellows-type fuel tank, one bellows-type 
oxidizer tank, one helium tank, and associated pressurization components and 
valvjng. 
lent tankage in Table 80. 
Each system 
The 16-lb thrust chamber is described in Table 79 ,  and the propel- 
The system is shown schematically in Figure 112. 
Integration Constraints, Unknown. 
Application to RCM Laboratory. The Model 8250 system is designed to 
The 
control one 200-lb and one 16-lb thrust assembly. 
would be necessary to control instead 12 o r  16 16-lb thrust assemblies, 
pair of propellant tanks in the Model b250 syatem have about 92 percent the 
capacity of a single RCS quad, so provision of one to four pairs of tanks wGuld 
be necessary, depending on the mission. The bellows-type tanks weigh more 
than comparable Apollo bladder- type tanks, but they should have the capabil- 
ity of withstanding longer mission durations. The other coniponents of the 
Model 8250 system have not been studied, so their capabilities compared to 
comparable Apollo components a re  not known. 
In the RCM laboratory it 
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Table 79.  Bell Model 8101/8250 Eagine 
Thrust 
Propellants 
16 f: 1 . 6  l b  at vacuum 
Mixzd oxides of nitrogen (MIL- 
C - 2 7408 )! uns ymme t r i cal 
dimethyl hydrazine (MIL-P-25604) 
O/F Weight Ratio 
Rated Dnration 
Engine Life 
Propellant Feed 
Thrust Vector Control 
mamed Use 
Status 
Sponsoring Agency 
1.10 f 3% 
2650 seconds design life 
E years maximum storage 
Positive expulsion tanks 
None 
8101 - Agena Secondary Pro- 
pulsion System, 8250 - Secondary 
Propulsion System, Agena- 
Gemiai Target Vehicle 
8101 was qualified and flight 
tested 3r 4 successful flights. 
The 8256 has PFRT Lompletod. 
Development: Si01 had prelim- 
inary design completed early 
1961, PFRT July 1961 through 
Septeaber 1962; 8250 system 
had preliminary design ci  m- 
pleted January 1963, PFRT 
February 1964 through 
October 1964 
Air Force/Lockheed for 8101 
and 8250, 35 units of Model 
8 101 have been delivered. 
Production Contract for 8250 
is AF 04(695)-545, for 
18 production systems plus 
2 spare thrust chamber units 
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Performance 
Thrust, lb  
Table 79.  Bell Model 8101/8250 Engine (Cont) 
Thrust Coefficient 
Specific Impulse, lbf- sec /lbm 
Characteristic Exhaust Velocity, ft/sec 
Chamber Pressure,  psia 
Flow Rates ,  lb/sec Oxidizer 
Fuel 
*At vacuum conditions 
Thrust Chamber 
Nozzle: Throat, Dt = 0 .  377 in., 
At = 0.1118 sq. in. 
Length, 
throat to 
exit = 3.715 in. 
Cont rac  - 
tion 1 / Z  
angle, = 40" 
Type : 80% Bell 
Combustion Chamber: 
Characteristic length, L* = 32 in. 
Chamber Temperature = 2400 F 
maximum 
Injector: 6 doublets, impinging 
streams, no barrier flow 
Thrust Chamber* 
16.0 
1.746 
252.2 
4647 
79 
0.0332 
0.0302 
Exit, De = 2.832 in., 
= 6. 28 sq. in. A€? 
Expan s ion 
area ratio, 
Ae/*t = 55.6 
Expansion 
1/2 angle, 
p= 29" 
Chamber, Dc = 1.5 in., 
A, = 1.765 sq. in. 
i 
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Table 79. Bell Model 8101/8250 Engine (Cont) 
Cooling Technique: Radiation cooled 
nozzle and chamber 
Chamber Construction: Tantalum t 10% 
tungsten, welded 
Pressurization System 
Nitrogen gas is used with stainless steel bellows ior  the 8250 and with a - 
collapsing teflon bladder for the 8101 
Weights = Model 8101 (in pounds) Dry 
Chamber and injector 2.2 
Weights - Model 8250 (in pounds) Dry 
Overall s ys tem 129.2 
Chamber and injector assembly 6.92 
Fuel tank 31. 3 
Oxidizer ‘tank 24. 9 
Pressurizing systems 13. 1 
Materials of Construction - 8101 and 8250 
Wet 
303.8 
Propellant Tanks: Aluminum/ teflon for 8 10 1, Stainless steel, 
347 bellows, 247 and A286 Shell for 8250 
Valves : Aluminum/ s tainles s s tee1 
Injector: Pure tantalum 
Chamber: Ta - 10 percent W with pyrochrome and aluminide coatings 
Nozzle Extension: Pure tantalum 
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Table 79.  Bell Model 8101/8250 Engine (Cont) 
~ - ~ _ _  
Operational Features 
Starting: Hypergolic ignition of propellants 
Res ta r t  Capability : 
Burning Time Limitations: 
90 - after acceptance testing 
150 seconds maximum burn time 
per cycle 
28 watts a t  28 volts dc Power Supply: 
Reliability 
Failure rate per cycle: 1 x (predicted) 
References 
Data sheets supplied by Bell Aerosystems Company, September 1965 
Table 80. Principal Characteristics of Propellant Tankage 
Used in Model 8250 System 
Item 
Tanks 
Diameter 
Length 
Oxidizer 
Fuel 
Mate rial 
Thickness 
Working pressure 
Bellows 
Oxidizer 
F u e l  
Material 
Thickness 
Cycle life 
Ope rating tempe rat u r  e 
Expulsion efficiency 
Characteristic 
10 in. inside diameter 
33 in. 
42 in. 
A-286 steel 
0.018 in. wall 
210 psi 
10 in. diameter x 93 convolutions 
10 in. diameter x 139 convolutions 
300 series stainless steel 
0. 006 in. 
200 expulsions 
0 to 100 F 
98 percent 
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s 
P+CEDlMG 
29. 
30. 
31. 
W PAGE!Bu\NK MOT FILMED. 
Tank, 0 2 ,  Cryogenic Storage Subsystem. 
Control Drawing ME282-0046 
NAA S&ID Specification 
Inverter, Power Static, 115/200 volt, 3-F%ase, 400 Cycles per Second. 
NAA S &ID Pr oc ur ement Spec if ica t ion MC49 5 - 0 0 0 1 
Zero-Gravity Positive Expulsion. Bell Aerosystems Brochure 
- 387 - 
SID 66-1853-3 
NORTH A M E R I C A N  AVIATION,  INC.  SPACE m n d  INWORMATION SYBTEMS DIVI8lON 
APPENDIX: AVCO REPORT ON FC,*iSIBILITY OF HEAT SHIELD REUSE 
In support of this study, Avco Corporation 
performed a preliminary study to assess  the feasi- 
bility of refurbishment of the Apollo command 
module heat shield. 
This appendix presents the Avco report con- 
m addition to taining the results of their study. 
technical feasibility, production and cost aspects 
of refurbishment were covered. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION -
This report is written in response to a request f rom the Advanced Programs 
Office of NAA/S&ID for an assessment of the refurbishment and reuse of the 
Apollo commrnd module heat shield for low ear th  orbit Apollo Applications 
m i s s i m s .  Specific attention is given to defining major problems associated 
with demonstrating the feasibility of heat shield reuse and refurbishment. A 
conceptual development plan for refurbishment and associated costs are also 
presented. 
This study is based upon the following guidelines and constraints: 
Reuse will be limited to low earth orbir  missions of 14-days 
duration. 
Reliability requirements will remain unchanged from Apollo 
requirements. 
Design performance cr i ter ia  for refurbished vehicles will be identical 
with Apollo cri teria.  
Maximum u.ilization will  be made of Apollo materials, processes and 
specific-Picms. 
NAA/SL1D will perform major -.-ehicle disassembly and structural 
cleaning and repair  prior to shipc-ent to Avco/SSD. 
Avc.:!SSD will perform refurbishment of all heat shield panels and 
components for which it has Block I1 fabrication responsibility. 
Vehicles recovered from earth orbital as well as lunar missions will 
be ref-irbished. 
A - 1 1  
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2 . 0  FACTORS AFFECTING FEASIBILITY OF REFURBISHMENT OF 
APOLLX) C/M HEAT SHJELD 
Post-recovery examination of Apollo C/M 009 and G/M 01 1 following entry from 
low earth orbit has indicated that the heat shield ablator survived entry quite 
well with apparent insignificant degradation in many areas. In other areas the 
depth of degradation or char, appears relatively shallow. In still others the 
local degradation is sipificant. Since the Apollo heat shield is desigmd for 
entry from lunar  missions, this result was expected. The degree of degradation 
of the ablator from entry at lunar velocity, however, is predicted to be signi- 
ficantly greater. The range of true depths will not be known, however, until 
the recovery of C/M 017 and C/M 020. 
In view of the wide range of local degradation anticipated, three conceptual 
approaches may be feasible for local refurbishment: 
a) complete reuse of recovered ablator, 
b) removal of char and reuse of uncharred ablator, 
c )  complete removal of original ablator, charred a d  uncharred. a d  
application of new ablator. 
(The reuse of heavily charred ablator material is not considered feasible due 
to its poor mechanical integrity). 
It is conceivable that all three or combinations of these approaches could ba 
employed on a single vehicle. Table 2-1 indicates the conceptual utilization 
of these refurbishment approaches. The feasibility of the first two of these 
refurbishment approaches has not been demonstrated. Approach C, complete 
replacement, is essentially equivalent to a standard Class 3 repair technique 
utilized currently on flight hardware. Its feasibility has been demonstrated on 
C/M 009 and C/M 01 1. As a result, primary attention has been given here to 
the problems associated with demonstrating the feasibility of Approaches A and 
B. The feasibility of these two approaches will depend heavily on the C/M's 
initial mission - being much more probable for initial earth orbital missions 
than for initial luna r  missions because of the latter's greater char depth. The 
initial entry trajectory will also influence char depth a d  thereby the local 
refurbishment approach. Such conside.rations are indicative of a major problem 
in the selection of the refurbishment approach, i. t- , the predetermination of 
char depth. The nature and influence of this r-oblem and other major factors 
affecting refurbishment are discussed in the following sections: 
A-13 
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TABLE 2-1 
a C E P T U A L  UTlLlZAflON OF REFURBlglMWT APPROACHES 
Approach 
Class A: complete reuse 
Class B: r e u s e  uncharred 
Class C: complete replacement 
Unchrred 
Areas 
X 
X 
Charred Areas 
uncharred uncharred 
required required 
X 
X X 
The predetermination of local char dep+h,or the depth in the ablator to which 
the char has penetrated, plays a mc j.3. role in the selection of refurbishment 
approach, i. e. , unless there has b m  1 decision to completely replace old 
ablator with n:w regardless of char depth. The depth of char will be a strong 
function of the C/M's initial mission and entry trajectory. For example, for 
the aft compartment char depth for earth orbit entry may average on the order 
of 25% of total thickress, whereas, for lunar  entry the char depth may average 
on the order of 50%. On the basis of the meager post-flight data available to 
Avco/SSD on C/M 01 1. it would appear that these char depth estimates may 
be conservative, i. e . ,  the actual post-flight unrharred material may be larger 
5an predicted. 
A more explicit characterization of earth orbital char depth and its distribution 
cannot be obtained until such time as appropriate post-flight test data on C/M's  
009 and 011 become available. In order to determine the feasibility of Class A 
and B refurbishments of heat shields which have utxiergone prior earth entry, 
analyses of post-flight data on C/M's 009 and 011 should be conducted. This 
is required to assess the adequacy of analytic methods for predicting char depths 
and to obtain a realistic appraisal of char depth distribution and of local anomalies. 
Determination of the feasibility of refurbishment of lunar heat shields will require 
similar study of AFMS 017 and 020. 
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An important factor which enters into the overall problem of feasibility is 
the definition of char depth, i. e. the criteria used to determine the depth of 
degraded and nonreusable ablator. As illustrated in Figure 2-1. a definition 
of "char depth" corresponding to minimum density instead of undegraded density 
might involve a difference of as much as  0. 2 inches in material available for 
reuse. .It is conceivable that judicious selections of this definition might permit 
a Class B refurbishment where a Class C refurbishment would otherwise be 
required. It is clear, however. that knowledge of the ability to reuse partially 
degraded ablator is required to demonstrate feasibility of Class A and B r t -  
furbishments which reuse partially degraded ablator. 
As shown in Figure 2-1. char depth may be defined in terms of ablator density. 
It also appears possible to define char depth in terms of the maximum temper- 
ature of in-depth exposure during entry. Neither of these techniques is really 
practical for recovered flight vehicles, however, because of the complexity 
and cost of obtaining density and temperature data. Two other techniques that 
have been used are color a d  electrical resistivity; however, too little er -  
perimental data are available to determine if these techniques are sufficiently 
consistent to yield reliable data for machining. Color recognition and definition 
are highly subjective and hence, subject to large observer error ,  particularly 
in deep chars gentrated over long heating periods. Electrical techniques have 
been used successfully in isolated analyses of test chars. but are unproven 
for production applications. The net result is that no technique can be shown 
at this time to be both feasible and practical. 
On the basis of the information available at this time, an NDT technique based 
on the m_easurement of the dielectric properties appears most feasible. In 
addition, &cause of extensive experience on Apollo in the use of this technique 
for determining ablator moisture content (Figure 2-2). dielectric probes, 
necessary instrumentation, and basic technology appear to be available. The 
dielectric approach. using these previously developed coplanar probes, should 
permit identification of surface char and char -virgin transition. The transition 
zoly, being a rcgion where density and resistivity change markedly, should 
provide a wide range of dielectric properties, and hence, an excellent thickness 
sensitivity. The major task remaining appears to be demonstration of the 
feasibility of reduction of this technique to production use. 
In summary, assessment of the following factors is  necessary to demonstrate 
the feasibility of Class A and Class B refurbishment: 
1 J Acceptable degree of degradation for reme 
2) Char depth measurement techniques for production use. 
Char depth is not a problem in Class C refurbishment. 
A-15 
SID 66-1853-3 
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION. INC. SR4CBrad IN-TION SyeTgM8 m v m  
c. 
L. 
\ M 
c 
\ 
c3 
# 1 E C O Y I  
c, 
7 
I. 
-#wSlTY 
SITION . 
TEWERATURE 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 C 6  
DEPTH fROM OCI1GINAL WRFAE,inch 
Figure 2-1 DENSITY PROFILE IN CHARRED APOLLO ABLATOR SAMPLE 
A -  16 
SID 6 6 -  1853-3  

NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC. SPACE ud INlroRMATKlN SYSTEMS 
2 . 2  PERFORMANCE OF USED ABLATOR 
Class A and Class B refurbishment require the reuse of ablator materials 
which have been subjected to prior entry t\ermal and structural loads. 
Evaluation of the adequacy of performance of reused materials is necessary, 
therefore, to the demonstration of feasibility of Class A a d  B refurbishments. 
The feasibility of Class C refurbishment is not affected by such considerations. 
The initial Block II entry will induce thermal gradients through the uncharred 
ablator material. If this uncharred material is :a be reused for a second entry, 
the effect of this previous temperature history on subsequent thermal and 
structural margins of safety must be understood. For Class A and Class B 
refurbishment, depending upon the definition of char depth or, conversely, 
the definition of degradation acceptable for reuse, the maximum exposure 
temperature could conceivably range from 250°F to 1000°F. The upper 
temperatures will be achieved (for short times) on ablator materials near 
the char-virgin interface. The lower temperature limit would correspond to 
material near the bondline which did not achieve axg entry temperature in excess 
of the initial 2SO'F post-cure temperature. Because of the potential variations 
of initial Block I1 entry trajectories as well as potential variations of earth 
orbit trajectories after refurbishment, it is not possible at this time to define 
the spectrum of material histories to be encouttered by "reusable" material. 
The definition of this spectrum can be acquired only after the variations in 
entry missions have been explicity defiried along with the definition of acceptable 
char depth. It does appear, however, that it should be possible to boud  the 
thermal performance problem by evaluating residual, uncharred materials 
exposed to the upper temperature bounds. Currently, 110 data are available 
on the effect of transiect, elevated (above cure temperature) thermal exposures 
approaching 1000°F. Data are available, however, for exposures to 350'F. 
For exposures as long as 100 hours at 350"F, the ablation performance of the 
Apollo ablator appears unaltered as  shown in Table 2-2. No alteration of char 
depth was noted. 
Several factors that will affect the structural performance of used ablator 
must also be investigated before the feasibility of reuse can be determined. 
The structural performance of the ablator on Apollo is measured in terms of 
margins of safety for cracking and for delamination from the substructure. 
The former, most critical when the ablator is cold, is primarily a function 
of the allowable mechanical strain of the ablator, the diiference between the 
free thermal contraction plus additional shrinkage of the zblator, a d  the 
thermal contraction of the substructsre referenced to the zero stress temper - 
ature. This ma gin of safety can readily be calculated once the ablator pro- 
perties - mod is, ultimate strain allowable, coefficient of thermal expansion. 
and additional skrinicage,are known. The margin of safety for delamination 
is a function of the local curvature of the substructure at a crack: It c tn  tr, 
computed once the ablator properties and the allowable curvature are known. 
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Then, to calculate structural margins of safety requires knowledge of "reusable" 
ablator properties. In a similar sense, the residual margin of safety associated 
with prior repairs made to the original Block 11 heat shield would be required. 
When an ablator is subjected to reentry heating, every portion of it will 
experience some time -temperature heating history that will affect its subsequent 
mechanical properties. For instance, it is known that the unrestrained ablator 
will shrink when exposed to elevated temperature and that this phenomenon is 
time -temperature dependent. Figure 2-3 depicts unrestrained behavior as a 
function of temperature that has been increased and decreased at a uniform 
rate of 3°F per minute. The nearly linear behavior up to 350°F is reversible, 
but the large shrinkage that occurs at higher temperatures is irreversible. 
Similar, more pronounced behavior has been noticed when the temperatures 
have reached 800°F. The ablator on the vehicle is restrained, however, and 
some test results have indicated that restrained ablator will creep and partially 
relieve the induced strains. Furthermore, as is ahown in Figure 2-4, shrinkage 
at a given temperature ia  time dependent. Thus, had the heating rates in Figure 
2-3 been increased to those of an actual reentry, the irreversible shrinkage 
would have been far  less. This is further borne out by the appearance of re -  
strained ablator samples that have been subjected to simulated reentry radiant 
lamp testing wherein the char layer is extensively cracked but none of the 
cracks appear to extend into the virgin material. 
In addition to affecting ablator Shrinkage, prior exposure to elevated temperatures 
will probably have an effect on ultimate allowable strains and moduli of 
elasticity. All these time -temperature effects on ablator properties and 
shrinkage must be investigated before the feasibility of reusing ablator can be 
determined. 
It is fairly evident at this time that a used heat shield would not be able to 
survive as cold a temperature as before entry without cracking because of 
the additional shrinkage strains; but just what minimum temperature it ccdd 
survive is unknown. 
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There is some reason to believe, however, that prior thermal exposure zriay 
not be as detrimental to s t ructural  performance as might at  f i r s t  be supposed. 
In the ear ly  phases of Apollo C/M development, when there was no boost 
cover, the ablator mater ia l  w a s  required to undergo significant ascent heating. 
This heating resulted in charring and degradation of the outermost 0. 1 to 0.2 
inch of ablator. The degraded heat shield was then required to be capable of 
sustaining -260'F cold soak, 250°F hot soak, ana reentry. 
H. y t  shield panels were subjected to ground tes t s  which sequentially exposed 
the ablator to simulations of these environments. Fo r  example, the tesi; panel 
shown in Figure 2-4A w a s  subjected to simulated ascent heating under radiant 
lamps. (The deep black color of the surface is due partly to the application of 
carbon black to improve absorptivity under the lamps. ) A light surface char  
and subsurface degradation were created by this exposure. 
then subjected to a cooling rate  simulating spaceflight temperature predictions 
and after 54 hours reached -260°F*2'. It wab soaked a t  this temperature for 
two hours and then raised to room temperature. F i g u r e  2-4B shows the panel 
after cold scdk. 
ture to berween 400 and 500'F until the bond line rrached 250' to 260F. 
held in this condition for 45 minutes with a flow of CO 
The maximum surface temperature reached during this , . riod was 470'F. 
panel w a s  then subjected to simulated reentry heatlng iri the radiant lamp facility. 
The tes t  panel after heating is shown in Figure 2-4C. 
after cold soak o r  reentry heating. 
The panel was  
The panel was then hot soaked by raising the surface tempera- 
It was 
across  the surface. 2 
The 
No c racks  were found 
In these tes t? ,  the ascent heating and consequent surface charring and degrada- 
tion were found to have no apparent detrimental effect on subsequent cold soak 
ai-d reentry performance. 
there may be reason to believe that reuse of degraded ablator in ClasE A and B 
refurbishments may prove structurally feasible. 
On the basis of these tes ts ,  i t  wouid appear that 
An important guideline that directly affects the local feasibility of CLass B 
refurbishment, and thereby total vehicle refurbishment cost, is the current  
requirement to use Apollo design c r i te r ia  on allowable backface temperature 
for the reuse Earth orbit  mission. 
mission i s  a strong function of allowable backface o r  bondline temperature,  
any relaxation of this cri terion would significantiy reduce the local, uncharred 
ablator required for Class E3 refurbishment. Relaxation of this cri terion does 
not appear to affect anticipated thermostructural  performance. 
resultant reeuced ablator thicknesses would be erpectec! to reduce any deleter-  
ious effects of cracking by reducing the degree of crack opening and by reducing 
delaminating s t resses .  
Since total ablator thickness for the reuse 
In fact, che 
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FIGURE 2-4A. TEST PANEL AFTER SIMULATED ASCENT HEATING 
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In summary, assessment of the following factors is necessary before feasibility 
of reusing ablator can be determined: 
1) The effect of prior exposure to appropriate time-temperature histories 
on the ablator mechanical properties of modulus, ultimate strain, 
coefficient of thermal expansion, a d  shrinkage, must be identified. 
2) The effect of such exposure on the substructure bending curvatures 
that would cause ablator and repair delamination must be foud. 
3) The effect of prior exposure on the aerothermodynamic performance 
of used ablator. 
2.3 SALT WATER IMMERSION 
Salt water immersion of the ablator will occur following entry of the C/M from 
its initial Block 11 mission. Post-recovery examination of C/M's 009 pnd O i l  
has indicated that heavily charred areas such as those to be expected on the 
aft compartment and windward portio- of the crew compartment will absorb 
salt water in significant quantities. (Data on actual weights absorbed are not 
available. ) Cracks or separations which naturally occur along honeycomb- 
ablator interfaces in the char together with the high char porosity may permit 
penetration of salt water throughout the greater portion of the char. Whether or 
not salt water pelretrates completely through the char or into the virgin ablator 
is unknown. 
A non-destructive test technique will be required to determine the presence 
of absorbed water in uncharred ablator for Class A and Class B refurbishments. 
A demonstrated nondestructive test method, based on dielectric techniques. 
is available for measuring the presence of aon-saline water; but no technique 
has been demonstrated for measuring absorbed salt water. 
It appears, at this time, based on Apollo specifications, that moisture retained 
in uncharred ablator in excess of 3% by weight would require removal by 
drying. No data are available on the effect of known quantities of absorbed 
water on ablator properties. Data available, however, on the effects of exposure 
to 90% relative humidity for periods up to 30 days indicate no significant 
effect on ablator properties, as shown in Table 2-3. 
If recovered, uncharred ablator is found to contain greater than 3% water by 
weight, and if Apollo specifications imposed for weight control are applied, 
then the recovered compartments would require arying to remove excess 
water. If salt water drying procedures must be developed, then a simultaneous 
determination of the effect of these processes and of retained crystalline salt 
on ablator thermal and mechanical performance would be required. Such effects 
are currently unknown. It is important to note that it should not be apriori 
assumed that absorbed salt water or retained salt are detrimental to ablator 
performance. 
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Heat shield materials other than the main ablator material, e. g. , edgemember, 
bolt plug sleeve, and gasket materials, which generally are impervious to 
salt water, are not expected to be affected by immersion. 
The impact of NAA/S&ID cleaning and refurbishment brought on by immersion 
of substructure elements such as aft compartment shear pad Marinite is 
currently unknown. If such refurbishments can be carried out without dis- 
turbing ablator - or edgemember - substructure interfaces, then Class C 
refurbishment of these interfaces may be minimized. 
Class C refurbishment appears feasible from the immersion standpoint. Unless 
salt water penetrates the HT-424 tape and cannot be neutralized or flushed 
and consequently endangers substructure face sheet integrity through corrosion 
or endanger bond integrity,Class C refurbishment based upon removal of all 
ablator to the HT -424 layer should be feasible. Generally, application of the 
HT -424 primer in combination with the flow of primary HT -424 adhesive 
would be expected to shield the steel face sheets from salt water. 
In summary, assessment of the following factors is necessary to demonstrate the 
feasibility of Class A and Class B refurbishments: 
1) Maximum allowable retained salt water or retained salt for acceptable 
thermal and structural performance. 
2) Ablator drying processes for acceptable thermal and structural 
performance . 
No immersion factors appear to impair the feasibility of Class C refurbishments. 
2.4 DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
Refurbishment of the Block II Apollo heat shield for reuse on earth orbit 
missions will  require generation of new design thicknesses. Since design 
techniques will have been verified by flight tests of C/M's 017 a m  020, 
feasibility of design for reuse will have been verified. Furthermore, with 
appropriate post-flight analyses, it should be possible to design for the reuse 
mission with known margins and possibly reduced thicknesses over those 
currently obtainable. 
Since each reuse of a flight C / M  will require fasrication 9f a new forward 
compartment, it is assumed that new forward compartment ablator thicknesses 
will be generated for the reuse earth orbit missions, 
Refurbishment class selection will require consideration of X- and Z-axis 
c. g. effects. 
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In general, reduced ablator thicknesses and refurbishment requirements will 
involve all major Block 11 heat shield components and a large number of 
Avco/NAA design interfaces. Some of the major effects of refurbishment and 
redesign for yeuse are  described in the following sections. 
In summary,no design factors have been identified which constrain the feasibility 
of Class A, B, or  C refurbishments. 
2.4. 1 Aft Compartment: Sinear and Compression Pads (Figure 2-5 and 2-6) 
All aft compartment shear and cor.3pression pads will require replacement, o r  
class C refurbishment, due to the severity of heating experienced, even from 
orbital entry. Load transmission requirements permit no degradation of 
mechanical properties from heating. Reduction in local main ablator thickness 
for the reuse mission will, in turn, cause the Block 11 pads to protrude if they 
are to accept the current S/M interfaces. Reduction of pad thicknesses will 
require re -verification of thermal and structural performance and redesign 
of the S/M pads. Maintenance of Block 11 design appears preferable and 
feasible if the resultant perturbed local heating is shown to be insignificant. 
Redesign of local gasketing does not appear to be required. 
2.4. 2 Aft Compartment: RCS Oxidizer Dump (Figure 2-5) 
This part is supplied, installed and gasketed by NAA/S&ID. Avco/SSD prepares 
edgemembe r closeout. 
Reduction of local main ablator thickness will require design change of dump 
ablator plugs to prevent perturbed heating. No local redesign of main ablator 
except thickness is anticipated for Class B or  C refurbishment. 
2. 4. 3 Aft Compartment: RCS Fuel Dump (Figure 2-7) 
This part is supplied, installed, and gasketed by NAA/S&ID. Avco/SSD prepares 
edgemember closeout. 
No redesign of local main ablator except thickness is anticipated for Class B 
or C refurbishment. Reduction of N M  plug thickness is anticipated to obviate 
perturbed he at ing effects . 
2 .4 .  4 Aft Compartment: C-Band Antenna (Figure 2-8) 
AFM 101 and 102 only, This part is furnished, installed, and gasketed by 
N U /  S& ID. 
No redesign of local main ablator except thickness is anticipated for Clasr B 
or  C refurbishment. NAA/S&ID removal of C-Band antennas is expected for 
reuse missions. Replacement with a plug in AFM 101 is anticipated, 
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@ NAA-AVCO Interface 
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Figure 2-8 AFT COMPARTMENT GRAND ANTENNA (AFM 101 AND 102 ONLY) 
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2.4. 5 Aft Compartment: S-Band Antenna (Figures 2-9) 
This part is furnished, installed, and gasketed by NAA/S&ID. Note that two 
designs are currently effective. 
No redesign of local main ablator o r  closeout interfaces except thickness is 
expected for Class B or  C refurbishment. NAA/S&ID redesign of both flush 
a d  non-protruding types is expected for reuse missions to prevent aerodynamic 
protrusion and perturbed heating. 
2.4.6 Aft Compartment: Inner Structure Attachment (Figure 2-10] 
All 59 bolt plug sleeves are expected to require Class C refurbishment if 
current (AFM 01 1) practice of core -drill removal of plugs continues. No 
redesign of local main ablator. plug, or  plug sleeves except thickness is 
anticipated for reuse missions. 
2.4 .7  Crew Compartment: A i r  Vents (Figure 2-11) 
This part is furnished, installed, a d  gasketed by NAA/S&ID. Avco/SSD 
prepares the surrounding edgemember closeout. 
No redesign of local ablator except thickness is anticipated. Reduction of 
local main ablator thickness will  require design change to vent entrance to 
accept reduced ablator interface without protrusion. 
2.4. 8 Cre v Compartment: Steam V e n t  (Figure 2-12) 
This part i s  furnished, installed, and gasketed by NAA/S&ID. Avco/SSD 
prepares the surrounding edgemember closeout. 
No redesign of local main ablator except thickness is anticipated. This re- 
duction will  require design change of vent ablator intei face to reduce vent 
entrance (molded ablator) to avoid protrusion. 
2.4.9 Crew Compartment: Emergency Boost Cover Ejection Mechanism 
(Figure 2-13) 
This part is furnished, installed, and gasketed by N M . i  3&ID. Surrounding 
edgemember closeout is installed by Avco/SSD. 
No redesign of adjacent ablator except thickness reduction is anticipated. 
Reduction of ablator thickness will  require relocation of mechanism -cover 
interface unless surrounding ablator is returned to original thickness, 
thereby requiring Class C refurbishment. Block I1 mechanism redesign w a l d  
not be 1 Jquired if the ablator plug is allowed to protrude and the resultant 
he at ing perturbation is ine ig nif ic ant. 
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Nonadhe rent Surface. @ Joint & Gasket design by AVCO. 
Fabricated by NAA. 
Nonadherent Surface. @ Joint & Gasket d e s i  n by AVCO. 
Fabricated by AVC % . 
Abktor  design allows removal of @ part i n  direction indicated. 
7616100 
Figuro 2-9 SBAND ANTENNA, NONPROTRUDINC 
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@ AVCO provides removable Bolt Plug with dia. shown. 
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Figuro 2-10 AFT COMPARTMENT ATTACHMENT (TYPICAL) 
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@ NAA-AVCO interface. 
Nonadherent Surface. Joint & 
Fabricated by NAA. 
Ablator design allows removal 
of part in direction indicated. 
@ Gasket design by AVCO. 
@ 
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Figure 2-12 STEAM VENT 
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I Substructure 
Nonadherent surface. Joint & Gasket 
design by AVCO. Fabricated by NAA. 
Nonadherent surface. Joint & Gasket 
design by AVCO. Fabricated by AVCO. 
Ablator design allows removal of part 
in direction indicated. 
761654D 
Figure 2-13 CREW HATCH BOOST COVER EJECTION MECHANISM 
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2.4. 10 Crew Compartment: Side Crew Hatch Access Latch (Figure 2-14) 
This par t  is fabricated, instailed, and gasketed by NAA/S&LD. Avco/SSD 
provides surrounding edgemember closeout. 
No redesign of adjacent main ablator except thickness is anticipated. This 
reduction will require design change to Block I1 latch plug to avoid protuberance. 
This design change may not be required if resultant perturbed ae ro  heating 
is insignificant. 
2.4. 11 Crew Compartment: Roll,Pitch, and Yaw Engine Panels  (Figure 2-15 
Typical) 
Nozzle extensions for these engines are fabricated, inst -Ked and gasketed by 
NAA/ S& ID. Avco/ SSD provide s s urrounding edgemembei closeouts. 
No redesign of adjacent ablator except thickness reduction is anticipated. 
This reduction will require NAA/S&ID design change to associated nozzle 
extensions to avoid protuberance heating; otherwise Block I1 extensions can  
be used and surrounding ablator faired t o  original Block I1 thickness through 
Class  C refurbishment. 
2.4. 12 Crew Compartment: Urine Dump (Figure 2-16) 
This part  is fabricated, installed and gaEketed by NAA/S&ID. Avco/SSD 
provides surrounding edgemember closeout. 
No redesign of surrounding ablator except thickness is anticipated. This 
reduction will require design change to urine dump assembly. 
2. 4. 13 Crew Compartment: Side Window Installation (Figure 2-17) 
Side window panels a re  furnished, installed, and gasketed by NAA/S&ID. 
Avco/SSD furnishes the molded ablator panel between side window glass  panels 
and surrounding edgemember closeouts. Molded ablator re ta iners  for the 
micrometeoroid window panels a r e  furnished, installed, and gasketed by 
N AA/ S & ID. 
Redesign would be required by a Class  B refurbishment of the side window 
installation, i. e. to accept a decrease in  thickness of surrounding ablator. 
Both the Avco molded panels and the N M / S & I D  molded retainers  would 
require redesign. Fo r  Class  A o r  Class  C refurbishment of the side window 
installation, adjacent ablator would be faired o r  replaced to accept a standard 
Block I1 installation. 
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Subs t ruc tur  e 
I 
Nonadherent surface. Joint & Gasket @ design by AVCO. Fabricated by NAA. 
Ablator design allows removal of 8 part  in direction indicated, 
7616150 
Figuro 2-14 CREW HATCH LATCH MECHANISM 
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Figure 2-15 RCS ROLL ENGINE PANEL 
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- Molded Ablator 
@ NAA-AVCO Interface 
Nonadherent surface, Joint L Gasket 0 design by AVCO. Fabricated by NAA, 
Ablator design allows removal or part @ in direction indicated. 
Fipuro 2-16 URINE DUMP 
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NAA -AVCO interface. 
Nonadherent surface. 
Joint Gasket design 
by AVCO. Fabricated 
by NAA. 
Nonad he rent s ur fac e. 
Joint L Gasket design 
by AVCO. Fabricated 
by AVCO. 
AVCO to provide 
remo%able plug, 
min. dia. = 0.438 
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Figure 2-17 SIDE WINDOW INSTALLATION (TYPICAL) 
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2.4.  14 Crew Compartment: Rendezvous Window Installation (Figure 2-18) 
Rendezvous window panels are fabricated, installed, a d  gasketed by NAA/SCID. 
Avco/SSD furnishes the molded ablator window frames and well panel. 
For Class C refurbishment minor design changes to frames and to the well 
panel would be required to accept a decrease in thickness of the surrounding 
crew compartment main ablator or even to accommodate a decrease in 
thickness within the well. No redesign would be required by a Class A re-  
furbishment or by a Class C refurbishment wherein the crew compartment 
ablator is faired into a standard Block II installation. The latter approach 
would, of co;irse, require a Class C refurbishment of the surrounding crew 
compartment ablator as well as  the window installation. 
2.4. 15 Crew Compartment: C-Band Antenna (AFM 101 & 102 only) 
(Figure 2-19) 
This part is fabricated, installed, and gasketed by NAA/S&ID. Avco/SSD 
provides surrounding closeout and gaskets antenna panel. 
. *  
This installation is applicable to AFM 101 and 102 only and does not appear 
on subsequent vehicles. It is anticipated that this installation will be removed 
:or any reuse mission through design change and that a local Class C re -  
furbishment or a replacement plug will be provided to accommodate this 
change. Class A, B, or C refurbishment would require no redesign of local 
ablator except thickness if this installation were retained for a reuse 
mi s sion. 
2.4. 16 Forward Crew Hatch (Figure 2-20) 
This part will be recovered. No difficulty is foreseen on Class A, B, or C 
refurbishment. New design thicknesses would be required for Class  B refur- 
bishment. In local regions such as that for the latch operation mechanism, 
Class C refurbishment or redesign may be required. 
2.4.  17 Hatch or Access Panel Frames (Figure 2-21, Typical) 
These frames are provided by Avco/SSD for general hatch or panel access and 
installation. No design change to these frames except thickness reduction 
is anticipated for Claes A, B, or C refurbishment. 
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Nonadherent surface. Joint & 
Fabricated by NAA. 
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Figure 2-18 RENDEZ'/O!JS WINDOW INSTALLATION 
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@ NAA-AVCO interface.  
Nonadherent surface.  Joint & Gasket @ design by AVCO. Fabricated by NAA. 
Nonadherent surface.  Joint & Gasket 0 des ign by AVCO. Fabricated by AVCC. 
Ablator des ign al lows removal  of part @ in direction indicated. 
AVCO to provide removable plug, 0 min.  dia. = 0 .438  
AVCO provides removable plug with @ dia. shown. 
0 Machined by NAA. 
76WSOb 
Figur. 2-19 CREW COMPARTMENT C-BAND ANTENNA (AFM 101 AND 102 ONLY) 
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No redesign of gaskets surrounding crew compartment or forward compartment 
hatches or inspection panels appears to be required by Class A, B, or C 
refurbishment. 
2.4. 18 Intercompartment Interfaces and Gaskets 
The Block 11 forward - crew compartment interface and gasket are provided 
by Avco/SSD. The Block 11 crew-aft compartment interface and gasket are 
provided by NM/SSD. Class A refurbishment will not require design change 
to these interfaces or gaskets. Class B or  C refurbishment will require 
design change for reduced thickness only. 
In general, Class C refurbishment of the aft compartment at the crew compart- 
ment interface, or local fairing of the crew compartment, will  be required 
for a Class A refurbishment of the crew compartment in order to provide 
a smooth interface. 
2 . 5  STRUCTURAL DISTORTION 
It is possible that under certain landing conditions the stainless steel sub- 
structure, particularly in the aft compartment, may sustain local permanent 
distortion. Such distortion will require NAA/S&ID inspection, NDT, and repair 
prior to shipme@ of the recovered heat shield to Avco/SSD for refurbishment. 
This will require removal at NAA/S&‘’IL’ of local uncharred ablator from 
distorted regions. Steel repair will require procedures that do not deteriorate 
adjacent ablator unless Class C refurbishment of this ablator is anticipated. 
In general, the feasibility of Class  C refucbishment appears urhfected by 
structural distortion. The feasibility of Class A or B refurbishment will 
depend upon the ability to determine nondestructively the presence a,& extent 
of any bond delamination that might occur as a result of water impact or  
structural distortion. At this time, it appears that ultrasonic NDT techniques 
may be used to detect such delamination, but verification of this presumption 
is required. 
Structural distortion or water impact may also cause local honeycomb node 
separation which would require local Class C refurbishment or repair. X-Ray 
techniques are expected to be adequate to assess such damage. 
In summary, before the feasibility of Class A and B refurbishment can be 
demonstrated, it is necessary to assess  the ability to detect bond delamination 
in retained ablator which has undergone water impact or other structural o r  
the rmos t r uct u r a l  loading. 
Structural distortion or  bond delamination have no effect on the feasibility 
of Class C refurbishment. 
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2 . 6  MANUFACTURING AND QUALITY CONTROL 
Refurbishment of the Block I1 Fpollo Command Module heat shield wi l l  require 
the following major manufacturing and QC activities: 
a) Ablator Inspection 
b) Ablator Removal 
c )  Ablator Refurbishment and Finishing 
It can be stated at this time that, f rom the standpoipt of manufacturing, Class A, 
B, and C refurbishments of the Apollo heat shield appear feasible. 
ear l ier ,  Class  C refurbishment is essentially no  different than a Class  3 repa i r  
which is currently performed regularly on Block I1 hardware. 
no manufactv:ing process  hat been identified j - ~  any of these refurbishments 
which requires  skil ls  o r  equipment not already developed and in  use at Avco/SSD 
on the Block 11 Apollo program. 
A s  noted 
Furthermore,  
Class  C refurbishment will require no development o r  expansion of QC skil ls  o r  
equipment. 
limited expansion of QC technology. A s  noted in  Sections 2. 1 and 2. 3, develop- 
ment and verification of NDT and QC production techniques and tools for  deter-  
mining residual char  and sal t  water content will be required. 
o r  equipment have been identified which are not already in use on the Block I1 
program. 
Class  A and Class  B refurbishments, however, will require  some 
No other QC skills 
2 .  6. 1 Ablator Inspection 
A key activity in the refurbishment of the Block I1 heat shield ablator will be 
the determination of the degraded state of the recovered heat shield. This in- 
formation is required, in general, for each ablator a r e a  and heat shield com- 
ponent before the c lass  of refurbishment for  that a r e a  o r  component can be 
selected-. Included in  these inspection data ore  the following: 
a) damage assessment:  data on local cracking, ablator delamination, and 
edgemember delamination 
b) char  depth: depth of non-reusa0.c sblator 
c )  major  dimensional data: data ic - manufacturing process  and 
machining tape generations 
d) water content: data on ablator water content for determination of drying 
r e  quire min t s  
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In addition to  these specific inspection data, standard Block XI process  and 
iabrication QC data will be required. 
An important question should be raised here  as to the order  i n  which the above 
inspection data should be obtained. Specifically, should char  depth damage and 
water content data be obtained and the local c lass  of refurbishment selected 
pr ior  to vehicle machining o r  should machining to final contour be accomplished 
f i r s t ?  (In ei ther  case  major  dimensional data are the first o rde r  of business. ) 
At this stage in  the investigation i t  appears  that it would be more efficient and 
economical to use  the la t ter  approach. With the ablator machined to final con- 
tour fo r  the reuse mission more reliable NDT and QC data can be obtained on 
damage, char  remaining, and the water content of reusable ablator. In addition, 
it appears  that these data could be obtained with a minimum of complexity and 
cost. 
could then be made. 
It appears  that a more reliable selection of the c lass  of refurbishment 
Any approach to refurbishment is expected to require the drilling of thickness 
inspection holes in  the ablator, a standard procedure currently employed in  
the Block I1 manufacturing process .  These holes would be located and drilled 
following receiving inspection to obtain major  dimensional data for  machining 
and to  obtain subsequent manufacturing and QC data. 
2 . 6 . 2  Ablator Removal 
A s  noted ear l ie r ,  no manufacturing process  has been identifie$. including the 
removal of char red  o r  degraded ablatcr fo r  Class  B refurbishments which r e -  
quires skil ls  o r  equipment not already developed and in use on the Block 11 
Apollo program. 
would be utilized in  char red  ablator removal. 
char red  ablator is removed to the final ablator thickness for reuse,  machi.ling 
techniques a r e  expected to be identical with cur ren t  Apollo machining procedures.  
Similarly, existing .4pollo techniq?ies and equipment will be used for  final con- 
touring and finishing of Class  C rehrb ishments .  
The same tape-controlled machining techniques and equipment 
For  the approach wherein the 
Class  A refurbishment is essentially a rejuvenation of ablator surfaces  which 
have undergone relatively light o r  incomplete charring. 
require removal of thin surface layers  of degraded mater ia ls  such as paint, 
i t  is anticipated that careful hand finishing techniques (currently used exten- 
sively on Block I1 Apollo) wi l l  be utilized. 
Should Class  A areas 
2.  6 .  3 Ablator Refurbishment and Finishing 
In Class  A and Class  B refurbishments of main ablator only two manufacturing 
refurbishment o r  rejunevation processes  are anticipated following removal of 
surface degradation. 
application of the white epoxy paint. 
accordance with existing Apollo specifications. 
These are application of the epoxy pore sea le r  and 
Both of these would be car r ied  out in  
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A s  noted ear l ie r ,  for Class  C refurbishments, i. e . ,  total replacement of local 
ablator with new ablator, Apollo Class 3 repair  procediires would be followed. 
In this process  the used o r  defective ablztor material  i s  completely removed 
down to the ablator-HT 424 adhesive interface. 
itccomplished rapidly with special hand operated tools designed to prevent 
penetration of the HT 424 and damage to the substructure.  
adjacent, reusable ablator is maintained square o r  vertical to the local sub- 
structure. 
specifications, A new layer  of HT 424 tape adhesive is applied and the open 
ablator honeycomb bonded and cured, A gap splice is maintained arotlnd the 
periphery of the repair  o r  refurbishment. The open honeycomb is then primed 
and the ablative mater ia l  gunned into the cells in accordanc- with standard 
Apollo specifications, The repaired o r  refurbished a rea  is then cureci a t  200 - 
210°F and the surface finished to contour in accordance with local requirements. 
La rge r  a reas  a r e  generally tape machined and small  a r eas  a r e  generally hand- 
finished. 
painted in accordance with Apollo process  specifications. 
This removal is generally 
The interface with 
The base HT 424 primer is then applied in  accordance with Apollo 
The resulting repair  o r  refurbished ablator is then pore sealed and 
Edgemember refurbishment can be car r ied  out without total replacement of the 
edgemember, i. e . ,  if damage of the edgemember i s  nominal. Post-flight 
examination of AFM 0 11 edgemembers indicated excellent performance without 
evidence of exaggerated charring o r  of detectable delamination. For  Class A 
and B rt iurbishments,  no processing of edgemembers is anticipated except a 
reduction in  local height to match ablator thickness requirements.  
delaminations o r  damage may be repaired by res in  impregnation and/or  doubling, 
depending on damage assessment,with no effect upon performance. 
o r  refurbishments have been used and flight tested on AFM 009 and AFM 0 11. 
Local 
Such repairs  
, 
Gasket refurbishment can also be car r ied  out without total replacement of the 
the gasket if i t  has suffered no substantial deL:adation o r  damage f rom flight. 
Examination of AFM 0 11 has a lso indicated excellent performance for the 
RTV-560 gaskets. 
mental gaskets showed no differential recession. 
A F M  C: 11 i t  appears for Class B refurbishment that many crew compartment 
gaskets would require no refurbishment save a reduction in height to reuse 
dimension. Class C refurbishment of surrounding ablator would, of ccurse,  
require Class C refurbishment of the gasket. 
gasket refurbishment will be required in a r e a s  of Class  A ablator refurbishment. 
This will be entirely dependent on local gasket performaxce, on the relative 
depth of swelling, and an handling care .  
With one exception all crew compartment and intercompart-  
Based upon the results of 
It is not known whether Class  C 
Table L-4 summarizes  the types of refurbishment currently anticipated for 
some of the major heat shield a r e a s  and components. 
a r e  presented since the decision between A, B, o r  C refurbishment of local 
ablator and components is a strong function of local char  thickness and individual 
vehicle perforniarce with the performance a t  lunar velocities st i l l  unknown. 
Alternate combinations 
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TABLE 2-4 
ANTICIPATED REFURBISHMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR APOUO HEAT SHIELD AREAS OR COMPONENTS 
Hmat Shield A r e a  or Component 
Aft Compar tmen t  
Shea r  and compreaa ion  pada 
RCS ox id i r e r  and fuel d u m p i  
C-Band antenna (101 and I O 2  only) 
S-Band a n t e m  
59 bolt plug area. 
C r e w  Compar tmen t  
A i r  vent. 
S t eam vent 
Boost cove r  e ject ion mechan i sm 
C r e w  hatch acceaa l a t ch  
Roll. p i t rh .  and yaw engine panela 
Urine dump 
Side and rendezvous uindow instr l la t ionu 
C-Band antenna (101 and 102 only) 
F o r w a r d  Compar tmen t  
C(her 
Forward  c r e w  hatch 
Hatch or Inspect ion Pane l  acceus  f r s m e a  
In t e rcompar tmen t  i n t e r f aces  and gaakets 
A Claa8 A :total r e u s e )  
B C h a r  B (reduce thickness and r c u r r )  
C Claaa C (tutally r ep lace  wi*h new) 
‘,bNAAIS&ID fu rn i shed  
- 
C l a s s  of Rafurbir -. 
Main Ablator 
B 
L 
B 
C 
B 
C 
B 
C 
C 
A 
B 
C 
A 
B 
C 
A 
B 
C 
A 
B 
C 
B 
C 
B 
C 
A 
B 
C 
A 
B 
C 
C 
A 
B 
A 
B 
C 
A 
B 
C 
E d i o m e m b e r a  
B 
C 
B 
C 
B 
B 
C 
Remova l  
- -  
A 
B 
C 
A 
B 
C 
A 
B 
C 
A 
B 
C 
B 
C 
B 
C 
A 
B 
P 
A 
B 
Removal  
C 
A 
B 
A 
B 
C 
A 
B 
C 
Caaketa  -
C 
C 
8. C 
C 
C 
Remova 
B. C 
C 
- -  
A. C 
B. C 
C 
A. C 
B. C 
C 
A, C 
B. C 
C 
A. C 
8. C 
C 
C 
C 
8. C 
C 
A. C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
Removal 
C 
A. C 
8. C 
A. C 
B. C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
rent 
X h e r  
Pada - C 
Pada - C 
*plugs - c 
*plug. - i 
*antern. - removal .  plug - C 
*antenna - r emova l  
Sleevea - C. 
plugs - c 
F r a m e s  - A ,  *R..tainera - A 
:‘rrrnc.s - C. *Reurnerr - C 
Fra-25 - C .  “Retainera  - C 
*’Antenna - r emova l .  “‘plug - C 
“AnLsrna - r emova l .  *plug - C 
OAntenna - removal 
(hew compar tmen t )  
*hau la t ion  - C 
Insulation - C 
Sleeve. - A. p!.ipu - C 
S l e r \ e u  - €3. C .  plug. - C 
Sleeve. - C. plug. - C 
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The following additional notations should be made with respect to a reas  and 
components listed on Table 2-4. 
2 .6 .4  Aft Compartment: Shear and Compression Pads (Figures 2-5 and 2-6) 
Particular difficulty is anticipated in rem0vir.g shear and compression pads, 
since these cclmponents a r e  of relatively high density and are bonded to the 
substructure. Removal by grinding appears required. This difficulty is com- 
pounded by the presence oi the interrupted steel  retaining ring a t  the base of 
each pad. 
delicate removal with tools which can potentially damage the substructure. 
is highly probable that the removal of these pads will necessitate damage to 
adjacent edgemembers ar d adjacent ablator, thereby requiring a Class C 
refurbishment of these elements. 
wi. 1 damage the Marinite installation in the substructure, thereby requiring a 
Class C refurbishment of the Marinite. 
This ring is bonded to the substructure and will require extremely 
It 
It is also possible that shear pad removal 
2.6.5 C-Band Antenna Installations 
Removal of these antennas from A F M  I01 aft compartment is anticipated. 
an alteration of local substructure class C refurbishment of the local ablator 
would remove edgemembers and gaskets. 
retain o r  remove edgemembers. depending on NAA/S&ID modifications, in 
which case the antenna would be replaced with p l u g  or new ablator. 
2 .6 .6  Window and Panel Access Frame Boit Plue Installations 
With 
Class A and B refurbishments could 
Refurbishment of local bolt plug installations, sleeves and adjacect ablator. is 
a strong function of the difficulty experienced in removing each bolt plug. i f  
bolt plugs can be removed without damage to the sleeves, then Class A and B 
refurbishments of the sleeves is feasible. Should sleeves be damaged in dis- 
assembly, repair techniques a r e  available and proven for replacing the sleeves, 
including suhstitution of cast  sleeves o r  a Class C refurbishment. 
refurbishment of bolt plug sleeves would entail Class C refurbishment of adja- 
cent ablator in panel frames and complete replacement of window frames. 
Damage to panel frame edgemembers during removal will generally require 
complete replacement with a new panel frame. 
Class C 
2 . 7  IMPACT OF AFM 017 AND A F M  020 FLIGHT TEST DATA 
The evaluation of Apallo heat shield refurbishment requirements summarized 
in this report is based upon an understanding and projection of heat shield per- 
formance derived from A F M  009 and A F M  011 post-flight evaluations. 
impact of post-flight evaluation of A F M  017 and A F M  020 on Class A and 
Class B refurbishment is currently unknown. 
heating on these flights wil! result i n  heat shield response approximating that 
The 
It is expected that the great?r  
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of entry from lunar return. 
to assessing feasibility of refurbishability will be the generation of operational 
char thicknesses, local recession and aggravation, and the acquisition of thermal 
performance data (temperatures, flux rates,  etc. ). Theje data and observations 
will permit the selection of local c lasses  of refurbishment with much greater  
certainty. 
be sufficiently clarified to permit preparation of detailed refurbishment plans 
and to permit generation of realistic cost estimates. 
The major contribution of AFM 017 and AFM 020 
The certainty of use of Class A and Class B refurbishments should 
Class C refurbishment is currently considered feasible; AFM Or? and A F M  020 
data a r e  not expected to have any impact on the feasibility of Class C refurbish- 
ment. 
The acquisition of the following post-flight test data f rom AFM's  017 and 020 is 
expected to significantly enhance the assessment of feasibility of Class A and B 
refurbishments. 
2.7. 1 Densitv-TemDerature Gradients 
Post-flight core  samples should be taken from typical regions of the vehicle in 
the near vicinity of temperature sensors  f rom which good flight tes t  d a b h a v e  
been recovered. 
NDT char depth data. 
will aid significantly in  assessing the feasibility of char depth measurement, 
refurbishment c lass  selection. and reused ablator thermal history and per- 
formance. 
These core samples should be used to obtain char  density and 
These data, in  combination with the temperature data, 
2 . 7 . 2  W a t e r  Content Measurements 
Post-flight cores  should be taken from selected regions for direct  quantitative 
measurement of salt water retained from recovery of actual flight vehicles and 
for calibration of potential NDT techniques and tes ts  for measurement of water 
content. 
2 .  7. 3 Char-depth Distribution 
Post-flight cores  should be taken from as many vehicle locations as practical 
(including the aforementioned cores  and anticipated local problem areas)  in 
order  to obtain char-virgin thickness distributions of sufficient detail to permit 
reliable definition of potential Class A and Class B refurtishment areas .  
analyses should be complemented with exhaustive post-flight examination of 
degradation of local components such as bolt plugs, bolt plug sleeves, edge- 
members, frames, gaskets, pads, etc. 
These 
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3. o CONCEPTUAL-REFURBISHMENT PLAN 
Although it i s  not possible at this time to prepare a true, definitive plan for the 
refurbishment of Block 11 heat shields for earth orbit reuse. the presentation of 
a conceptual refurbishment plan helps to identify the underlying logic of refur- 
bishment by identifying expected major tasks and their interrelations. The con- 
ceptuai reiurbishrnent plan outlined here does not include those engineering, 
development, and test tasks which are associated with demonstrating feasibility. 
It is assumed that such tasks demonstrating feasibility have been executed prior 
to implementation of any refurbishment plan. 
This conceptual refurbishment plan is based on the following assumptions. guide- 
lines, and constraints. In a number of cases individual guidelines a re  best 
assumptions based upon available information; the validity of the resulting plan 
is largely dependent on the validity of these assumptions. 
a) 
for reuse on low earth orbit missions of 14 days duration. 
Al l  heat shield panels and components for all vehicles will be refurbished 
b) 
Block II Apollo criteria. 
Design criteria for refurbished heat shields will be identicabwith 
c) 
partment disassembly and removal of N M  furnished components. NAA/ 
S&ID will also perform all substructure cleaning and repair prior to ship- 
ment to Avco/SSD. 
N M / S & I D  will perform major vehicle disassembly, including com- 
d) 
ponents for which it has Bloc2 II responsibility, including, 
Avco/SSD will perform refurbishment of all  heat shield panels and com- 
1) removal of all degraded or non-reusable ablator and components 
2) Class A, B, or C refurbishment and finishing. 
e) 
lunar missions will be refurbished: 
Heat shields of five Block 11 vehicles recovered from earth orbital and 
1) AFM 101: Earth orbital 
2 )  A F M  103: Lunar 
3) AFM 105: Earth orbital 
A-59 
SID 66- 1853-3 
NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC. BPACE rad INPORMA'I'ION S y B T g M S  DlVIBION 
4) AFM 107: Lunar 
5) AFM 108: Lunar 
f )  
cerres, specifications, and tooling. 
Maximum utilization will be made of Block II Apollo, materials, pro- 
g) 
second launch is required. 
heat shields a minimum of 5 months prior to launch. 
A minirnum turnaround time of one year from Block II recovery to 
NAA/SUdD will require delivery of refurbished 
h) Class A and Class B refurbishments will, in practice, be proven feasible 
for earth orbital and lunar heat shields and for aft and crew compartment 
areas and components. In particular, acceptable performance and/or revised 
design criteria for ablator reuse will be demonstrated. 
3.1 BASELINE REFURBISHMENT 
Because of the complexity and interdependence of such factors a s  Block 11 entry 
trajectory, local ablator and componerrrt performance, water impact and recovery 
environment, char depth definition, cost, and schedules, all of the potential com- 
binations of approaches cannot be presented in this plan. Instead, a single, con- 
ceptual, baseline approach to refurbishment is proposed which separately provides 
for the refurbishment of Block II earth orbital and lunar vehicles. 
refurbishment is discussed in addition to the baseline for comparison purposes. 
Total Class C 
Table 3-1 and 3-2 summarize the baseline refurbishments conceived for 
earth orbital and lunar heat shields, respectively. The earth orbital baseline 
anticipates Class B refurbishment of aft compartment and crew compartment 
main ablator. Some local class C refurbishment of the roll engine panel ablator 
and edge members is also anticipated. 
hatch ablator is also anticipated under the assumption that there a re  no interface 
effects. 
replacement of NAA window panel gaskets expected. In general, class C re- 
furbishment of almost all gaskets is anticipated. Some access panel frames may 
not require new gasketing; but, in general, reduction of ablator thickness in 
Class  B refurbishment for the reuse mission is expected to alter local panel dis- 
tortions sufficiently to make regasketing preferable. It is also expected that 
certain bolt plug sleeves will require refurbishment because of damage on removal 
Class A refurbishment of forward crew 
Class A refurbishment of window installations is also anticipated with 
of plugs. 
The lunar baseline described in Table 3-2 anticipates Class C refurbishment of 
the enti.Fe aft compartment. 
main ablator is  expected with the exception of certain local areas. 
refurbishment of the window installations is anticipated in order to avoid rsdesign 
(see 2.4). 
Class B refurbishment of the crew compartment 
Class C 
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Figures 3-1 and 3-2 give typical examples of baseline refurbishment of earth 
orbital and lunar hardware. It must be understood that the refurbishments 
described in Figures 3-1 and 3-2 a r e  typical examples only and that individual 
vehicle problems can be expected to induce minor changes to processing logic 
and detail, These baseline refurbishments are founded on the concept of iden- 
tification of char depth and selection of f inal  local refurbishment class after 
machining the ablator to reuse thickness. This approach is currently considered 
less costly and time consuming than that of determining char depth and refurbish- 
ment approach prior to machining. 
Since the baseline refurbishment assumed here anticipates Class  B refurbish- 
ment of both earth orbital and lunar crew compartments, the baseline approach 
given in Figure 3-1 can be considered typical of the refurbishment of both types 
of vehicles. 
As  shown in Figure 3-1, window panels and panel frames will be removed from 
the crew compartment for refurbishment in parallel and wil l  be subsequently 
reinstalled and gasketed. 
practice. 
gunning and curing of new ablator. 
current 200-210°F cure and a second cure, either the current post-cure o r  a new 
cure (to be determined by engineering study) designed to meet ablator shrinkage 
restraints. Note also that drying of the ablator following machining is assumed 
to be required. 
This procedure is in accordance with current Block 11 
Local Class C refurbishment will entail rnutgg out old ablator and 
The cure cycles to  be utilized will be the 
Figure 3-2 describes the baseline refurbishment of earth orbital recovered aft 
compartments. 
orbital recovered aft compartments, no Class C refurbishment processes a r e  
considered except the preparation of new shear and compression pads. 
return alt compartments the process of ablator and pad removal and inspection 
must be added to the current Block II sequence. 
supplied as new hardware for each reuse, will be fabricated with reduced thick- 
nesses in accordance with current Block LI sequences. 
Since Class B refurbishment is assiuned feasible for earth 
For lunar 
All forward compartments, 
3.2 BASELINE REFURBISHMENT PROGRAM TASKS 
The execution of a development/operations phase program to refurbish the afore- 
mentioned five Block I1 vehicles in accordance with the baseline approach will require 
the performance of specific engineering, test, and manufacturing tasks. 
Table 3-3 gives a preliminary description of the major tasks required to execute 
baseline refurbishment of these vehicles. 
conform to the NAA/Apo!.lo task structure: 
These tasks have been presented to 
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Task No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
a 
9 
Task Area 
Integration & Systems Analysis 
Reliability & Quality Assurance 
In st rumenta ti on 
Training and Simulations 
System Test Operations 
Launch Operation & Field Support 
Documentation 
Program Management 
Design and Development 
10 Preproduction & Rearrangement 
11 C/M GSE 
12 S/M GSE 
13 Fabrication and Assembly 
14 Fabrication and Assembly, Spares 
Table 3-3  also gives an estimate of the relative level of effort associated with 
baseline refurbishment and total Class C refurbishment of all  five vehicles. 
general, reliability, QA, documentation, management, engineering, and test 
tasks all require significantly greater levels of effort for the baseline refurbish- 
ment (due to the use of Class A and B refurbishments) than for an  approach 
restricted to total Class C refurbishment. 
a r e  estimated, however, to be greater for the total Class  C approach. 
In 
Fabrication, assembly, and QC efforts 
3 . 3  SCHEDULE CONSIDERATIONS 
The basic schedule corrstraint for refurbishment of the command module heat 
shield is  the requirement for delivery of the refurbished heat shield a minimum 
of five months prior to second launch, 
7 months or 27 weeks for AvcoISSD refurbishment. 
parieon of th i s  constraint with preliminary estimates of baseline refurbishment 
This will permit a maximum period of 
Figure 3 - 3  gives a coxq- 
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time spans. 
line refurbishment should be possible to accomplish within the 27 week con- 
straint. 
refurbishment of the aft compartment. 
for a total class C refurbishment of the crew compartment.) 
As shown in Figure 3-3, preliminary estimates indicate that base- 
The longest time span appears to be :.ssociated with a total Class C 
(A similar time span would be required 
It is very important to caution that the time sllans presented in Figure 3-3 a re  
preliminary estimates, typical only of the assumed baseline refurbishments. 
These estimates a re  subject to the validity of underlyinp, assumptions specified 
in Section 3.0 and subject to individual vehicle variations. 
A and B refurbishments has not been demonstrated. 
The validity of Class 
A further ccnstraixit f 4 baseline refurbishments is the requirement to mate 
the crew and forward comflrtments for fairing interfaces and for casting the 
intercompartmental gasket. For baseline refurbishment, the maximum advan- 
tage under this constraint would be obtained by early receipt of the forsrard 
compartmeat substructure. Such an approach could significantly advance the 
delivery of the earth orbital crew compartment which would otherwise require 
a hold. 
the aft compartment. Baseline Class C refurbishment of the aft compartment 
is expected to require 3-4 weeks greater time than a new Block 11 because of the 
requirement to inspect and remove used ablator prior to a standard Block II 
fabrication. Should the lunar crew compartment also require a total Class C 
refurbishment, the time span for its reftirbishment would be es;entially the same 
as that for the lunar aft compartment. 
Subsystem delivery of refurbished lunar heat shields is constrained by 
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Baseline Cost 
(Percent of Total Class C) Task 
4.0 COST CONSIDERATIONS 
Almost all the factors presented in this report as affecting the feasibility or  
execution of refurbishment also directly affect the cost of refurbishment. In 
particular, the assumptions that have been required to generate the baseline 
plan described in Section 3.0 are so numerous and so fundamental that the validity 
of any cost estimated for the baseline plan is wholly dependent upon the  validity 
of these assumptions. In addition, other factors such as the actual state of 
individual recovered vehicles, the amount of actual engineering, development, 
and test required to demonstrate and verify reuse designs, and the potential of 
undiscovered problems will have significant effects on baseline unit cost. 
Because of the tenuousness of these assumptions and because of the lack of 
adequate definition of these other factors, no firm unit cost data are available 
at this time. 
In an  attempt to obtain some feeling for cost considerations associated with 
refurbishment, preliminary, crude cost comparisons were generated in this 
study. 
the basis for this comparison. 
the levels of effort required to execute two refurbishment programs. 
The baseline refurbishment program outlined in  Table 3-3 w a s  used as 
Table 3-3 presents a qualitative comparison at 
As a result of a preliminary, budgetary analysis of these two programs, the 
czude estimates in Table 4-1 were obtained for the relative costs of these two 
programs. 
TABLE 41 
PRELIMINARY COMPARISON OF RELATIVE COSTS OF REFURBISHMENT APPROACHES 
2 . 0  Reliability & Quality Assurance 
6.0 Launch Operations & Off-Site 
7.0 Documentation 
8.0 Program Management 
9.0 Design and Development 
13.0 Fabrication and Assembly 
Support 
120 
100 
130 
110 
80 
170 
Total Program 190 1 
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It is important to point out that the uncertainty in the estimates in Table 4-1 
i s  at least t25%.  
baseline refurbishment of the five vehicles considered in this study might yield 
a 10% saving over total class C refurbishment. For a larger number of vehicles 
the saving might approach 20%. In view of the uncertainty in these estimates, 
the difference of 10% between baseline and total class C refurbishment is 
insignificant. 
available it can only be concluded that the cost savings of baseline refurbish- 
ment m a y  be insignificant. 
On the basis of these preliminary estimates it appears that 
Until a better definition of fundamental cost factors becomes 
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5.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In Summary, this preliminary study has indicated the following: 
1) Class C refurbishment, complete replacement of used ablator with 
new ablator, appears technically feasible 
2 )  The feasibility of Class A and Class B refurbishments has not been 
demonstr; ..ed 
3) Demonstration of the fzasibility of Class A and Class B refurbishments 
requires the follo-iving: 
a) Detailed analyses of post-flight data on C / M  009, 011, 017, and 
020 to obtain a realistic appraisal of char depth distribution and 
of local anomalies 
b) Demonstration of a reliable production technique for determining 
char depth or  the existence of residual char on machined ablator 
surfaces 
c) Definition of a performance-acceptable degree of degradation in  
reused ablator 
d) Assessment of the effect of prior entry exposure on the thermo- 
structural and aerothermody-namic performance of used ablator 
e) Demonstration of a reliable production technique for measuring 
the amount of salt water retained in ablator materials destined 
for reuse 
f )  Assessment of the effects of residual salt water, retained salt, 
and drying processes on ablator thermostructural and aerothermo- 
dynamic performance 
g) Demonstration of the ability to detect bond delamination in reused 
ablator which has undergone water impact or  other structural or 
thermostructural loading 
4) No design factors have been identified which constraii, the feasibility 
of Class A, B, or C refurbishments 
5) No manufacturing process has been identified in C L s s  A, B, o r  C 
refurbishment which requires manufacturing skz~l. or quipment jo t  
already developed and on use at Avco/SSD on the bkc1.r I1 Apollo program 
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6 )  The acquisition of the following post-flight test data from AFM 017 
and 020 i s  expected to  significantly enhance the assessment at feasibility 
of Class A and B refurbishments: 
a) Density-temperature gradients 
b) Water content measurements 
c )  Char depth distribution 
7) The concept of identification of char depth and selection of f ina l  local 
refurbishment class after machining ablator to reuse thickness is 
proposed. 
than that of determining,char depth and approach prior to machining 
Baseline refurbishment shodd be possible in significantly less time 
than the 27-week constraint. 
early forward compartment deIivery may be possible in less than 
15 weeks. 
than current Biock II because of the requirement for total Class  C 
refurbishment of the aft coppartment 
This approach is considered less costly and time consuming 
- .  
8 )  
Earth orbital baseline refurbishment with 
Lunar baseline refurbishment may require greater time 
9 )  Preliminary cost estimates indicate that baseline refurbishment of the 
five subject vehicles m a y  yield a 10% saving over total Class C refurbish- 
ment. In view of the uncertainty in these estimates, it can only be 
concluded at  this time, without further study, that the cost saving is  
insignificant 
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